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Abstract
When systems and subsystems are put under external shocks and duress, they suffer
physical and economic collapse. The ability of the system components to recover
and operate at new stable production levels characterizes resilience. This research
addresses the problem of estimating, quantifying and planning for resilience in inter-
dependent systems, where interconnectedness adds to problem complexity. Interde-
pendence drives the behavior of sectors before and after disruptions. Among other
approaches this study concentrates on economic interdependence because it provides
insights into other levels of interdependence. For sectors the normalized losses in
economic outputs and demands are suitable metrics for measuring interdependent
risk. As such the inoperability input-output model enterprise is employed and ex-
panded in this study to provide a useful tool for measuring the cascading effects of
disruptions across large-scale interdependent infrastructure systems. This research
defines economic resilience for interdependent infrastructures as an “ability exhibited
by such systems that allows them to recover productivity after a disruptive event in
a desired time and/or with an acceptable cost”. Through the dynamic interdepen-
dent risk model resilience for a disrupted infrastructure is quantified in terms of its
average system functionality, maximum loss in functionality and the time to recovery,
which make up a resilience estimation decision-space. Estimating such a decision-
space through the dynamic model depends upon the estimation of the rate parameter
in the model. This research proposes a new approach, based on dynamic data assim-
ilation methods, for estimating the rate parameter and strengthening post-disaster
resilience of economic systems. The solution to the data assimilation problem gener-
ates estimates for the rate of resilient recovery that reflects planning considerations
xii
interpreted as commodity substitutions, inventory management and incorporating re-
dundancies. The research also presents a robust optimization based risk management
approach for strengthening interdependent static resilience estimation. There is a
paucity of research dealing with quantification and assessment of uncertainties in in-
terdependency models. The focus here is more on the extreme bounds of event and
data uncertainties. The deterministic optimization becomes a robust optimization
problem when extremes of uncertainties are considered. Computationally tractable
robust counterparts to nominal problems are presented here. Also presented in this
research is a discrete event simulation based queuing model for studying multi-modal
transportation systems with particular focus on inland waterway ports. Such models
are used for impact analysis studies of inland port disruptions. They can be integrated
with the resilience planning methodologies to develop a framework for large-scale in-
terdependent risk and recovery analysis.
xiii
Chapter 1
Introduction and Motivation
1.1 Overview
Many large-scale systems and critical industries such as transportation, telecommu-
nications, power, and banking share significant resources, and the flow of goods and
information constantly takes place among these different industry sectors. Realizing
the interdependent nature of US infrastructure and industry sectors, the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) stresses the urgency and need to protect infrastructures
(DHS., 2009):
Attacks on Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR) could signifi-
cantly disrupt the functioning of government and business alike and produce
cascading effects far beyond the targeted sector and physical location of the
incident. Direct terrorist attacks and natural, manmade, or technological haz-
ards could produce catastrophic losses in terms of human casualties, property
destruction, and economic effects, as well as profound damage to public morale
and confidence.
Hence, increased connectivity of today’s infrastructure systems (Pederson et al., 2006)
has meant that direct impacts of disruptions lead to cascading indirect impacts called
multiplier effects (Santos, 2006). For the economic health and security of a region,
‘lifeline’ infrastructures like transportation systems, emergency services and informa-
tion and communications technology (ICT) need to be at full or almost full function-
ality during disruptive times.
With focus on security and global threats the approach towards infrastructure
protection has lead to changes in viewpoints on the importance of infrastructures for a
1
functioning society. The definition of ‘infrastructures’ has been evolving over the years
due to changing threat perceptions. For considerable time US public policy makers
considered infrastructures as economic facilities with “the common characteristics of
capital intensiveness and high public investment at all levels of government” (CBO.,
1983). The Clinton Executive Order (Clinton, 1996) redefined infrastructures in a
security context as:
The framework of interdependent networks and systems comprising identifiable
industries, institutions (including people and procedures), and distribution
capabilities that provide a reliable flow of products and services essential to
the defense and economic security of the United States, the smooth functioning
of government at all levels, and society as a whole.
Making ‘protection’ the central theme of national infrastructure security the Critical
Infrastructure Protection (CIP) was a Presidential Directive (Clinton, 1998) that
reflected the prevailing mandate at the time.
In recent years some extreme impacts of local and global significance have altered
the thought process incorporated in the CIP approach. The September 11, 2001 ter-
rorist attack on the World Trade Center (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003) highlighted
the fact that protection and prevention against man-made disruptions is not always
possible. Moreover monitoring and safeguarding against global human threats arising
from different sources likes pandemics (H1N1, H5N1) and bio-chemical weapons is al-
most impossible. Also extreme weather events like hurricanes Katrina and Ike (Blake
et al., 2007) have shown that some events are just too big and extreme to protect
against. As such there has been an increased understanding that it is not possible
to protect every potential target against every conceivable attack and eliminate all
vulnerabilities (CITK., 2006).
While little can be done to prevent the occurrences of all extreme events, pre-
ventive measures help in lessening the impact of resulting disruptions. Interest lies
in predicting the adverse impacts of disruptive events in an interdependent economy
2
and evaluating risk management efforts to lessen these impacts. Since infrastruc-
ture interconnectedness leads to improved efficiency during normal operations there
is interest in preserving interdependence during disruptions because it can be utilized
for speedy recoveries. Due to the practicality of such an approach there has been a
paradigm shift in infrastructure security, where the emphasis on ‘preparedness and
response’ has been added to the ‘protection and prevention’ approach.
The Critical Infrastructure Resilience (CIR) (CITK., 2006) highlights the new take
in policy making by introducing resilience as the overarching objective for safeguard-
ing against risk. In its broadest definition and scope, as specified by the Infrastructure
Security Partnership (TISP) (2011), a resilient sector would “prepare for, prevent,
protect against, respond or mitigate any anticipated or unexpected significant threat
or event”, and “rapidly recover and reconstitute critical assets, operations, and ser-
vices with minimum damage and disruption”. Resilience has been incorporated into
the security lexicon and the DHS National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP)
stresses the importance of building a resilient society (DHS., 2009):
Build a safer, more secure, and more resilient America by preventing, de-
terring, neutralizing, or mitigating the effects of deliberate efforts by terror-
ists to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit elements of our Nation’s CIKR, and
to strengthen national preparedness, timely response, and rapid recovery of
CIKR in the event of an attack, natural disaster, or other emergency.
To help realize the goal of improving interdependent infrastructure resilience to dis-
ruptions a concentrated research effort is required to understand the very nature of
the problem at hand. Some relevant questions that need to be answered are: (i) What
factors characterize interdependent infrastructure behaviors? (ii) How do we quantify
interdependence and measure the system performances in terms of such interdepen-
dence? (iii) How is the interdependent performance eroded due to disruptive events
and how can this erosion be quantified? (iv) Are there indicators in the interdepen-
dent sectors behaviors that exhibit properties of resilience and recovery? (v) How do
3
we quantify the resilience through the properties that are inherent in the system and
then enhance such resilience by strengthening such properties? (vi) What quantifi-
able planning strategies can be constructed to improve resilience and what aspects
of the system do these strategies concentrate on? and (vii) Can an overall resilience
estimation and planning framework be formalized and implemented practically?
1.2 Defining resilience and its domains
With current emphasis on resilience estimation and system preparedness, develop-
ing a quantifiable resilience estimation methodology presents an interesting research
challenge. To this end, the research presented here aims to construct a resilience
framework for interdependent infrastructure systems. The questions posed above
have been answered in detail in the subsequent development of this work, to come
up with a framework that is capable of quantifying system resilience to impacts on
interdependent infrastructures that are of homeland security and national interest.
The primary research interest lies in analyzing large-scale infrastructure systems,
like industry sectors, that are of socio-economic importance. For such systems, in-
terdependence exists across many layers and over time increases, leading to physical,
cyber, geographical, and logical interdependencies across sectors (Rinaldi et al., 2001).
A broad analysis of interdependence would entail capturing all structural details ex-
plaining interactive system behaviors. But such analysis becomes system specific and
is too complex to solve beyond a certain point. The problem is simplified if we con-
centrate on one aspect of interdependence that is good enough to explain most of
interactive system behaviors.
Economic interactions among sectors provide suitable measures around which in-
terdependence can be estimated and expanded to a generalized framework. The level
of economic interdependence between infrastructure systems can be used as an in-
4
dicator of other levels of interdependence to some degree. For large-scale industry
sectors economic consequences of impacts are major drivers during recovery planning
and decision-making. Understanding interdependent impacts in terms of business
economic interruptions has been considered to be a useful tool for analyzing the
capabilities of such systems to withstand disruptions (Tierney, 1997; Rose & Liao,
2005). Measures that quantify losses due to economic interruptions provide suitable
metrics around which resilience can be expressed and planning can be considered.
With emphasis on economic aspects of interdependent behavior, this research
concentrates on developing a quantifiable economic resilience estimation framework.
Such a framework is applicable to studies of large-scale infrastructure recovery be-
haviors from extreme weather related events to man-made impacts. Before going into
further details the definition of economic resilience that has been proposed in this
study is presented here.
Economic resilience for interdependent infrastructures describes an ability ex-
hibited by such systems that allows them to recover productivity after a dis-
ruptive event in a desired time and/or with an acceptable cost, noting that
resilience is planned for in advance of a disruptive event through preparedness
policies and investments. Economic resilience planning leads systems towards
targeted stable levels of productivity which indicate their recovery from dis-
ruptions.
Some of the aspects of system resilience defined above come from the properties of
the infrastructure systems that are being analyzed. Large-scale infrastructures have
similar properties to macro-economic systems that are spread over vast geographic
and economic domains. As such most disruptive impacts can be absorbed by such
systems without complete loss of functionality because there are several mechanisms
in place to cope with the disruptive events. The recent Japanese earthquake and
tsunami (Fackler, 2011) caused unprecedented loss of life and economic productivity,
while an off-season snowstorm along the East-Coast of the US caused widespread
electricity blackouts leading to business disruptions (Allen, 2011). But in the end
5
economies have recovered from such adverse impacts. Therefore there exists an in-
herent resilience (Rose, 2004a) property that is present due to measures that are
already part of the system. There is a general understanding that in macro-economic
systems such resilience is realized through either the availability of resources (inven-
tories) that are in place or the market prices that drive resource allocations towards
necessary consumers and thus satisfy incomplete demands (Rose, 2007). The business
coping behavior or community response properties (Tierney, 1997) are thus contribu-
tors towards inherent resilience properties. For economic systems inherent or inbuilt
resilience can be quantified through the amount of economic losses they are able to
avoid immediately after a disruptive event.
Having established that there would be some capability inherently present in the
systems that allows for recovery, the research emphasis here is to improve on such ca-
pabilities. As highlighted through the definition above, improving resilience requires
a planning mechanism that leads towards better system performance. Hence this
research provides decision-making methods that help in resilience planning and esti-
mation for disruptive recovery of interdependent economic systems. Disruptions in
economic systems at the macro level result in losses of market supplies and demands
that materialize themselves as interdependent risks. Such risks are instrumental in
establishing the resilience planning objectives in two types of domains
1. Static resilience planning domain - In the framework presented here, when in-
terest lies in improving the long term recovery behavior of the infrastructures
after disruptions, then the resilience planning is said to be static resilience plan-
ning. Primarily the focus is to quantify the disruptive system response that is
time independent and only concerned with the long term capability of the sys-
tem to rearrange itself. The path taken towards recovery is irrelevant and the
only driving factor for system resilience is its capability to withstand the initial
disruptive impacts. In terms of estimating and quantifying such resilience, the
6
demand side risks of the macroeconomy provide suitable measures.
2. Dynamic resilience planning domain - When the short-term recovery behavior
of interdependent systems needs to be improved then the planning involves
understanding the path the system takes from the onset of disruption up until
any given time. Such behavior shows properties that can indicate dynamic
resilience planning. The quantification of the dynamic system responses helps
establish the dynamic resilience planning measures. Both demand and supply
side driven economic risks drive the dynamic interdependent system responses
and are fundamental in establishing the measures for such resilience planning.
In establishing an improved dynamic response leading to strengthened system re-
silience there is also scope for incorporating new measures that help the system with-
stand further impacts and update its response to future disruptions. As such, it can
be said that the planning introduces an adaptive resilience (Rose, 2004a) capability
into the system behavior. Adaptive response comes from extra effort and ingenuity
(Rose, 2007) that leads to system enhancement, and for interdependent economic
systems it can be realized through adaptive responses in organizational responses in
the public and private domains (Comfort, 1999).
1.3 Components of a resilience framework and research ap-
proaches
Having established a broad definition for economic resilience and the primary types
and domains of resilience of interest in this research, there is a need to establish a
resilience framework. An understanding needs to be developed about the primary
elements that motivate the formation of the framework in the first place. We look at
the research approaches that have been undertaken and highlight the motivation for
7
using our approach. Figure 1.1 shows the two principle elements of a resilience frame-
work that need to be understood in a quantitative fashion. The resilience framework
is built around these components, which are respectively (i) the interdependence of
infrastructures, and (ii) the nature of the response and recovery of each infrastructure.
1.3.1 Modeling interdependence
Due to underlying interdependence, many industry and infrastructure sectors face
direct and indirect risks due to disruptive events. The potentially wide-ranging indi-
rect losses due to the cascading effects of disruptions in such interconnected systems
(Rinaldi et al., 2001) are often greater than the direct impacts (Jiang & Haimes,
2004) of such disruptions. Hence, from a risk analysis perspective, an understanding
of the impacts of a man-made attack, accident, or natural disaster must account for
the interdependencies among industry and infrastructure sectors (Heal et al., 2006).
Studies on potential disruptions due to earthquakes and floods (Cavallo et al., 2010),
terrorist attacks (Gordon et al., 2007; Rose, 2009b), and power outages (Cavdaroglu
et al., 2010), among others (Noy, 2009), have focused on interdependence of systems.
The different research approaches suggested for studying infrastructure interde-
pendence include agent-based models (Bonabeau, 2002; Outkin et al., 2008), network
models (Zhang et al., 2005; Lee et al., 2009), survey and expert judgement based
models (Markowsky, 2009), among others (Pederson et al., 2006). Even though there
are several merits of such schemes their scope in analyzing large-scale infrastructures
is limited either by computational complexities and logistic elements (network mod-
els) or they have been designed for system specific interdependence estimations. As
such the most widely used class of models for interdependent infrastructure analy-
sis come from the Leontief based economic input-output family of models (Leontief,
1966). Explained in brief, the economic input-output models represent the equilib-
8
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(b) Infrastructure response to shock and economic recovery behavior
Figure 1.1: Establishing the two main elements of the resilience framework.
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rium balance in demand and supply for a system of many interconnected industries
and thus are natural indicators for interdependence. These models are supported
by vast data resources across the world (Atkinson et al., 1995; BEA., 2011). A few
interesting applications that have incorporated the economic input-output models in
large-scale interdependent system analysis include environmental life-cycle assessment
(Hendrickson et al., 1998), hurricane damage assessment (Hallegatte, 2007, 2008)
and earthquake impact analysis (Brookshire et al., 1997), terrorist attack impacts
on ports (Gordon et al., 2005), analysis of electricity lifeline disruptions (Rose et al.,
1997). Input-output model analysis has also been incorporated into broader modeling
frameworks such as transportation network analysis models for spatial and temporal
analysis of lifeline structures (Cho et al., 2001; Okuyama et al., 2004).
A risk-based extension to the economic input-output model is the inoperability
input-output model (IIM). Introduced by (Haimes & Jiang, 2001), in the IIM study
sector-wise economic risk is measured in terms of: (i) inoperability, or the fractional
loss of industry economic output relative to its pre-disruption as-planned output level,
and (ii) demand perturbation, or the fractional loss of sector final demand relative
to its pre-disaster as-planned output level. Extensions of the model to dynamic
(Lian & Haimes, 2006) and multi-regional (Crowther, 2007; Crowther & Haimes,
2010) analysis frameworks have been made. The static intra- and multi-regional IIMs
are in fact normalized notions of the economic input-output model and thus bear
structural resemblance to the economic input-output models. The rational behind
using these models is that they provide metrics which allow for a comparative scale
to measure the degrees of risk among interacting sectors. While economic sector
outputs and demands might vary across a wide range depending upon the volume of
commerce of sectors, the normalized IIM evaluates risk on the same scale allowing
for comparison of disruption impacts on sectors. It might be of decision-making
interest to evaluate economic impacts in terms of the fraction of damage instead of
10
the amount of damage so that the decision-making is not biased towards the bigger
economic systems. Though the dynamic IIMs are also built from normalizing the
dynamic economic input-output models their interpretation of the dynamic rate terms
are different. Insights into dynamic impact and recovery, which are not captured by
the dynamic economic input-output models, can be provided through the dynamic
risk models.
The IIM enterprise, including the dynamic and also multi-regional models, has
been applied in numerous risk modeling applications, including: malevolent attacks
(Andrijcic & Horowitz, 2006; Haimes et al., 2005b), supply chain disruptions (Wei
et al., 2010; Barker & Santos, 2010a), workforce availability (Barker & Santos, 2010b;
Orsi & Santos, 2010), transportation disruptions (Pant et al., 2011; MacKenzie et al.,
2012a), and resource sustainability (Santos et al., 2008).
1.3.2 Resilience estimation
The importance of resilience in infrastructures has already been stressed so now its
important to understand the meaning of resilience for different users. Different view-
points about resilience exist within the research community (Rose, 2007), but there
is consensus that resilience estimation is vital for risk decision-making (Klein et al.,
2003). The main difference of opinion in defining and understanding resilience arises
between the engineering approach that resilient recovery occurs by moving towards
the previous stable state (Bruneau et al., 2003), and the ecological approach that
resilience is developed to move towards a different system state (Handmer & Dovers,
1996). The original definition of resilience is attributed to Holling (1973) who stated
that for ecological systems resilience is “a measure of the persistence of systems and
of their ability to absorb change and disturbance and still maintain the same rela-
tionships between populations or state variables”. Since then there have been several
definitions of resilience across different disciplines, which has led some to question the
11
relevance of the term in research (Klein et al., 2003; Rose, 2007, 2009a). Table 1.1
highlights some interpretations of resilience that have been misunderstood with other
concepts used in disaster management.
Table 1.1: Different resilience definitions and conflicts in research.
Author Definition Comment
Holling (1973) resilience implies ability to
bounce back to original stability
Resilience can still exist
after fluctuations lead to
another state not neces-
sarily stable
Mileti (1999) “...a resilient community...takes
mitigation actions consistent with
achieving that level of protec-
tion.”
Mitigation is imple-
mented before a dis-
ruption and resilience
after.
Timmerman
(1981); Pelling
(2003)
in context to hazard vulnerabil-
ity “...resilience to natural haz-
ards is the ability of an individual
to cope with or adapt to hazard
stress”
Resilience is post-
disaster condition and
vulnerability is pre-
disaster.
Bruneau et al.
(2003)
resilience results in reduced prob-
ability of failure and reduced con-
sequences of failure.
Failure probability is re-
duced through mitiga-
tion and not resilience.
Godschalk
(2004)
“future mitigation programs must
also focus on teaching the city’s
social communities and institu-
tions to reduce hazard risk and re-
spond effectively to disasters, be-
cause they will be the ones most
responsible for building ultimate
urban resilience.”
Resilience and mitigation
are unrelated.
Primarily resilience has been defined in context to the speed of systems to go
towards equilibrium (Adger, 2000), capability to cope and bounce back (Wildavsky,
1988), ability to adapt to new situations (Comfort, 1999), be inherently strong and
flexible and adaptive (Tierney & Bruneau, 2007), ability to withstand external im-
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pacts and recover with least outside interferences (Mileti, 1999).
Economic resilience has been defined as the “inherent ability and adaptive response
that enables firms and regions to avoid maximum potential losses” (Rose & Liao,
2005). Mainly economic resilience has been studied in context to seismic response
and recovery (Tierney, 1997; Bruneau et al., 2003), community behavior (Chang &
Shinozuka, 2004) and disaster hazard analysis (Rose, 2004b), among others (Rose,
2009a).
Even though there are different opinions in defining resilience there is some con-
sensus in the measurement of system resilience. Generally resilience in measured in
terms of the amount by which the system is able to avoid maximum impact (static
resilience (Rose, 2004a)/robustness (McDaniels et al., 2008)) and the speed at which
the system recovers from a disruption (dynamic resilience (Rose, 2004a)/ rapidity
(Zobel, 2010)). In recent work Vugrin et al. (2010) have developed an economic
resilience framework for measuring the targeted economic response of infrastructures.
1.4 Building resilience for large-scale infrastructures - ap-
proach and contributions
Several research components are considered here in building the resilience estimation
framework for interdependent economic systems.
1.4.1 Interdependence modeling
This research study addresses the problem of estimating, quantifying and planning
for resilience in interdependent systems, where interconnectedness adds to problem
complexity. Understanding interdependence is critical for the development of the
framework proposed here. The ultimate usefulness of understanding interdependent
impacts, particularly from the standpoint of a preparedness decision maker, is not
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just a descriptor of property damage, but of business economic interruption (Tierney,
1997; Rose & Liao, 2005). That is, at the heart of understanding and planning for
disruptive events is the quantification of (i) dollars of losses, and (ii) extent of and
duration of system inoperability. The study of physical models of interdependency
provides little benefit unless they are ultimately translated into those quantities. As
such, this work focusses on modeling economic resilience in interdependent infrastruc-
tures and industries.
The input-output based models (Leontief, 1941; Haimes & Jiang, 2001) are uti-
lized here for understanding and building an interdependent resilience framework.
In particular the inoperability input-output enterprise provides a suitable framework
on which interdependent infrastructure resilience concepts can be built. As out-
lined before, interdependence modeling is not a problem in these models due to the
availability of economic input-output data. Moreover, economic interactions between
infrastructures can be integrated with physical attributes to strengthen resilience es-
timations. During disruptions the inability of economic sectors to supply products or
the loss of demand for commodities is an indicative of possible physical damages to
infrastructure systems.
Rose (2007) points out that there is a similarity of the inoperability input-output
model with static resilience estimation. Also the dynamic inoperability input-output
model (DIIM), based on the economic input-output model, captures the interconnect-
edness of infrastructures and models recovery from disruptions. Hence, it is a useful
resilience construct that captures dynamic aspects of resilient recovery. This research
interprets and extends the inoperability input-output model capabilities of resilience
estimation.
One way to develop resilience to economic losses would be by maintaining product
inventories which reflect physical actions. In its present formulation the DIIM assumes
that resilience comes from within a sector (Lian & Haimes, 2006). Such a treatment
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of resilience does not account for the interdependent effects of product substitution
and inventory management. This research expands the capabilities of the DIIM in
capturing such effects.
1.4.2 Risk management and system performance planning
In order to improve interdependent infrastructure resilience, this work provides a
structured decision-making approach. Emphasis has been given to devising strategies
to reduce infrastructure losses (Grabowski & Roberts, 1997), and this study seeks
to provide an approach to quantify the efficacy of such strategies that prepare for
timely post-disaster infrastructure functionality and performance, with emphasis on
the interdependent relationships among infrastructures.
In the estimation of a static resilience planning the IIM can measure the efficacy
of preparedness strategies in interdependent infrastructures by quantifying measures
of interdependent inoperability and economic loss that may result from a disruptive
event. Developing and choosing such a strategy requires quantitative trade-off anal-
yses among different metrics such as cost, benefit, and risk, where interdependent
sector risk is measured with the IIM. While the IIM can be used in a descriptive
manner to model inoperability and economic loss resulting from a disruptive event,
the ultimate usefulness of the model comes from its prescriptive ability to quantify
how the implementation of risk management can lessen the interdependent impacts of
a disruptive event. There are numerous ways to plan for risk management of interde-
pendent systems using the IIM metrics (Jiang & Haimes, 2004; Anderson et al., 2007;
Crowther, 2008). The risk management approach suggested here assumes that there
exist planning policies that lead to reduction the demand losses, which translates to
reduced economic losses. Planning economic loss reduction policy distributions based
on the availability of budgets or deciding the budgets required for allowable economic
losses provide two perspectives of the risk management decision-making. Such an
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approach contributes a simple scheme that adds to the capabilities of the IIM-based
interdependent risk evaluation. Presenting the problem as a scheme to strengthen
static resilience strengthening scheme is a new research approach.
Dynamic resilience explained through a model extension of the DIIM is also based
on a planning decision. Such planning is aimed at making the model confirm to tar-
geted behaviors that are representative of system resilience. The meaning and inter-
pretation of dynamic resilience comes from certain properties that systems exhibit.
In this research, dynamic resilience of a disrupted system is quantified in terms of
three metrics: (i) average level of system operability/functionality (ii) maximum in-
operability/loss of functionality, and (iii) time to recovery. These three metrics can
be utilized to generate performance criteria for the dynamic behavior of interdepen-
dent recoveries. Specifically for large-scale interdependent systems that are being
studied here the resilience quantification from the performance target-based planning
approach is a new concept introduced here. Most of the models that discuss infras-
tructure resilience are limited in their treatment of quantifying the interdependent
nature of resilience. Similar metrics exist in engineering resilience methods (Bruneau
et al., 2003) but have been used it in a qualitative manner to discuss the collective
resilience of systems. Quantitative treatment has been limited to individual systems
(Zobel, 2011). Due to the wide scope of the input-output model the dynamic resilience
estimation methods are applicable to many systems in unison. Network-based mod-
els have been used to quantify combined resilience for transportation (Duen˜as-Osorio
et al., 2007) or ICT systems (Ulieru, 2007), but they have to be infrastructure and
network specific.
The dynamic resilience planning methods add more meaning to the resilience in-
terpretation of the previous dynamic risk input-output schemes. It is shown, that
in particular for resilient recovery, it is desirable for a sector to maintain stock of
other sectors for utilization during recovery. Maintaining stock inventory would help
16
a sector be prepared for the disruption in advance, thus providing an inherent in-
terdependent resilience. Also adaptive resilience, which for interdependent sectors is
achieved through changes in production and modified flows of resources when disrup-
tions occur, can be quantified through the methods presented here. Previous DIIM
research has ignored such effects and assumed that the interdependency structure
remains invariant for entire analysis. Many researchers have pointed out that use of
input-output models for disruption modeling should account for such changes (Ku-
jawski, 2006; Hallegatte, 2008). Our methods account for updated interdependency
structures between infrastructures reflecting new market situations as a result of dis-
ruptions.
In most resilience estimation studies, the notion of equilibrium is central to sys-
tem recovery. The engineering resilience view (Bruneau et al., 2003; McDaniels et al.,
2008; Zobel, 2011), shared by TISP, associates resilience with the ability to return to
previous levels of stability. Rose & Liao (2005) have argued that for some disruptions
economic systems cannot return to original stability levels. Nonetheless their eco-
nomic resilience approaches are based on the notion that resilience leads to attaining
different levels of equilibrium. Regional economies do not remain at equilibrium and
hence resilience is truly adaptive if it impacts economic evolution (Simmie & Martin,
2010). Associating resilience with constant change is becoming a popular notion due
to evolutionary nature of economic systems (Pendall et al., 2010). Though not dis-
cussed explicitly here, the approach presented in this research is capable of extending
the “constant change” notion to interdependent resilience.
1.4.3 Mathematical concepts developed
Evaluation of model feasibility
It is important is establish the feasibility of the models being developed. The input
data and output metrics in the interdependency models are constructed to confirm to
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real-world economic properties. Hence there are certain mathematical rules that the
models should confirm to. In the static models the existence of the matrix inverses
are critical for model solutions, while in dynamic models the stability of the system
is important for the existence of feasible solutions. Since there are matrices involved
here, eigenvalue analysis (Hu et al., 1998; Meyer, 2000; Lewis et al., 2006) is utilized to
understand system behaviors. In particular the Greshgorins Circle Theorem (Moon
& Stirling, 2000) has been utilized here to show the possible ranges of values of the
dynamic system rate matrix elements that are required for stable solutions. Such
mathematical treatment of these models has been missing from literature.
1.4.4 Robust optimization in static resilience planning
Risk studies of infrastructures requires quantification of the disruptive events and the
underlying interdependent complexities of the systems. A deterministic approach for
such problems has limited scope (Rose, 2004b), making uncertainty-based analysis
a logical alternative. Sources of epistemic and aleatory uncertainties (Pate´-Cornell,
1996; Haimes, 2009) arising due to unreliable data and limitations in disaster pre-
dictions need to be included in the analysis approach. In interdependent systems
the exact relationships between the elements at the physical or economic level may
be unknown though estimable, thereby creating scope for analyses that incorporate
approaches such as structural fragility (Kim et al., 2007), covariance structure esti-
mates (Hays & Kachi, 2008) and auto-regressive estimates (Bessler & Yang, 2003).
Hence, many approaches have incorporated uncertainty in the modeling of interde-
pendent sectors, including agent-based models (Lewis, 2006), discrete simulations and
dynamic models (Brown et al., 2004; Min et al., 2007), among others.
Incorporating uncertainties in systems analyses increase the scope for decision
making in planning and management for extreme events. Risk-based decision mak-
ing involves finding optimal solutions to single or multiple objectives that provide
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guidelines to minimize risk while optimizing any number of other often competing
objectives. Since seminal works by Dantzig (1955) and Charnes & Cooper (1959),
stochastic optimization methods for decision making under uncertainty have been
widely developed (Infanger, 1994; Kall & Mayer, 2010). These methods assume that
underlying probability distributions for uncertain model parameters are know from
historical data, and therefore future predictions are governed by past distributions.
Decisions made from probability-driven optimal solutions are only as good as those
underlying probability distributions (Huber, 2010). Some of these inaccuracies are
addressed by the robust optimization framework (Soyster, 1973), that provides de-
cision making solutions that are feasible and distribution independent. And since
often is the case in risk-based decision making that we seek not the best option but
rather to avoid making a bad decision, robust decision making can reflect worst case
scenarios. Due to their ability to account for uncertainty in underlying parameters,
robust optimization has seen several recent theoretical and methodological develop-
ments (Ben-Tal & Nemirovski, 2000; Ben-Tal et al., 2006; Atamturk & Zhang, 2007;
Ben-Tal et al., 2009). While robust decision making has been applied in analyses of
individual systems, e.g., inventory control (Bertsimas & Thiele, 2006; Bienstock &
O¨zbay, 2008), its application to interdependent systems is limited.
Data assimilation in dynamic resilience planning
The dynamic resilience planning is a problem of estimating the rate parameter of the
dynamic risk input-output model. Having set planned targets for the resilience met-
rics the dynamic resilience behavior is established by calibrating the model to meet
the prescribed target values. Model calibration and prediction is a very widely used
approach based on linear or non-linear least-square fit methods (Draper & Smith,
1998). If the model is dynamic, as is the case here, then the parameter estima-
tion problem is a data assimilation scheme where data are combined with results
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from a predictive model to produce an estimate of the current state of the system
(Lewis et al., 2006). The data assimilation problem developed here is solved using
a forward sensitivity approach, in which parameter sensitivities are critical for the
problem solution (Lakshmivarahan & Lewis, 2010). Data assimilation is typically
used in forecasting, particularly in weather forecasting (Kanamitsu, 1989; Kalnay,
2003), hydrology (Reichle et al., 2002), among others (Lewis et al., 2006). No lit-
erature is available on the use of data assimilation to describe dynamic recovery of
disrupted infrastructure and economic systems, considering its great potential for use
in interdependent resilience planning.
1.5 Inland waterway applications
The application of the methods developed in this research can be made on multi-
modal transportation systems and in particular inland waterway ports and network
systems. Multi-modal transportation systems, identified by DHS to be among the
critical US infrastructures (DHS., 2009), play a significant role in maintaining com-
modity flows across industries, and preserving the functionality of a multi-regional
interdependent economy. A disruptive event that causes inoperability of the multi-
modal transportation network is propagated to industry demand and supply, thereby
causing production losses. For example, in 2002, Oklahoma witnessed the collapse of
an I-40 bridge spanning the Arkansas River, due to a barge collision with a bridge
pylon. The resulting daily detouring of 22,000 vehicles caused congestion, secondary
road infrastructure accelerated wear and other economic losses that persisted for
nearly two months, as the bridge was repaired (Schmitt et al., 2010). Similarly, the
I-35W bridge collapse over the Mississippi river in Minneapolis, Minnesota caused
the daily rerouting of 140,000 vehicles (Zhu et al., 2010) with a significant adverse
economic impact. Events like these make risk analysis of freight disruptions an impor-
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tant research topic. Furthermore, the risks of larger-scale disruptive events, such as
earthquakes and malevolent man-made attacks, could result in the protracted closure
of key transportation facilities such as rail yards, cargo terminals, airports, seaports,
or inland ports. Multi-modal risk assessment studies of various sorts have appeared
recently (Sohn et al., 2004; Ham et al., 2005a,b; Tatano & Tsuchiya, 2008; Ishfaq
& Sox, 2010); though risk studies of inland port disruptions have been particularly
sparse in number. Transfer facilities, such as inland ports, are the locations that
are particularly susceptible to disruptions in commodity flows that can cause losses
of demand and supply to certain industries, which then propagate among other in-
terdependent intra- and inter-regional industries. Inland port operations that are
susceptible to disruptions include commodity arrivals at port, storage at unloading
yards, transfer to docks by cranes, loading onto vessels, and departure to destinations.
Inland waterways, although prominent in North America, are even more common in
the European economy (Rodrigue et al., 2010).
The risk-based interdependency model quantifies the propagation of inoperabil-
ity, or the extent to which industry output will not be produced, through a set of
interconnected industry sectors. Operations at inland ports can be modeled through
simulations as queueing systems capable of quantifying the number of commodities at
each point of operation. By comparing the normal port operations with the disrupted
port operations, the difference in number of arrivals and departures can be obtained
to measure the losses for commodities/industries that use the port. Quantifying these
losses respectively as loss in demand for the exporting region and loss in supply and
demand for the importing region provides parameters for the risk input-output mod-
els. The interdependent nature of these models then cascades these losses to other
industries locally and across regions, thereby providing an estimate for large-scale
economic impacts of disruptions at an inland port.
The work presented here differs from other transportation disruption studies in
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that it does not use the traditional network analysis approach. Most of the exist-
ing studies in the literature build an optimized transportation network of roads and
railways that minimize travel distance across regions and use the economic data to
maintain the constraint that the supply is equal to the demand (Ham et al., 2005a,b).
Such network approaches are computationally intensive; hence, our analysis of the
inflow or outflow of goods through a region using queuing concepts at particular com-
ponents in a network can reduce the computational burden and help build an efficient
means to quantify multi-regional inoperability and economic losses due to disruptive
events. In addition, existing studies assume that during a disruption, supply finds al-
ternate paths on the network to meet demand. In practice, this might not be true for
short time duration and across all industries. In particular, for port disruptions there
are bulk products that are sitting at the port or are off shore for which alternative
transportation arrangements are costly or impractical. In light of this perception, a
company decision maker may prefer to wait for some time for the port to reopen.
1.6 Structure of the dissertation
The research framework developed in this study is shown in Figure 1.2. The discussion
of the framework is organized in rest of the dissertation Chapters that follow.
Chapter 2 reviews the static and dynamic interdependent economic and risk input-
output models. It presents mathematical proofs for the existence of feasible solutions
to the static and dynamic input-output models. The discussion of the static eco-
nomic input-output model includes model development, existence of model solution,
and the data support on which the model is built. The static risk input-output model
is presented with the risk metrics and the mathematical properties of the risk inter-
dependency matrix are also discussed. The dynamic economic input-output model
is presented and shown to be unstable. The dynamic risk input-output model is
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presented and its stability criteria are established.
In Chapter 3 the resilience framework using economic input-output data based
risk models is constructed. The static risk input-output model metrics are shown
to be suitable for resilience estimation. A static resilience problem is presented as
a resource allocation and planning scheme. Subsequently a risk management opti-
mization problem is formulated and solved to show resilience planning. The dynamic
risk input-output model is developed as a resilience estimation construct. To develop
the resilience methodology the dynamic model behavior to external shocks is ana-
lyzed and resilience is quantified through appropriate metrics. These metrics, called
the time averaged level of operability, maximum loss of functionality, time to recov-
ery, respectively denote the systems’ ability to maintain functionality throughout the
post-disruption response, withstand the maximum disruptive impact and still recover,
and progress towards recovery with some speed. The functional relationship between
the metrics is developed to generate a decision support space. Adaptive resilience
behavior through the dynamic risk input-output model is also presented.
Chapter 4 discusses the nature of uncertainties in the static resilience planning
problem developed in Chapter 3. Uncertainties change the problem objective due to
which the static resilience risk management questions posed previously have to be
reformulated as a problem of estimating the required amounts of resource allocations
when economic losses need to be kept below certain thresholds. The general guidelines
that need to be followed to make the problem robust are presented, which depends
upon the uncertainty sets that are vital to the solution of the robust problem. The
robust formulations to the nominal problems are built from the given uncertainty
sets. Robust formulations, which increase the problem dimensions but preserve the
nominal problem structure, are the result of the given data and event uncertainty
sets. An example problem highlights the usefulness of the robust schemes by showing
that small data uncertainties have great affect on the planning solutions, which are
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accounted for in the robust solution.
Chapter 5 proposes the scheme for solving the parameter estimation problem from
dynamic resilience metrics. The inverse problem and the parameter estimation scheme
is subsequently explained. The forward sensitivity scheme is presented and it is shown
that control estimates are obtained from sensitivity functions. The computations of
sensitivity matrices and the forward sensitivity scheme’s computational tractability in
solving the inverse problem are also discussed. An example problem is solved using
the sensitivity algorithm and the different dynamic model and resilience concepts
generated throughout Chapters 2 to 5 are discussed. The usefulness of the method in
generating the model parameter essentially provides a useful tool to understand and
interpret the interdependence of dynamic systems.
Chapter 6 is the application of the methodologies of concepts developed here on an
inland port system. It discusses the relationship between the input-output risk metrics
and transportation hubs (e.g., ports). A queueing-based simulation model is presented
that describes normal port export and import operations and the adjustments that
can be made to incorporate effects of disruptive events. A case study of the impacts
of exports and imports disruptions through the Port of Catoosa in Oklahoma and the
inland waterway network of the Mississippi River system is shown.
Chapter 7 concludes this study and discusses future research avenues for this work.
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Chapter 2
Economic Input-Output Based Risk Interdependency Models
2.1 Introduction
This Chapter generates a discussion that includes a review of static and dynamic
interdependent economic and risk input-output models, and analysis of the mathe-
matical conditions required for these models to be feasible. Such analysis is crucial
when the model metrics are used to describe economic risk to infrastructure systems,
because it is desired that the model result is reflective of a quantifiable real world sit-
uation. While the mathematical analysis generates some already known results about
the properties of the interdependency matrix in the economic input-output model,
the presentation of such analysis for inoperability input-output models is an extension
to research. The discussion in this Chapter is geared towards the development of the
dynamic risk input-output model that is presented in the Section 2.5 with a different
approach than previous research.
The primary research question here is:
What are the models used for quantifying interdependence and do these models
give feasible solutions?
The static interdependency models are systems of linear equations relating input and
output vectors of the same dimension by a matrix operator that captures interdepen-
dence. Hence, the solution of a static model exists and is unique if the matrix operator
is invertible. The dynamic interdependency models are systems of first-order linear
differential equations that are temporal extensions of the static models. In dynamic
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behavior the stability of the model is important for the existence of feasible conver-
gent solutions across all times, and it depends upon the growth/decay rate parameter
in the model. We address these issues as we progress through the Chapter.
In Section 2.2 the discussion of the static economic input-output model includes
model development (Section 2.2.1), the proof that the model solution exists due to
the properties of the interdependency matrix arising from the problem structure (Sec-
tion 2.2.2), and the data based approach for generating the model (Section 2.2.3).
The static risk input-output model developed in Section 2.3.1 presents the risk met-
rics with the range of values they take, while in Section 2.3.2 the properties of the
risk interdependency matrix that lead to an invertible matrix are presented. Sec-
tions 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 respectively present the dynamic economic input-output model
and the conditions that make the model unstable. The Section 2.5 development of
the dynamic risk input-output model addresses, in Section 2.5.2, the stability criteria
necessary for convergent solutions. Section 2.5.3 establishes the possible values the
model parameters can take for satisfy the stability criteria. This completes the de-
velopment of the new risk input-output model presented in the research. Section 2.6
provides a closing remark to the findings of the Chapter.
2.2 Economic input-output model
The economic input-output model (Leontief, 1936, 1941, 1951, 1986), for which Wass-
ily Leontief won a Nobel prize, has been widely accepted as a useful tool for analyz-
ing the interdependent connections between industry sectors. Such interdependence
makes for convenient usage in macroeconomic impact analysis studies. Leontief’s
model establishes a common comparative framework between sectors ranging from
agriculture, energy, manufacturing to banking, communications, information tech-
nology, among others. Over the years the economic input-output model has been
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studied and developed to interpret intra-regional and multi-regional static and dy-
namic interactions among infrastructures (Isard et al., 1998; Lahr & Dietzenbacher,
2001; Leontief et al., 2004; Ten Raa, 2005; Miller & Blair, 2009). The wide use and
popularity of the model is due to the fact that it is built for, supported, and verified
by vast data resources (Polenske, 1980; Horowitz & Planting, 2006).
2.2.1 Leontief’s economic model
The basic principle behind the economic input-output model is that it explains the
supply and demand balance in an economy consisting of interacting sectors. It can
be interpreted as a macroeconomic supply chain in which firms produce goods to
satisfy demands of other firms and households and in return use resources from the
other firms and households to make more of those goods. The value of transactions
between industries in the group provides an indication of the supply and demand
requirements in the economy. When supply and demand are balanced the economy is
said to be at equilibrium. Equation (2.1) expresses this supply and demand balance
mathematically for a group of n interacting industries. The total output of the ith
industry sector, measured in dollars, is distributed to all industries and also satisfies
external demand. If xi is the dollar value for industry i total output, zij is the dollar
amount of industry i output purchased by industry j, and ci is the dollar value of
final demand for industry i output, then the input-output balance is expressed as
xi =
n∑
j=1
zij + ci (2.1)
Equation (2.1) is called the demand side input-output model because it accounts
for the amount of intermediary and final demands for industry output, thus giving
an indication of the output required to balance such demands. A supply side input-
output model also exists (Ghosh, 1958), and measures the balance of industry j output
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with the total amount of commodities it purchases from all other industries and the
value added vj expenditures it requires to generate output. Hence, in the supply side
model the purchases required by an industry are a measure of supply amount needed
to produce its output. Equation (2.2) expresses the supply side input-output balance
discussed so far.
xj =
n∑
i=1
zij + vj (2.2)
The demand and supply balances through the input-output model are depicted in
Table 2.1, which shows the equilibrium economic accounting in terms of balances
between selling and purchasing sectors. Such tables, called input-output transactions
(flow) tables, have been adopted across number of countries for understanding and ac-
counting of their economic structures. The final demand column in these transaction
tables is made up of consumer/household purchases, private investment purchases,
federal, state and local government purchases, and exports sales of industry products.
The value added rows of the tables consist of payments made by the sector in labor
expenses, government taxes, capital interest, rental and other payments, and import
purchases by industries to make their product. The input-output balance between
economic sectors typically depicts a long-run behavior of interindustry flows. The
numbers in the transaction tables would generally show annual amounts of selling
and purchasing balances between industries.
A key assumption in the input-output model is that zij depends upon xj, which
implies that the amount of product an industry purchases depends upon its output
production. In the input-output model this relationship is assumed to be linear and
is expressed as
zij = aijxj (2.3)
where aij, called the technical coefficient, is explained as the value of product in-
dustry j purchases from industry i for producing $1 of its own output. Under the
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Table 2.1: Economic Input-Output transactions(flow) table for an n sector economy
Buying Sector
Final Demand Total Output
1 . . . j . . . n
Selling sector 1 z11 . . . z1j . . . z1n c1 x1
...
...
...
...
...
...
i zi1 . . . zij . . . zin ci xi
...
...
...
...
...
...
n zn1 . . . znj . . . znn cn xn
Value Added v1 . . . vj . . . vn
Total Output x1 . . . xj . . . xn
Equation (2.3) assumption the input-output Equations (2.1) and (2.2) become
xi =
n∑
j=1
aijxj + ci (2.4)
xj =
n∑
i=1
aijxj + vj (2.5)
Research and application has primarily been focused on the development of the
demand side input-output model, which was as intended through Leontief’s formula-
tion and model usage. The supply side model has been questioned because it depicts
economic behavior for a constant supply distribution, which has raised concerns in
research (Oosterhaven, 1988; Rose & Allison, 1989).
2.2.2 Existence of solution to input-output system
The Leontief input-output model expression of Equation (2.4) leads to the n sector
matrix Equation (2.6) where x is an n × 1 vector of industry production outputs,
A is an n × n industry-by-industry matrix of technical coefficients, c is an n × 1
vector of final demands, and I is an n × n identity matrix. The model shows that
total production is made up of industry-to-industry intermediate production (Ax)
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and production to satisfy final demands (c).
x = Ax + c =⇒ (I−A)x = c (2.6)
Equation (2.6) shows that the primary usage of the input-output model involves find-
ing the industry outputs for given final demands, which depends upon the proposition
that the matrix I−A is invertible. We investigate and prove that this is always true
through the following two properties of the elements of the A matrix.
1. In the economic system under consideration each industry purchases something
from all the other industries. Hence the connectivity between two sectors is
finite which means that aij ≥ 0,∀1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. This leads to an irreducible non-
negative technical coefficient matrix expressing a strong connected relationship
across industries.
2. If both sides of Equation (2.5) are divided by xj we get the following
1 =
n∑
i=1
aij + vj/xj =⇒
n∑
i=1
aij = 1− vj/xj < 1 (2.7)
which shows that the sum of elements along each column of the A matrix is at
most equal to 1.
We now show that the above two conditions lead to an invertible I−A matrix. For
this we first state a property of the A matrix, which is essential for the existence of
the inverse.
Proposition 1. If a given non-negative irreducible matrix A =
{
aij : aij ≥ 0, ∀1 ≤
i, j ≤ n} has column sums less than 1 then the spectral radius of A, given as ρ(A) is
always less than 1.
Proof. Since A is an irreducible non-negative matrix and is also an n × n square
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matrix, from the Perron-Frobenius theorem (Meyer, 2000), the maximum eigenvalue
λ of Aᵀ, and hence A, is a real number that satisfies the condition
0 ≤ min
j
∑
i
aij ≤ λ ≤ max
j
∑
i
aij < 1 (2.8)
where the upper bound of one exists because column sums of A are less than 1, while
the lower bound is due to non-negative elements of A. Hence, it can be concluded
that the matrix A has a spectral radius less than 1, i.e., ρ(A) < 1.
The above Proposition means that the geometric series
{
A,A2, ...,Ak
}
of powers
of the A matrix converges towards 0, which is expressed as
lim
k→∞
Ak = 0 (2.9)
Hence Equation (2.10) shows that the inverse of I−A, which by definition can be
written as the infinite sum of the powers of A stops growing after some k and hence
is less than infinity. This shows that the matrix I−A is always invertible.
(I−A)−1 =
∞∑
k=0
Ak <∞ (2.10)
In the input-output literature (I−A)−1 is referred to as the Leontief inverse
and its existence means that the industry output can be measured in terms of final
demands as
x =
(
I−A)−1c (2.11)
The primary usage of Equation (2.11) is for economic impact analysis wherein we
measure the change in output due to the change in demand resulting from growth or
disruption to the economy.
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2.2.3 Make-Use data tables for model development
The linear production function in the input-output model may appear to be an overly
simple assumption, but nonetheless the model has been found to be applicable in vast
amount of research efforts. Such research efforts have made sure that the validity of
the model is attested for by the consistency of its results. The general consensus
has been that input-output models can be useful tools in macroeconomic analysis
when long run economic behavior is studied. In addition, there are detailed data
sets available to support analysis with the model, including the commodity flow data
published annually by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA., 2011) and the
worldwide data maintained by the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and De-
velopment (OECD., 2011). The data sets used for constructing the input-output A
matrix constitute what is known as the commodity-by-industry framework. Since the
inception of this framework (Stone, 1961; Stone et al., 1963), it has been adopted by
several countries around the world and ratified by the United Nations (UN., 2009) as
the standard the input-output data gathering method.
The commodity-by-industry framework is based on the premise that industries
make and use commodities. Every industry is associated with making one primary
commodity in addition to several secondary commodities. The dollar value of com-
modities made by industries are collected in a Make table, which is an industry-by-
commodity table. Most commodities are required by almost all industries for making
products, which means every commodity is used by almost all industries. The Use
Table collects information on the dollar commodity-by-industry usage in the economy.
In the commodity-by-industry framework generally the number of industries and
commodities is not the same. If it is assumed that there are n industries producing
m commodities, then these m commodities will be used by n industries. Hence, the
make table translates into an n × m matrix V = {vik,∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ k ≤ m},
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while the use table becomes an m × n matrix U = {ukj,∀1 ≤ k ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ n}.
Table 2.2 shows that input-output arrangement of the economy based on the make-
use matrices. It can be seen from the table that the row sums of the make matrix are
equal to the sector outputs (x), while the column sums of the make matrix are equal
to the commodity outputs or total industry inputs (y).
Table 2.2: Commodity-by-industry input-output structure of the economy
Commodities Industries Final Total
1 . . . m 1 . . . n Demand Output
Commodities 1 u11 . . . u1n e1 y1
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
m um1 . . . umn em ym
Industries 1 v11 . . . v1m x1
...
...
. . .
...
...
n vn1 . . . vnm xn
Value Added v1 . . . vn
Total Inputs y1 . . . ym x1 . . . xn
While different forms of input-output A matrices can be obtained from the make-
use data, the most relevant one has been found to be the industry-by-industry matrix.
This matrix translates the make-use data into an n industry selling and purchasing
structure similar to the Table 2.1 construct. The A matrix is obtained from normal-
ized make (Vˆ) and normalized use (Uˆ) matrices, by establishing the input-output
relationships through these matrices. The relationship between the matrices is shown
in Table 2.3, which highlights the mathematical derivation of the A matrix through
input-output relationships
Input-output accounting through the make-use tables has provided a data based
credibility to the Leontief economic construct. Due to the the worldwide availability
of such data and its organization into make-use tables the input-output method is
also considered to represent a global supply chain characterizing inter-industry and
34
Table 2.3: Derivation for the input-output A matrix from make-use tables
Normalize matrices
vˆik = vik/yk =⇒ Vˆ = V[diag(y)]−1
uˆkj = ukj/xj =⇒ Uˆ = U[diag(x)]−1
Output-Input equation
xi =
∑n
k=1 vik =
∑n
k=1 vˆikyk
=⇒ x = Vˆy
Input-Output equation
yk =
∑m
j=1 ukj + ek =
∑m
j=1 uˆkjxj
=⇒ y = Uˆx + e
Derivation
Vˆy = VˆUˆx + Vˆe
=⇒ x = (VˆUˆ)x + Vˆe
=⇒ x = Ax + c
Result A = VˆUˆ , c = Vˆe
commodity flows. In the US this supply chain is defined and compiled for industries
named according to the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS)
(Kelton et al., 2008). From BEA data for NAICS industries input-output accounts
can be generated at the national, regional and local level. Every 5 years the BEA
gives a list of 65 NAICS industries for which input-output accounts are maintained,
and also annually produces a list of 15 aggregated industries from combining the 65
sectors.
2.3 Inoperability input-output model
2.3.1 Model formulation
An extension of the economic input-output model of interest to this work is the Inop-
erability Input-Output Model (IIM) (Santos & Haimes, 2004; Santos, 2006). Instead
of describing the connections between the interdependent industry sectors in terms of
commodity flow dollars, the IIM illustrates how normalized production losses propa-
gate through all interconnected industries.
Central to the development of the inoperability input-output analysis is the as-
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sumption that the interdependency structure of the economy, measured by the A
matrix does not change when demands and resulting outputs change. If in the n
sector economic system xˆ and cˆ represent equilibrium as-planned output and final
demand levels respectively, while x˜ and c˜ represent disrupted/perturbed equilibrium
levels for output and final demands respectively, then
xˆ = Axˆ + cˆ (2.12)
x˜ = Ax˜ + c˜ (2.13)
Here it is assumed that the production and demand levels at the perturbed conditions
are lower than as-planned levels. The key premise of Equations (2.12) and (2.13) is
that when the as-planned interdependent economy is disrupted there are reductions
in demands for products, which results in reduced equilibrium industry outputs. The
IIM approach builds on this notion of equilibrium shift by providing two metrics that
translate degraded outputs and demands into risk measures. These metrics called
inoperability and demand perturbations are explained below.
Inoperability for industry i, qi, refers to the inability of the industry to perform its
intended functions. In the context of economic loss analysis for measuring failure in
industry sectors, qi is the measure of the loss of production in industry i as a propor-
tion of its original production level, as shown in Equation (2.14). The inoperability
of a system lies between 0 and 1, where qi = 0(x˜i = xˆi) is a measure of a perfectly
operable industry i, and qi = 1(x˜ = 0) is a measure of complete failure of industry i.
qi =
As-planned Output(xˆi)− Perturbed Output(x˜i)
As-planned Output(xˆi)
(2.14)
For the n sector economy the inoperability vector q of size n × 1 is a vector of
industry inoperabilities expressed in terms of the changed outputs normalized by the
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as-planned outputs.
qi =
(
xˆi − x˜i
)
/xˆi =⇒ q =
[
diag(xˆ)
]−1(
xˆ− x˜) (2.15)
Demand perturbation for industry i, c∗i , refers of the change in final demand for
industry i output due to disruptive events. For economic systems it is the measure
of the change in demand as a proportion of the original production level in industry
i, as shown in Equation (2.16). Demand perturbation can occur due to the inability
of the producing sector to meet the demands of the final consumers when there is a
failure in the system. The values of c∗i lie between 0 for no economic failure and loss
of demand, and ci/xˆi < 1 for total economic failure and loss in demand.
c∗i =
As-planned Demand(cˆi)− Perturbed Demand(c˜i)
As-planned Output(xˆi)
(2.16)
The demand perturbation vector c∗ of size n× 1 for the n sector economy is thus
a vector of industry demand perturbations expressed in terms of the changed final
demands normalized by the as-planned outputs.
c∗i =
(
cˆi − c˜i
)
/xˆi =⇒ c∗ =
[
diag(xˆ)
]−1(
cˆ− c˜) (2.17)
From the concepts developed in Equations (2.12) through (2.17) the IIM provided
in Equation (2.18) is derived by subtracting Equation (2.13) from Equation (2.12)
and normalizing with xˆ, thus essentially maintaining a form similar to the Leontief
economic input-output model.
[
diag(xˆ)
]−1
(xˆ− x˜) =
([
diag(xˆ)
]−1
A
[
diag(xˆ)
])[
diag(xˆ)
]−1
(xˆ− x˜)
+
[
diag(xˆ)
]−1
(cˆ− c˜)
=⇒ q = A∗q + c∗ (2.18)
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Normalized interdependency matrix A∗ of size n× n is a modified version of the
original A matrix describing the extent of economic interdependence among a set
of infrastructure and industry sectors. Shown in Equation (2.19), the row elements
of A∗ indicate the proportions of additional inoperability that are contributed by a
column sector to the row sector.
A∗ =
[
diag(xˆ)
]−1
A
[
diag(xˆ)
] ⇐⇒ a∗ij = aij(xˆj/xˆi) (2.19)
2.3.2 Existence of solution to the inoperability input-output model
Similar to the input-output approach the IIM measures the inoperability in terms of
the demand perturbations, which means that the solution of Equation (2.18) depends
upon the existence of the inverse of the matrix I−A∗. We can prove that this inverse
always exists due to the properties of the A and A∗ matrices.
1. Since the elements of A∗ are derived from A it is easy to see that A∗ would
also be an irreducible, non-negative matrix, i.e., a∗ij ≥ 0,∀1 ≤ i, j ≤ n.
2. If both sides of Equation (2.5) are divided by xi we get
1 =
n∑
j=1
aij
xj
xi
+
ci
xi
=⇒
n∑
j=1
a∗ij = 1−
ci
xi
≤ 1 (2.20)
Hence we can see that the sum of elements on each row of A∗ is less than or
equal to 1.
Arguing as before, we can show that the spectral radius of A∗ is less than 1,
which leads to an invertible I−A∗ matrix structure. This is shown to be true in two
different ways. Proposition 2 uses the fact that A∗ and A are similar matrices and
thus have the same eigenvalues and spectral radius. Proposition 3 proves the same
result for a general A∗ matrix with the properties highlighted above.
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Proposition 2. The interdependency matrices A∗ and A have the same eigenvalues.
Proof. Let λ¯∗ be an eigenvalue of A∗. Therefore λ¯∗ satisfies the characteristic equation
of A∗, which leads to the following
det(A∗ − λ¯∗I) = det([diag(xˆ)]−1A[diag(xˆ)]− λ¯∗I)
=
[
diag(xˆ)
]−1
det(A− λ¯∗I)[diag(xˆ)]
= det(A− λ¯∗I) = 0 (2.21)
λ¯∗ also satisfies the characteristic equation of A, which means A∗ and A have the
same eigenvalues. Hence, if A has a spectral radius less than 1, then so does A∗.
Proposition 3. If a given non-negative irreducible matrix A∗ =
{
a∗ij : a
∗
ij ≥ 0,∀1 ≤
i, j ≤ n} has row sums less than 1 then the spectral radius of A∗, given as ρ(A∗) is
always less than 1.
Proof. Since A∗ is an irreducible non-negative matrix and is also an n × n square
matrix, from the Perron-Frobenius theorem (Meyer, 2000), the largest eigenvalue λ∗
of A∗ is a real number that satisfies the condition
0 ≤ min
i
∑
j
a∗ij ≤ λ∗ ≤ max
i
∑
j
a∗ij ≤ 1 (2.22)
where the upper bound of one exists because row sums of A∗ are less than 1, while
the lower bound is due to non-negative elements of A∗. Hence, it can be concluded
that the matrix A∗ has a spectral radius less than 1, i.e., ρ(A∗) ≤ 1.
From either Proposition 2 or 3 we conclude that the geometric series
{
A∗, (A∗)2, ...
}
of powers of the A∗ matrix converges towards 0, which is expressed as
lim
k→∞
(A∗)k = 0 (2.23)
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Hence Equation (2.24) shows that the inverse of I−A∗, which by definition can be
written as the infinite sum of the powers of A∗ stops growing after some k and hence
is less than infinity. This shows that the matrix I−A∗ is always invertible.
(I−A∗)−1 =
∞∑
k=0
(A∗)k <∞ (2.24)
Similar to the economic input-output model, the interdependent risk impact anal-
ysis has been concentrated on solving the system
q =
(
I−A∗)−1c∗ (2.25)
2.4 Dynamic economic input-output model
2.4.1 Model development
While the static equilibrium analysis of Equation (2.11) allows for study of long-
term economic behavior, interest lies in studying the short-term dynamic aspects of
changes in interdependent economic systems. Research has focussed on developing
different dynamic models using the input-output concepts (Solow, 1956; Duchin &
Szyld, 1985; Steenge & Thissen, 2005). The Leontief (1986) dynamic input-output
model is one such construct that builds a simple notion of a dynamically growing
economy given by a first order differential equation. In a dynamic interdependent
economy it is assumed that industry outputs x(t) and exogenous demands c(t) are
now time-dependent and they evolve according to the dynamic model
x(t) = Ax(t) + c(t) + Bx˙(t) (2.26)
where B is an n × n matrix called the capital coefficient matrix, whose element
bij(∈ [0, 1]) represents the capital stock of industry i maintained by industry j per
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unit of its output (Leontief, 1986). Equation (2.26) shows that the time-dependent
industry outputs are still interdependent on other sector outputs through the matrix
A while being driven by the time-dependent exogenous demands. The additional
dynamic term signifies, through the capital coefficient matrix, the ability of the sectors
to invest in the capital resources of other sectors such as inventory, land, machines
with their rate of change (x˙(t)) of output. For solving the dynamic input-output
model the continuous or discrete-form solution of the differential equation given in
Equation (2.27) is sought
x˙(t) = −B−1[Ax(t) + c(t)− x(t)] (2.27)
2.4.2 Model issues
The solutions of the dynamic economic system depend upon the existence of B−1,
and as such, it is assumed that B−1 exists at all times. One of the problems with the
dynamic economic input-output model is the unavailability of data for the B matrix.
Data for the B matrix can be obtained through the capital flow tables provided by the
BEA (BEA., 2011), which at present contain data updated till 1997. Santos (2006)
outlines the procedure for generating the B matrix from the BEA capital flow data.
Since, the elements of B are estimates of the investment in technology, equipment,
etc. by sectors they are expected to vary substantially over time. Hence, using old
estimates does not lead to a reliable model for estimating the temporal changes in
sector outputs.
The bigger issue with the solution of the Equation (2.27) system is that there is no
guarantee that the matrix B is invertible (Luenberger & Arbel, 1977). In reality not
every sector needs to maintain capital stocks of other sectors, which means that some
of the rows or columns of the B matrix would contain all zero elements. Moreover
the amounts of capital stock requirements of some sectors might be identical leading
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to two rows of columns being the same, which also leads to a singular B. Leontief
(1986) suggested solving the discrete-time dynamic model recursively backward in
time, with the assumption that the matrix I−A + B is always invertible. Assuming
discrete time steps k = 0, 1, 2, ..., N this solution is given as
x(k) =
(
I−A + B)−1[Bx(k + 1)− c(k)] (2.28)
Although the above formulation gives a feasible solution due to the existence of the
matrix inverse the problem with using it arises due to the fact that the system behavior
at time-step N needs to be known. This is not practical because generally the initial
behavior at time-step k = 0 is given as we estimate the future x(N) behavior from it
and not the reverse.
2.5 Dynamic risk input-output model
2.5.1 Model development
The need for a dynamic risk input-output model arises because the static equilib-
rium approach of the IIM lacks in modeling temporal interdependent inoperability
propagation. Economic impact analysis requires modeling the dynamic interactive
effects between an engineering and economic perspective, and representing the dif-
ferent time scales over which the actual disruptive events take place and direct and
multiplier economic effects are felt (Okuyama et al., 2004). Modeling dynamic inter-
dependent inoperabilities from the onset of a disruption till its dissipation over time
determines how long it takes sectors to recover from a disruption. This added model
feature makes for a dynamic risk input-output process that can also be used as a
risk management model because recovery can be improved through efficient resilience
metrics.
42
A dynamic inoperability input-output model was proposed (Lian & Haimes, 2006)
along similar lines to the Leontief dynamic input-output model. The dynamic risk
input-output model we intend to discuss here is along similar lines to the Lian &
Haimes (2006) model, with a subtle difference that will be discussed as the model is
developed.
It is assumed that as-planned interdependent economic system is time invariant
and obeys the Leontief input-output equilibrium construct at all times. Restating
Equation (2.12) as-planned economic behavior as a dynamic model with rate of change
˙ˆx = 0
xˆ = Axˆ + cˆ + B˙ˆx (2.29)
When a disruption occurs at time t = 0 it is assumed that industry outputs reduce to
levels x˜(0) and exogenous demands reduce to c˜(0). The equilibrium between demand
and supply no longer exists and for subsequent times t the industry output evolution
is assumed to be governed by the dynamic input-output model
x˜(t) = Ax˜(t) + c˜(t) + B˙˜x(t),∀t > 0 (2.30)
Since, the perturbed output levels are lower than the as-planned levels the aim of the
economic system is to move from the perturbed state towards the as-planned levels.
If we subtract Equation (2.30) from Equation (2.29) we get
xˆ− x˜(t) = A[xˆ− x˜(t)]+ cˆ− c˜(t) + B[ ˙ˆx− ˙˜x(t)] (2.31)
Utilizing the previous definitions and constructions a dynamic inoperability risk input-
output model is constructed by normalizing Equation (2.31) with the diagonal matrix
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of as-planned output levels, diag(xˆ), to obtain
q(t) = A∗q(t) + c∗(t) + B∗q˙(t) (2.32)
where q(t) = [diag(xˆ)]−1[xˆ − x˜(t)] is now a time-dependent inoperability vector
that represents the loss of output as a ratio of as-planned output at all times,
c∗(t) = [diag(xˆ)]−1[cˆ− c˜(t)] is the time-dependent demand perturbation vector that
represents the loss of demand as a ratio of as-planned output at all times, A∗ =
[diag(xˆ)]−1A[diag(xˆ)] is the risk interdependency matrix as before, and B∗ is ob-
tained from the B matrix as B∗ = [diag(xˆ)]−1B[diag(xˆ)].
Equation (2.32) can be reformulated as Equation (2.33) to give a state-space
presentation of the dynamic model. Here we introduce the matrix K∗ = −(B∗)−1 to
separate the differential term from the rest of the equation.
q˙(t) = −K∗(I−A∗)q(t) + K∗c∗(t),∀t (2.33)
K∗ matrix introduced in Equation (2.33) is an n× n matrix that controls the rate of
change of industry output in relation to its inability to establish equilibrium between
demand and supply. Although Equation (2.33) is similar in structure to the dynamic
input-output model of Equation (2.27) it represents recovery instead of growth. It
is assumed that K∗ exists and even though we mathematically derived it from the
B in reality it is not governed by the existence of the B−1 matrix. Understanding
the meaning and role of the K∗ is central to the development of the dynamic risk
input-output model and is discussed is the next section.
Assuming the model evolution is studied in discrete time-steps given by 0, 1, 2, ...,
with unit time interval, the continuous time model of Equation (2.34) can be dis-
44
cretized as
q(k + 1) =
[
I−K∗(I−A∗)]q(k) + K∗c∗(k) (2.34)
2.5.2 Dynamic risk input-output model stability conditions
A closed form analytic solution to the differential Equation (2.33) exists and is ex-
pressed as
q(t) = e−K
∗(I−A∗)tq(0) +
∫ t
0
e−K
∗(I−A∗)(t−z)K∗c∗(z)dz (2.35)
which shows that the evolution of inoperability at any time t depends upon the initial
inoperability q(0), the demand perturbations c∗(t) at all times, the matrices A∗ and
K∗. These parameters are referred to as system controls.
The dynamic risk input-output model is primarily used to model recovery from
disruptions. Hence it is important that the Equation (2.35) solution leads towards an
inoperability that signifies dissipation of the disruptive effects resulting from initial
inoperabilities and demand perturbations. These considerations govern the values
that can be taken by the elements of the K∗ matrix. Since, it is required that the
model provide stable solutions to inoperability evolution at all times the right hand
side of Equation (2.35) cannot diverge or grow over the long run. Hence, requirement
for model stability leads to the necessary condition that
lim
t→∞
e−K
∗(I−A∗)t → 0 (2.36)
Establishing the Equation (2.36) necessary stability condition also guarantees that the
dynamic risk input-output model is bounded at at times. As seen in Equation (2.35)
the first term on the right hand side signifies free evolution of the system with 0 ≤
q(0) ≤ 1 by definition. Hence this term asymptotically converges towards zero.
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The second term contains the forcing function c∗(t), which is also bounded because
0 ≤ c∗(t) ≤ cˆ/xˆ.
∫ t
0
K∗e−K
∗(I−A∗)(t−z)c∗(z)dz ≤
∫ t
0
K∗e−K
∗(I−A∗)(t−z)(cˆ/xˆ)dz
= [1− e−K∗(I−A∗)t](I−A∗)−1(cˆ/xˆ)
≤ (I−A∗)−1(cˆ/xˆ) ≤ 1 (2.37)
Having established the necessary system stability criteria puts restrictions on the
values that can be taken by the elements of the K∗ matrix, due to the fact that A∗
is mainly data driven and thus exists a priori. Therefore an exercise in establishing
system stability requires finding the range of possible K∗ values that lead to system
convergence. Two results in matrix theory that establish the stability requirements
of state-space systems based on properties of the eigenvalues of the state matrix
(−K∗(I−A∗) in our case) are stated in Proposition 4 (Lewis et al., 2006). With
these results we can decide on the possible acceptable values of the matrix K∗.
Proposition 4. For bounded initial conditions, the continuos state-space linear sys-
tem y˙ = My converges when every eigenvalue, λM, of M has a negative real part
Re(λM) < 0. Moreover the discretized counterpart, y(k+ 1) = (I + ∆tM)y(k), of the
state-space system converges only when the spectral radius ρ(I + ∆tM) < 1.
From Proposition 4 we can conclude that the dynamic risk input-output model has
a convergent solution if the matrix K∗(I−A∗) has positive real valued eigenvalues.
We use this information and combine it with the practical interpretations of K∗ to
establish a possible range of values.
2.5.3 Establishing parameter values for stable system behavior
Equation (2.33), called the Dynamic inoperability input-output model (DIIM) when
K∗ is a diagonal matrix, is explained in detail in the works of Haimes et al. (2005b),
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Lian & Haimes (2006) among others. Lian & Haimes (2006) argue that the K∗
matrix represents a short-term behavior of sectors to invest to adjustments in changing
outputs. They consider K∗ is a diagonal matrix, whose diagonal elements, 0 ≤ k∗ii ≤
1(∀i = {1, 2, ..., n}), represent the ability of each sector to attain stable responses
to changes in its production outputs and demands. We explore the system stability
when such an assumption holds. Proposition 5 and 6 show that system stability is
guaranteed.
Proposition 5. Given non-negative irreducible matrix A∗ =
{
a∗ij : a
∗
ij ≥ 0,∀1 ≤
i, j ≤ n} which has row sums less than 1 there exists an n × n positive diagonal
matrix K∗, such that the matrix K∗(I−A∗) has positive eigenvalues.
Proof. Since the sum of each row of A∗ is less than 1, we can show that
n∑
j=1
a∗ij ≤ 1 =⇒
∑
j 6=i
|a∗ij| ≤ 1− a∗ii (2.38)
Hence, the matrix I−A∗ is a diagonally dominant matrix. From Greshgorins Circle
Theorem (Moon & Stirling, 2000) every eigenvalue λ∗i of I−A∗ satisfies the condition
|λ∗i − (1− a∗ii)| ≤
∑
j 6=i
|a∗ij|,∀i = {1, 2, ..., n} (2.39)
From Equation (2.39) the lower bound on the real part of the eigenvalues of I −A∗
is given as
Re(λ∗i ) ≥ 1−
∑
j=1
a∗ij > 0 (2.40)
Assume the matrix K∗ is given as K∗ = {diag(kii), kii > 0,∀1 ≤ i ≤ n}. The ith row
of the product matrix K∗(I−A∗) is given as k∗ii[1 − a∗i1,−a∗i2, ...,−a∗in], which is the
multiplication of the the ith row of I−A∗ by kii. Hence, the lower bounds on every
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eigenvalue κ∗i of the matrix K
∗(I−A∗) can be expressed as
Re(κ∗i ) ≥ k∗ii
[
1−
∑
j=1
a∗ij
]
> 0 (2.41)
which proves that the eigenvalues of K∗(I−A∗) are positive.
Proposition 6. Given a non-negative irreducible matrix A∗ =
{
a∗ij : a
∗
ij ≥ 0,∀1 ≤
i, j ≤ n} which has row sums less than 1 bounds on the elements of the diagonal
matrix K∗ for which I − K∗(I−A∗) has a spectral radius less than 1 are given by{
diag(kii), 0 < kii < 2/(1− a∗ii +
∑
j 6=i a
∗
ij),∀1 ≤ i, j ≤ n
}
.
Proof. The ith row of the product matrix I−K∗(I−A∗) is given as
[
k∗iia
∗
i1, k
∗
iia
∗
i2, . . . , 1− k∗ii(1− a∗ii), . . . , k∗iia∗in
]
From Greshgorins Circle Theorem (Moon & Stirling, 2000) every eigenvalue κ¯∗i of
I−K∗(I−A∗) satisfies the condition
|1− k∗ii(1− a∗ii)− κ¯∗i | ≤
n∑
j 6=i
|k∗iia∗ij| (2.42)
Hence the maximal bounds on the real value of the ith eigenvalue are established as
1− k∗ii
(
1− a∗ii +
n∑
j 6=i
a∗ij
)
≤ κ¯∗i ≤ 1− k∗ii
(
1−
n∑
j=1
k∗iia
∗
ij
)
(2.43)
Since the spectral radius of the I −K∗(I−A∗) is less than 1, |κ¯∗i | < 1,∀1 ≤ i ≤ n.
This establishes a maximal bound on the inequality (2.43), which is leads to the two
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inequalities
− 1 < 1− k∗ii
(
1− a∗ii +
n∑
j 6=i
a∗ij
)
=⇒ kii < 2(
1− a∗ii +
∑n
j 6=i a
∗
ij
) (2.44)
1− k∗ii
(
1−
n∑
j=1
k∗iia
∗
ij
)
< 1 =⇒ kii > 0 (2.45)
Hence (2.44) and (2.45) provide the limits for the range of kii,∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, which are
as stated in the proposition.
We have being able to show range of values that the elements of the K∗ matrix can
take if it is strictly a diagonal matrix. One caveat with choosing K∗ from this range
is that the upper bound values are greater than 1. Since in the dynamic risk input-
output model we have the term K∗c∗(t) which contributes towards the inoperability,
there is a chance that the value of q(t) might overshoot 1 which violates its very
definition. Hence, if a choice of K∗ has to be made from the above defined range then
care should be taken that the product K∗c∗(t) does not exceed 1. For simplicity sake
and to confirm to previously established research we recommend that for a diagonal
K∗ the elements should be kept between 0 and 1.
For a K∗ matrix with non zero off-diagonal elements it is difficult to establish a
range for the values of the matrix. Based on the Proposition 4 we want to establish a
dense K∗ for which the joint spectral radius of the term I−K∗(I−A∗) is less than 1.
Establishing this is not simple for any matrix, but here we can make an assumption
about the K∗ matrix that comes from its practical interpretation. The values of
K∗ in general represents the degree of resilience investment that a sector makes in
safeguarding itself against a disruption. Such investments come by strengthening its
own resources and productions or by investing in inventories of other sector products
to substitute for its own. There is a general incentive of a sector to concentrate on
safeguarding its own interests, which translates mathematically to a K∗ that is a
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diagonally dominant matrix and in which the off-diagonals are small values. It can
be assumed that an dense K∗ is represented as K∗ → diag(K∗) + ∆K∗, where ∆K∗
is introduces a perturbation in the diagonal diag(K∗) matrix to give the K∗.
2.6 Discussion and summary
This development of the economic and risk input-output models presented here shows
that these models possess mathematical properties that makes them always produce
feasible solutions. Moreover there is a credible and dedicated data support system
in place for these models, which means that they can be readily used for large-scale
infrastructure risk analysis. Although the linear structure of the static models is quite
simplistic it is nonetheless a useful construct for a basic analysis of interdependent
system behaviors and risk properties. Having established the existence of solutions
for the static models the development of the dynamic models is done by introducing
a rate term to the static models, which makes the dynamic models first-order linear
differential equations. The stability criteria that is established for a convergent fea-
sible solution of the dynamic models is important for obtaining solutions from such
models. Also the mathematical rules that are developed here have been related to
the real world importance of the terms in these models, which helps establish cer-
tain guidelines for estimating or choosing the possible values of model parameters for
practical and mathematical convenience. Overall we have been able to derive certain
results here that show the existence of matrix inverses in the static systems and the
criteria for the model stability in dynamic systems. Such properties are useful because
they provide a prescription for choosing possible values for data or parameters where
data is sparse or there is no prior knowledge about the possible parameter values and
hence a design or expert-based judgement is required.
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Chapter 3
Resilience Estimation and Planning Through the Risk
Input-Output Framework
3.1 Introduction
The primary focus of this Chapter is to develop a resilience framework using economic
input-output data based risk models. Resilience denotes the ability of the system
to “spring back, rebound, return to the original form, recover readily or adjust”
(Oxford English Dictionary, (OED., 2012)) from an external shock. The static and
dynamic risk input-output models that we discussed in Chapter 2 are suitable tools
for quantifying and planning for improved system resilience, and we show how these
models can be applied towards achieving such goals.
Our static risk input-output model (Haimes & Jiang, 2001; Santos, 2006) quan-
tifies the ability of the system of interdependent infrastructures to move from one
equilibrium state to another after disruption. This means that the model is able to
capture the system’s capability to rearrange itself, which shows a resilience quality.
Much of this quality depends on the ability of the system to resist the immediate
impact of the external perturbation it is subjected to. In the context of the static
model the relevant resilience planning question, in its broadest context, is
How can the shock impact be reduced so that the system of interdependent
infrastructures shifts from one equilibrium to another with minimum losses
given the constraints of the planning environment?
In Section 3.2 we expand on the above question by posing the static resilience problem
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as a resource allocation and planning scheme. Such an approach lends itself towards
a risk management optimization problem, which is explained in Section 3.2.1, while
Section 3.2.2 provides some numerical insights into the planning problem with an
example.
For a dynamic system resilience is indicative of its ability to resist initial impact
effects and also return to adequate functionality within a desirable time-frame. The
dynamic risk input-output model (Lian & Haimes, 2006) quantifies the trajectory
of inoperability from the time of the disruptive event up until the system has made
recovery. It is a suitable indicator of properties that define resilience. Resilience esti-
mation through the dynamic model requires answering the following set of questions
What properties in the dynamic response to disruptions for the system of inter-
dependent infrastructures imply resilience? How can we use these properties
to estimate measures for resilience estimation?
These questions are handled in detail in Section 3.3, where we explain the dynamic
risk input-output model as a resilience estimation construct. An understanding needs
to be first developed on why the model is being used for resilience estimation. This
comes from the type of disruptive events and their modeled behaviors, which are
reflective of real world large-scale infrastructure responses to system shocks. It is un-
derstood that large-scale economic systems inherently possess resilient properties that
lead towards recovery from disruptions (Klein et al., 2003). To this end Section 3.3.1
quantifies the type of external shocks and the model responses we are interested in.
Once the system responses are understood resilience is quantified through appropri-
ate metrics, explained in Section 3.3.2, which answers the first of our questions about
dynamic resilience. These metrics, called the time averaged level of operability, maxi-
mum loss of functionality, time to recovery, respectively denote the systems’ ability to
maintain functionality throughout the post-disruption response, withstand the max-
imum disruptive impact and still recover, and progress towards recovery with some
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speed. The time averaged level of operability metric can be expressed as a function of
the other two metrics and improving system speed to recovery can come at the cost
of incurring more maximum impact. These complex behavior are better understood
if the metrics can be used to generate a decision space that allows a user to choose
appropriate levels of values and thus affect system resilience. Section 3.3.4 explains
this construct.
Most resilience constructed in the static and dynamic model domains is in response
to either an instantaneous or a continuos and short lived disruption. As such the
resilient recovery is implied to come from pre-disruption preparedness and lends itself
to be an inherent system property. In general a system could be subjected to multiple
shocks that occur in phases. As such building the properties that allow a system to
adapt its resilient behavior and rearrange itself every time it is shocked is required.
Section 3.4 discusses this adaptive resilience behavior through the dynamic risk input-
output model. Finally, Section 3.5 summarizes the topics discussed in this Chapter.
3.2 Static Resilience estimation
Static resilience is defined as “the ability of the system to maintain functionality
when shocked” (Rose, 2007). Mathematically static economic resilience is measured
in terms of the maximum potential drop in system performance and the estimated
performance drop (Rose, 2004a). Figure 3.1 shows the graphical representation of
static economic resilience and its mathematical formulation. The static economic re-
silience definition suggested is quite similar to the static inoperability metric defined
in Equation (2.14), which suggests that the inoperability input-output model Equa-
tion (2.18) can be used as a resilience measuring construct. In essence if solution of
the equation q = A∗q + c∗ gives us q < 1, then the values 1− q tells us how much
functionality the system is able to preserve after the disruptive impact. While simply
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Figure 3.1: Static economic resilience visualization and mathematical definition
(Rose, 2004a).
measuring the inoperabilities as a result of disruptive impacts is a good enough indica-
tion of the cascading collapse that is still able to preserve some levels of functionality,
it is useful to improve the system performance such that cascading failures can be
optimized. As such, minimizing the sector inoperabilities in some form leads to better
system resilience. Such improvements are brought through efficient resource alloca-
tions during disruption recovery. Resource allocation requires developing strategies
that reduce demand perturbations effectively leading to economic resilience. This
demand driven approach is consistent with the idea that static economic resilience is
a consequence of efficient utilization of resources and not system repair (Rose, 2007).
3.2.1 Strengthening static resilience through risk management
In order to improve static economic resilience a risk management approach needs to
be adopted. A general risk management approach can be based on three questions
(Haimes, 1991): (i) What can be done and what options are available? (ii) What
are the associated trade-offs in terms of costs, risks and benefits? (iii) What are the
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impacts of current management decisions on future options? This triplet of questions
motivates the development of a framework for interdependent risk decision-making
formulation, which is explained below.
Consider a system consisting of n interdependent economic sectors related through
the inoperability input-output model. Assuming a disruptive event results in initial
demand perturbations for m ≤ n of the sectors. If such demand perturbations are
given by c∗l (0), l = {1, 2, ...,m}, then the risk management is concerned with reducing
these c∗l (0)’s through appropriate measures. If rl signifies a risk management strategy
adopted to reduce the initial sector l demand perturbation impact, then the effec-
tiveness of rl is measured in terms of the new demand perturbation resulting from
implementing rl on c
∗
l (0). This can be represented in functional form as
c∗l = fl(c
∗
l (0), rl) (3.1)
Assuming a numerically higher value for rl signifies a better management strategy, the
graphical relationship between c∗l and rl is chosen as one of the possible forms shown
in Figure 3.2. The upper bound c∗l (0) shows the inability of the strategy to reduce
initial impacts, which is interpreted through the lowest value for rl. The Figure 3.2
c∗l
rl
c∗l (0)
Figure 3.2: Possible functional relationships between c∗l and rl showing that the
greater effect of the risk management strategy results in lesser demand perturbations
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interpretation of the relationship between demand perturbations and management
strategy suggests that an as high as possible value for rl should be conveniently
adopted. But since implementing risk management comes at a cost there is a finite
budget that governs the maximum possible values taken by rl. If gl(rl) expresses the
cost of implementing the strategy rl then this budget as an upper bound. For an
interdependent system planning the consideration of an overall budget would give a
better planning option because it influences the distribution of resources for imple-
menting the management strategies across all affected sectors. Thus, for the entire
economy if at most budget b is available, then the Equation (3.2) constraint shows
allocations that are decided on a fixed budget.
m∑
l=1
gl(rl) ≤ b (3.2)
For an interdependent economic system being analyzed at the macro level overall
system behavior needs to be quantified through a suitable metric. A metric for
measurement of the overall impact of inoperabilities and demand perturbations for
interdependent systems is the total economic loss, Q, experienced across all n sectors.
Equation (3.3) shows how Q can be measured in terms of the as-planned outputs,
xi’s, and the inoperabilities qi’s across all sectors. Since risk planning considerations
entail the minimization of the total economic loss resulting from a disruptive event,
minimizing Q helps achieve such an objective and answers the first of the questions
posed above.
Q =
n∑
i=1
xiqi = x
ᵀq (3.3)
As established already that the static inoperability input-output model is a demand
driven model, Q is expressed in terms of the demand perturbations using the inop-
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erability model. Thus expressing Q = xᵀ[I−A∗]−1c∗ shows that the interdependent
nature of the economic system is reflected in the decision-making framework. Here
the vector c∗ is the n× 1 demand perturbation vector for all n sectors and is given as
c∗i =
 c
∗
l if i ∈ l
0 otherwise
(3.4)
Combining the above equations into a risk management problem provides the
statement for the improvement of static resilience of an interdependent economic
system. Equation (3.4) shows the optimization formulation, which is understood
through the following statement:
For given initial impact on sectors in the form of demand perturbations if risk
management strategies exist to reduce effects of such demand perturbations,
then given a finite budget for implementation how do we allocate the strategies
such that the overall interdependent economic losses are minimized?
min Q = xᵀq = xᵀ[I−A∗]−1c∗
subject to
c∗l = fl(c
∗
l (0), rl),∀l = {1, 2, ...,m}∑m
l=1 gl(rl) ≤ b
rl ≥ 0,∀l = {1, 2, ...,m}
(3.5)
MacKenzie et al. (2012b) have developed a similar risk management framework
for accessing the budget allocations required for efficient recovery in the aftermath of
the Deepwater Horizon oil spill (Cleveland, 2010). In their model fl is exponential
with a quadratic r0 term in the exponent for allocating budget to all sectors.
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3.2.2 Example planning problem insights
The type of the functional forms fl and gl govern the solution to the resilience planning
problem. For macro level planning of the input-output kind of systems the rl value
might denote the amount of capital that can be invested to purchase and substitute
for the lost demand denoted by c∗l . With increased capital investment the demand
perturbations are expected to decrease. Assuming there exists an exponential function
that represents the decrease in demand perturbation from the initial level c∗l (0) as
investments are made, the function fl is represented as given in Equation (3.6)
c∗l = c
∗
l (0)e
−αlrl (3.6)
where αl > 0 can be regarded as the measure for the effectiveness of investment rl,
which also shows the return for substituting for lost demand for sector l. Using this
formulation the optimization problem of Equation (3.5) becomes
min Q = xᵀ[I−A∗]−1c∗
subject to
c∗l = c
∗
l (0)e
−αlrl ,∀l = {1, 2, ...,m}∑m
l=1 rl ≤ b
rl ≥ 0,∀l = {1, 2, ...,m}
(3.7)
Assuming the matrix D∗ = [I−A∗]−1 = [d∗ij] denotes the interdependent propa-
gation, the solution of the Equation (3.7) optimization problem is obtained by con-
structing the Lagrangian function
L =
m∑
l=1
( n∑
i=1
xid
∗
il
)
c∗l (0)e
−αlrl + λ0
( m∑
l=1
rl − b
)
−
m∑
l=1
λlrl (3.8)
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where λl, l = {0, 1, 2, ...,m} are the Lagrangian multipliers. Assuming
Wl =
( n∑
i=1
xid
∗
il
)
c∗l (0)
the optimal resource allocations rl are obtained by solving the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
conditions (Boyd & Vandenberghe, 2004) given by
∂L
∂rl
= 0 =⇒ −Wlαle−αlrl + λ0 − λl = 0,∀l = {1, 2, ...m} (3.9)
m∑
l=1
rl ≤ b (3.10)
rl, λl ≥ 0, ∀l = {1, 2, ...m} (3.11)
λ0
( m∑
l=1
rl − b
)
= 0 (3.12)
λlrl = 0, ∀l = {1, 2, ...m} (3.13)
Setting λ0 > 0 and λl = 0, l = {1, 2, ...,m} leads to the optimal resource allocation
values obtained by solving the system of Equations (3.14) and (3.15)
−Wlαle−αlrl + λ0 = 0,∀l = {1, 2, ...m} (3.14)
m∑
l=1
rl = b (3.15)
An example problem illustrates the effectiveness of planning resource substitution
for a decreasing demand perturbations and enhancing the static system resilience.
Table 3.2 shows a three industry economy with given input-output transactions table.
From the table the interdependency matrix A∗ and the maximum possible demand
loss vector c∗(0) can be calculated, as shown in Equation (3.16). Also the substitution
measures for the three sectors given by the α vector are shown in Equation (3.16).
These values come from expert elicitation or previous recovery planning data based
on the properties of the system.
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Table 3.1: Two industry input-output transaction data in million of dollars
Industry 1 2 3
External Demand (c) Total Output (x)
($ US million) ($ US million)
1 266 378 230 126 1000
2 267 110 224 899 1500
3 340 340 468 52 1200
Value added 127 672 278
Total Output(xT ) 1000 1500 1200
A∗ =

0.27 0.38 0.23
0.18 0.073 0.15
0.28 0.28 0.39
 , c∗(0) =

0.13
0.59
0.04
 , α =

0.05
0.04
0.08
 (3.16)
Two results which can be obtained from the resource allocation problem are shown
in Figures 3.3(a) and 3.3(b). The decrease in the total economic losses for the en-
tire economy with increasing budget allocation provides a estimate of the impact of
budget allocation of the ability to improve system performance. Further, as shown
in Figure 3.3(a) the sector-wise allocation of budget shows the optimal distribution
of resource for most improved performances. In this example Industry 2 gets most
of the budget, which can be explained from the fact that it is most impacted by the
disruption. For low budget allocation almost all of the allocation goes to Industry 2.
Figure 3.3(b) highlights the returns from the resource investments in the individual
sectors and the entire economy. The net benefit of budget allocation can be estimated
as (Anderson et al., 2007)
Net Benefit = Loss when no allocation− Loss due to allocation− Allocation Cost
= Net loss avoided− Investment made (3.17)
This metric when plotted against the amount of resource allocation shows that be-
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yond a certain point there is a diminishing return of the investment. Hence, the
maximum limit till which budget/resource allocation makes gives increasing returns
can be accessed to help decision-making. As seen in Figure 3.3(b) investing resources
to Industry 3 beyond approximately $40 million does not provide any increasing re-
turns for the investments. Hence, excess budgets can be directed towards the other
two sectors for improving their performances. The above analysis is a basic frame-
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Figure 3.3: Trade-offs between investments in losses.
work for a static resilience improvement and estimation problem, where the decision
variable vector r can have different meanings depending upon the nature of the prob-
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lem.
3.3 Dynamic Resilience estimation
Dynamic resilience behavior adds the time element to recovery properties desired
from a system rebounding from disruptions. For economic systems the “speed of the
system towards achieving a desired state” (Rose, 2007) becomes a factor in determin-
ing how dynamically resilient it is. In the dynamic risk input-output model construct
most of the system behavior is indicative of a progression towards a stable state, and
also the system inoperability responses are bounded. Hence, the dynamic model is a
suitable candidate for analyzing and characterizing resilience in interdependent sys-
tems. We explore the dynamic risk input-output model behavior and build resilience
interpretations through it.
3.3.1 Dynamic behavior
The n sector dynamic risk input-output model, which was discussed previously in
Section 2.5.1, is restated here. This model, used for quantifying interdependent risk
recovery for economic sectors, is given by the first order different equation
q˙(t) = −K∗(I−A∗)q(t) + K∗c∗(t), ∀t > 0 (3.18)
The analytic solution of the differential Equation (3.18) is given as
q(t) = e−K
∗(I−A∗)tq(0) +
∫ t
0
e−K
∗(I−A∗)(t−z)K∗c∗(z)dz (3.19)
From Equation (3.19) it is evident that the temporal evolution of sector inoperability
depends on the initial inoperability vector q(0), demand perturbation vectors c∗(t) at
all times, model parameters K∗ and A∗ that effect the rate of recovery of the system.
62
From a system dynamics point of view the first term represents the motion that is
inherently driven by system properties, and the second term represents system dy-
namics due to forced external loading. Some model properties, previously explained,
are restated as follows:
1. The inoperability, qi(t) at any time t of sector i will lie between 0 and 1, where
a value of 0 means that there is no loss of output and a value of 1 shows total
loss of output. The q(t) vector can be treated as a measure of likelihood of
damage to interdependent sectors and hence it is a risk metric.
2. The demand perturbation, c∗(t) at any time t for sector i will lie between 0 for
no loss of demand and ci/xi < 1 for complete loss in demand of sector i output.
c∗(t) is a metric for measuring risk to interdependent sectors due to external
disturbances.
3. A∗ is a data-driven matrix derived from the Bureau of Economic Analysis data
(BEA., 2011). In Section 2.3.2 it was shown to be an irreducible non-negative
matrix with row sums less than 1. A∗ measures the degree of interdependence
between sectors, which provides an indication of the cascading effect of a dis-
ruption.
4. The K∗ matrix represents a short-term behavior of sectors to invest to adjust-
ments in changing outputs. In Section 2.5.3 we showed that when K∗ is a
diagonal matrix its elements are given as
K∗ =
{
diag(kii), 0 ≤ k∗ii ≤ 1(∀i = {1, 2, ..., n})
}
(3.20)
A K∗ with non-negative off-diagonal elements is also constructed in Section 2.5.3
and is an almost diagonal matrix. K∗ elements represent the speed with which
sectors can attain stable responses to changes in its production outputs and
63
demands.
5. The bounds that are established for the elements of the K∗ are determined by
the consideration that the matrix K∗(I−A∗) has positive eigenvalues. This
guarantees that the solution of Equation (3.19) does not diverge, which is an
important consideration for modeling recovery through the model.
From a resilient recovery perspective we need to investigate possible functional
forms of Equation (3.19) that suggest the system approaches towards an equilibrium
state. Three possible cases are considered for analysis.
No demand perturbations
This condition arises when the disruption only affects the supply of economic com-
modities due to a direct impact on industry facilities. Such impacts would have
localized effects leading to partial failure of economic sector productivity, but would
not be widespread enough to affect demand losses. Mathematically it means c∗ = 0,∀t
in Equation (3.19), which eliminates the second term to give
q(t) = e−K
∗(I−A∗)tq(0) (3.21)
The above solution always leads to the stable state q(t) → 0, t → ∞, due to the
exponential decay term. This implies that economic sectors are able to recover from
supply only disruptions as long as they have some resilience. Such resilience can be
built through component redundancies.
Constant demand perturbations
When the final demand perturbations are stationary during the entire time of analysis,
the disruption is said to have lead to a constant demand perturbation. This condition
implies that the economy has never fully recovered from the impact and there are
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always some residual demand perturbations, which might arise either due to inability
of the economic sectors to meet final demands or decrease in demand from final
consumers. In Equation (3.19) if we substitute c∗(t) = c∗,∀t, the time-dependent
inoperability becomes
q(t) = (I−A∗)−1c∗ + e−K∗(I−A∗)t[q(0)− (I−A∗)−1c∗] (3.22)
The stable state solution of the above Equation is q(t→∞) = (I−A∗)−1c∗, because
of the exponential decay term approaches zero over time. This stable state condition
solution shows that at equilibrium the dynamic model reduces to the static inoper-
ability input-output model. Such a condition is desirable for the input-output based
economy because it shows the natural tendency of the system towards balancing the
demand and supply shortages. For resilient economic recovery c∗ should be such that
q(t → ∞) ≤ q(0) because it is desirable to move towards an equilibrium condition
that is better than the initial system state. Hence, c∗ should be a low value indicating
only some residual shortages that exist in the economy.
Exponentially decreasing demand perturbations
A generalized recovery behavior is represented by demand perturbations that dissipate
after an initial impact. There are entire families of curves that can be used to plan
or represent the recovery of the demand perturbations over time. Exponentially
decaying demand perturbations cover a wide variety of complex planning and behavior
patterns, making them natural fits for quantifying system recoveries. If the demand
perturbation is given as c∗(t) = e−Ptc∗(0), where P is a matrix for the rate of decay
of demand perturbations. P = diag(pi), 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1 would represent a good choice for
the rate of recovery planning or behavior for each sector. Substituting the value of
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c∗(t) into Equation (3.19) the time-dependent inoperability becomes.
q(t) = e−PtZ−1K∗c∗(0) + e−K
∗(I−A∗)t[q(0)− Z−1K∗c∗(0)] (3.23)
where Z = [K∗(I−A∗)−P]. For mathematical design purposes, the choice of matrix
Z is made such that it is invertible. The stable state condition for the Equation (3.23)
inoperability is q(t→∞) = 0, which is achieved quicker with larger values of pi.
An example problem is provided to give a visual presentation of the model dy-
namics generated from the above three disruption scenarios. A two-sector economy
is considered here with an input-output transaction as shown in Table 3.2. From
the data the interdependency matrix A∗ is calculated and shown in Equation (3.25).
The K∗ matrix is assumed to be a diagonal matrix with diagonal elements equal to
0.5 for both sectors. It is also assumed that a disruptive event occurs and causes
an initial inoperability in sector 2, while sector 1 does not have any initial inoper-
ability. Demand perturbation considered for the three scenarios are also shown in
Equation (3.25). Figure 3.4 shows the operability (1 - q(t)) profiles for the sector
recoveries for the three scenarios presented here.
Table 3.2: Two industry input-output transaction data in million of dollars
Industry 1 2 External Demand (c) Total Output (x)
1 250 400 350 1000
2 200 100 1700 2000
Value added 550 1500
Total Output(xT ) 1000 2000
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A∗ =
 0.25 0.40
0.10 0.05
 , K∗ =
 0.5 0
0 0.5
 , q(0) =
 0
0.5
 ,
Case 1: c∗(t) =
 0
0
 , Case 2: c∗(t) =
 0
0.2
 , (3.24)
Case 3: c∗(t) =
 0
0.3e−0.05t
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Figure 3.4: Dynamic profiles for sector operability vs time signifying recoveries from
three scenarios of disruptions for a two sector economy. (a) Sector 1 risk profiles, and
(b) Sector 2 risk profiles, for the three disruption scenarios characterized respectively
by zero, constant and exponentially decaying demand perturbations. All scenarios
show some form of recovery after initial impact.
3.3.2 Metrics for resilience using the dynamic risk input-output model
Having established that the dynamic risk input-output model is capable of model-
ing sector recoveries we need to quantify resilience through this model. For this
the methodologies developed in the engineering resilience framework are explored
and related to the model. Bruneau et al. (2003) developed a framework for seis-
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mic resilience estimation that captured technical, organizational, social and economic
aspects of community behavior. The quantitative concepts of this framework ap-
ply to the dynamic economic resilience estimation framework we intend to discuss.
Seismic resilience is estimated by measuring the expected degradation of the system
from the time immediately after an earthquake till it makes suitable recovery. Fig-
ure 3.5 shows the graphical representation and the formulation for measuring system
resilience based on the quality of the system at each time. From this approach, called
the resilience triangle approach, the loss of resilience is quantified by the metric R
which gives the shaded area showing the loss of quality during recovery. Based on this
approach resilience is contended to have four dimensions applicable to any general
system behavior characteristics.
1. Robustness - The measure of the sector’s ability to resist the initial impact.
2. Rapidity - The measure for the time it takes a sector to attain recovery.
3. Redundancy - Ability of the sector to substitute for lost product through in-
ventories and other means.
4. Resourcefulness - Capacity enhancing capabilities of a sector to improve its
performance.
As shown in the Figure 3.5, the resilience triangle concentrates on quantifying
system resilience in terms of the robustness and rapidity, which are understood to
be achieved through incorporating redundancy and resourcefulness into the system
(Bruneau et al., 2003). Research on the resilience triangle concept has been extended
to include better methods to measure the resilience through multiple triangles showing
more redundancies (Bruneau & Reinhorn, 2007), finding the area beneath the curve
which actually indicates resilience (Cimellaro et al., 2010; Zobel, 2010, 2011). Prob-
abilistic approaches have also been incorporated into the resilience triangle approach
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Figure 3.5: Resilience triangle concept showing the measures of robustness and ra-
pidity and the calculation of the loss of resilience which is the shaded area (Bruneau
et al., 2003).
(Chang & Shinozuka, 2004; Bruneau & Reinhorn, 2007).
Although resilience quantified through the above approach is based on four sys-
tem characteristics it ultimately measures one quantity encapsulating entire system
behavior. Zobel (2010, 2011) contend that a multi-dimensional representation of re-
silience is necessary because a single metric could be misleading. Mathematically the
areas within two triangles can be the same indicating the same amount of resilience,
but one behavior could be due to high robustness and low rapidity while the other
might be the opposite. Figure 3.6 highlights this point. Such considerations require
multiple metrics in the resilience estimation framework. Vugrin et al. (2010) discuss
the importance of and develop metrics for building an infrastructure and economic
resilience framework.
By its very definition and equation structure, the dynamic risk input-output model
can be used to measure and quantify resilience. The four dimensions of infrastructure
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Figure 3.6: Resilience triangles having same shaded areas but different robustness and
rapidity conditions. (a) Higher impacts but faster recovery, and (b) Lower impact
but slower recovery.
resilience can be explained through the model to develop a multiple metric frame-
work for building economic resilience frameworks. In previous dynamic inoperability
input-output model (DIIM) analysis resilience is understood only in terms of the K∗
matrix. Haimes et al. (2005b); Lian & Haimes (2006) call the coefficients of K∗ in-
dustry resilience coefficients that measure the efficacy of a sector’s risk managements
options. For the diagonal K∗, with diagonal elements between 0 and 1, higher re-
silience is indicated by closeness of elements towards 1 and lower resilience means
diagonal elements tend towards zeros. Treating the K∗ matrix as the only indica-
tor of resilience is an incomplete and inaccurate analysis approach. In fact K∗ is a
factor that contributes towards the interdependent system resilience, and the actual
resilience is built on such contributions. Figure 3.7 shows the caveat in treating K∗ as
the only resilience metric. Using the two sector example data of Table 3.2 we consider
responses to same initial inoperability and demand perturbation conditions for two
different K∗ matrices. Using same q(0) as in Equation (3.25) and c∗ = 0,∀t we find
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responses for a lower K1 and a higher K2 resilience matrices given in Equation (3.25).
Given c∗ = 0,∀t and
A∗ =
 0.25 0.40
0.10 0.05
 , q(0) =
 0
0.5
 , (3.25)
K∗1 =
 0.2 0
0 0.2
 , K∗2 =
 1 0
0 1

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Figure 3.7: Sector 1 dynamic response profiles showing sector operability vs time from
two different K∗ matrices. The plot shows the trade-off between higher immediate
impacts and recovery times for the two different K∗ choices.
The analysis shows that for industry Sector 1 having a higher values for diagonal
K∗ leads to faster time to recovery but comes at a cost of increasing the initial impacts
of disruptions. Hence, there is a trade off between achieving faster recovery at the
cost of higher cascading impacts. Due to the coupling effects from interdependency
the choice of higher K∗ can lead to adverse non-desirable effects.
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We need multiple metrics for a holistic quantification of resilience and measuring
such trade-offs between the metrics. The three metrics proposed here to explain
resilience through the dynamic risk input-output model are related to the resilience
triangle approach and in essence explain the four resilience dimensions of the Bruneau
et al. (2003) framework.
Time averaged level of operability for a sector
The overall level of functionality maintained by a system, starting from the time of
initiation of disruptive effect till any time horizon, provides a good indication of its
resilience to the disruptive event. From the dynamic risk input-output model the
measure 1 − qi(t) is the level of operability of sector i at each instance of time and
can be used to quantify the overall sector functionality level. Starting at t = 0, if
the system is being monitored till a long time t = T then overall system performance
can be quantified in terms of the time averaged level of operability over the analysis
period. This metric, which we call Fi, is given in Equation (3.26) as
Fi =
1
T
∫ t=T
t=0
[
1− qi(t)
]
dt = 1− 1
T
∫ t=T
t=0
qi(t)dt (3.26)
From Equation (3.26) we observe that 0 ≤ Fi ≤ 1, with Fi = 0 occurring for a
totally inoperable system (qi(t) = 1,∀t ∈ [0, T ]) and Fi = 1 corresponding to a fully
functional system (qi(t) = 0, ∀t ∈ [0, T ]) during the entire time of analysis. Typically a
system would prefer to have Fi closer to 1 because it indicates high levels of operability
at each time step. A certain level of consideration needs to be made in deciding the
time T over which the system functionality is being measured. In most analysis the
dynamic risk input-output being used provides an exponentially decaying solution
for sector inoperability. After a certain time the model values converge towards
almost zero values. If T is large integral term involving qi(t) in Equation (3.26)
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will converge towards zero (limT→∞ 1T
∫ t=T
t=0
qi(t)dt = 0) and the measure Fi(T ) → 1.
A case-based study for the possible values for T and Fi is required based on the
particular trajectory of qi(t), which depends upon the external forcing c
∗
i (t)∀i. The
vector representation F of the Equation (3.26) metric for the entire n sector economy
is given in Equation (3.27). Here 1 in a n× 1 vector of ones.
F = 1−
∫ t=T
t=0
q(t)dt (3.27)
Zobel (2010, 2011) have used a similar approach to define a normalized resilience
metric from the area beneath the resilience triangle, which they call the predicted
resilience of a system. Fi can also be related to the economic loss metric Qi, which
is widely used in inoperability loss estimation studies of the infrastructure systems
(Barker, 2008; Barker & Santos, 2010a). For a dynamic inoperability response Qi is
defined as
Qi = xi
∫ T
t=0
qi(t)dt (3.28)
Hence, its functional relationship with Fi is as expressed as
Fi = 1− Qi
xiT
=
xiT −Qi
xiT
(3.29)
Equation (3.29) suggests that if xiT represents the maximum loss the system could
have incurred then Fi is a measure of the amount of loss the system avoided as fraction
of potential maximum damage. This is consistent with the static economic resilience
definition (Rose, 2007), which is often used as an overall performance measure even
for dynamic system analysis.
73
Maximum loss of sector functionality
The immediate impact of a disruptive event on an infrastructure system is felt through
the degradation of its output producing capacity. In addition, if the external demands
for output are perturbed system operability is further eroded. A preferred resilient
system is one that is capable of maintaining a high level of initial operability and
continues being as much operable as possible during disruptions. In reality there are
events that a capable of causing systems to lose most of their functionality, which
makes it difficult for them to operate at high levels of productivity. As such there is
interest in understanding the worst effect a disruption can have on the infrastructures
before they can recover to better levels of performance. Since resilience is associated
with the capability of a system to bounce back or recoil from disruptions, getting
a perspective of the lowest productivity levels during recovery is needed to develop
an understanding for system resilience. In the dynamic risk input-output model it is
assumed that any infrastructure is capable of recovering from any level of inoperability
below one to an equilibrium condition. Hence, in the model, inoperability reaches a
maximum value before the sector rebounds towards recovery. This maximum sector
i inoperability, called maximum loss of functionality, is quantified as
qmi = max
t≥0
[qi(t)] (3.30)
It is clear from Equation (3.30) that 0 ≤ qmi ≤ 1 since it is directly measured in terms
of inoperability which lies between zero and one. Like the previous resilience metric
a case-based study is required for quantifying possible ranges in which qmi values lie
depending upon the trajectory taken by the time-dependent inoperability. The n
sector vector for maximum loss of functionality is expressed as
qm = max
t≥0
[q(t)] (3.31)
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1 − qmi is referred to the robustness measure in the resilience triangle framework,
although there is a slight difference between its interpretation in the two approaches.
In the engineering based interpretation robustness implies the ability to resist the
direct impact and avoid immediate damages (Bruneau et al., 2003; McDaniels et al.,
2008), which would be measured in terms 1− qi(0). qmi can manifest itself at a later
time as seen in Figure 3.7, because it comes from a coupled system response and
highlights the reaction of one sector to shocks in others. In the end strengthening
robustness or reducing qmi require similar planning strategies that enhance sector and
overall system performances.
Time to recovery
Dynamic resilience is best understood in context to the speed of recovery of systems.
The faster a system is able to recover from a disruptive event the more resilient it is
supposed to be. The notion of system recovery is important when trying to under-
stand the time it takes to recover. For an ideal resilient system recovery implies return
to pre-disruption levels of productivity and thereafter the capability to maintain func-
tionality at the same levels. In reality systems might not be able to reorganize and
recover to pre-disruption output levels due to the existence of permanent losses or
different evaluation standards. Hence, recovery is best understood in terms of the
capability of the system to achieve a stable condition where productivity levels are
higher than they were immediately after the disruptive impacts. In the dynamic
risk input-output model analysis we showed that the infrastructure systems approach
equilibrium conditions from different initial inoperability and demand perturbation
forcing conditions. Hence, we can define a suitable resilience metric, called the time
to recover for indicating sector recovery through the dynamic model. As the dynamic
model analysis suggests, the equilibrium levels of sector inoperability depending upon
different dynamic conditions are known. Thus, time of recovery is measured in terms
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of said equilibrium level inoperabilities. If for sector i the equilibrium inoperability
is given as qei then its time to recovery τi is defined as the time when its inoperability
qi(t) is within an (<< 1) neighborhood of q
e
i . This is stated in Equation (3.32) as
τi =
{
t : t > 0, |qi(t)− qei | ≤ 
}
(3.32)
Similar to the above two metrics, the time to recoveries of all the sectors can be
collected in an n× n matrix defined as
τ = diag
[
τ1, τ2, ..., τn
]
(3.33)
Time to recovery is synonymous with the notion of rapidity in all dynamic re-
silience frameworks (Bruneau et al., 2003; Rose, 2007), with slight difference in its
role here. Rapidity is always associated with an improved dynamic resilience, because
it is understood that recovery brings the system from its worst initial condition to a
desired state and the increased speed implies more resilience. As shown in Figure 3.7
there is a tradeoff between the time to recover and maximum inoperability, which
shows that increased speed does not always lead to a better performance throughout.
Again system interdependence brings about such behaviors.
The graphical representation of the three resilience metrics generated from a gen-
eral sector response to disruption is shown in Figure 3.8. Parallels can be drawn with
the Figure 3.5 resilience triangle.
3.3.3 Relationship between the resilience metrics
Since the three resilience metrics defined above come from the dynamic risk input-
output model, a functional relationship exists between them. Investigating such a
function that relates the three metrics gives us a sense of bounds associated with
the each metric based on its dependence on the other two. Moreover we can find
76
!"#$%
&
'$
()
*"
+",
-%
qm
τ!"#$%,.%($/.0$(-1%
2)3"#4#%+.55%.6%647/8.7)+",-1%
T =
!"#$%)0$()9$:%+$0$+%.6%.'$()*"+",-1%
F =
Shaded Area
T
Figure 3.8: Resilience metrics as given by the dynamic risk input-output model.
the values for two of the metrics and use them to make an educated guess about
the possible value of the third metric. From the definitions of the resilience metrics
it is convenient to represent the time averaged level of operability in terms of the
maximum loss of functionality and the time to recovery. Equation (3.34) gives the
general functional form that expresses the relationship between the resilience metrics
Fi = gi(T, q
m
i , τi) ⇐⇒ F = g(T,qm, τ ) (3.34)
The functional form of g can be developed by looking at the definitions developed
from Equations (3.26) to (3.33). Fi given in Equation (3.27) can be estimated as
Fi = 1− 1
T
∫ t=τi
t=0
qi(t)dt− 1
T
∫ t=T
t=τi
qi(t)dt (3.35)
Since, by definition τi represents a time to attain stability the level of sector inop-
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erability can be considered time invariant beyond τi. Substituting the equilibrium
inoperability estimation qei of Equation (3.32) in Equation (3.35) we get
Fi = 1− 1
T
∫ t=τi
t=0
qi(t)dt− 1
T
∫ t=T
t=τi
qei dt
= 1− (1− τ
T
)
qei −
1
T
∫ t=τi
t=0
qi(t)dt (3.36)
This relationship can be generalized to the entire interdependent economy to get the
average operability vector F as
F = 1− (I− τ
T
)
qe − 1
T
∫ t=τ
t=0
q(t)dt (3.37)
The particular form of the functional relationship in Equation (3.37) is further
explained when we look at specific functions for the time-dependent sector inoper-
ability. Therefore the expressions for inoperabilities derived previously will be used
here to explain the exact functional relationships.
No demand disruptions
The interdependent inoperability vector for this case is an exponential decaying func-
tion and was calculated in Equation (3.21). It can be substituted into the Equa-
tion (3.37) expression for the time averaged level of operability.
F = 1− (I− τ
T
)
qe − 1
T
∫ t=τ
t=0
e−K
∗(I−A∗)tq(0)dt
= 1− 1
T
[1− e−K∗(I−A∗)τ ][K∗(I−A∗)]−1q(0) (3.38)
As shown before the equilibrium inoperability is given as qe = 0, which is achieved at
τ →∞. For numerical and practical purposes we can assume that each τi represents a
time beyond which there is no significant sector inoperability and numerically qi(t) ≈
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0,∀t > τi. Also, it is clear here that sector inoperabilities are obtained through
the product of an exponentially decaying matrix function with a vector. Hence,
for simplicity it is assumed that the maximum sector inoperabilities occur initially,
which means qm = q(0). This might not be the general case as some inoperability
grow from their initial levels due to system couplings. Substituting for qm into the
Equation (3.38) the functional relationship between the resilience metrics is described
through Equation (3.39)
F = 1− 1
T
[1− e−K∗(I−A∗)τ ][K∗(I−A∗)]−1qm (3.39)
Constant demand perturbations
Similar to the case-based analysis for the no demand perturbation scenario we can
find a relationship between the resilience metrics for a constant demand perturbation
scenario. The time-dependent inoperability for this case was also calculated pre-
viously in Equation (3.22) and needs to be plugged into Equation (3.37). Here the
equilibrium inoperability is qe = [I−A∗]−1c∗ and again it is assumed that qm = q(0).
F = 1− (I−A∗)−1c∗ − 1
T
[1− e−K∗(I−A∗)τ ][K∗(I−A∗)]−1[qm
− (I−A∗)−1c∗] (3.40)
Exponential decaying demand perturbations
The Equation (3.23) expression for the time-dependent inoperability is used to calcu-
late the desired functional relationship in this case. As shown before, since this is an
exponential decaying response qe = 0. Similar to previous assumptions qm = q(0)
for this case also. Equation (3.41) provides the required expression relating F to T ,
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τ and qm.
F = 1− 1
T
[1− e−Pτ ]P−1Z−1K∗c∗(0)
− 1
T
[1− e−K∗(I−A∗)τ ][K∗(I−A∗)]−1[qm − Z−1K∗c∗(0)] (3.41)
3.3.4 Decision space generated by resilience metrics
Evaluating system performances through the resilience metrics allows for better un-
derstanding of the system, which leads to better decision-making. By capturing the
overall resilience through the F metric and also through the characteristics that sig-
nify system robustness and rapidity allows for comparison between different disruption
scenarios (Zobel, 2011). Since, we have been able to obtain a functional relationship
between the metrics it is possible to use two metrics and estimate the third. This pro-
vides an overall picture for system performance objectives. Equations (3.39) to (3.41)
are complex matrix functions that can become difficult to solve because they require
measures for recovery times and maximum inoperabilities for all the sectors. Hence,
getting a decision support through these constructs can becomes quite challenging.
Nevertheless these equations provide valuable information that allows us to develop a
visualization between the resilience metrics. We propose utilizing the functional forms
of the derived functions for building a visualization tool for specific sectors. From
example the Equation (3.39) suggests that for the no demand perturbation case the
sector specific relationship between the resilience metrics is of the form
Fi = 1− 1
αiT
(1− e−αiτi)qmi (3.42)
where αi denotes some measure of interdependence suggested through K
∗(I−A∗)
matrix. Oliva et al. (2010) suggest that the term
∑n
j=1 a
∗
ij can be treated as quick
global evaluation for sector resilience. It is called a dependency index because it
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reflects the infrastructures capabilities to maintain functionality under maximum in-
terdependent inoperabilities. Deriving from the matrix form of Equation (3.39) the
term αi can take the values given by Equation (3.43), which is obtained by assuming
a diagonal K∗ matrix.
αi = k
∗
ii
(
1−
n∑
j=1
a∗ij
)
(3.43)
The above value for αi can be utilized to reflect a decision-maker’s control over the sys-
tem resilience by controlling the possible values for k∗ii. Combining expressions (3.42)
and (3.43) provides a functional form for quick visualization of the system resilience
metric relationships, that can be controlled through changing the degree of interde-
pendence. A contour plot showing isolines for Fi based on all combination for τi
and qmi can be constructed to generate a decision space that reflects recovery and
maximum impacts for same levels of overall functionalities. The two-sector example
problem previously discussed in Table 3.2 is considered here to show such contour
plots. From the data we get the following relationships between the resilience metrics
F1 = 1− 1
0.35k∗11T
(1− e−0.35k∗11τ1)qm1
F2 = 1− 1
0.85k∗22T
(1− e−0.85k∗22τ2)qm2 (3.44)
From Equation (3.44) Figures 3.9 and 3.10 show, respectively for Sector 1 and 2,
the contour lines for Fi as τi and q
m
i vary for different choices of kii. Similar analysis
is also presented in generating a multi-dimensional decision-space using the resilience
triangle construct (Zobel, 2010, 2011; Zobel & Khansa, 2011). Such plots generate
a decision-space which can be used to estimate the outcome of system performance
when choosing recovery strategies reflected through K∗. The values on the contour
isolines, which denote the Fi values, can indicate to the decision-maker the outcome
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of different k∗ii choices. A comparison is made in Figure 3.9 between two outcomes,
shown as dots on the plots, that result in same recovery time and overall operability,
but vary in the maximum inoperability values. Hence the choice of k∗11 = 0.8 is
better in this case because it results in lower maximum losses while maintaining same
values for other performance metrics. Similar tradeoffs can be accessed through the
two decision-spaces for Sector 2. In general it is seen that higher k∗ii leads to faster
recovery and higher average operabilities for same levels of maximum inoperabilities.
Another way of utilizing the resilience metrics is done through planning for the amount
of investment required in rebuilding or substitution to recover from a disruption.
This is quantified through the value of K∗ elements that could indicate the desired
tradeoff between the metrics. An example problem of such planning is presented in
Equation (3.45). For the given interdependency matrix A∗ it is known that there are
not demand perturbations, and there is an initial inoperability q(0) that shows sector
2 suffers more disruption than sector 1. For sector 1 the decision is to determine the
effect of its k∗11 planning on its resilience metrics, given that k
∗
22 = 1. Figure 3.11 shows
both the change of maximum sector inoperability (qm) and average inoperability
(1−F ) with the change in recovery time as k∗11 is varied from 1 to 0. As k∗11 is increased
from 0 to 1 the time to recovery decreases along with the average inoperability, but
the maximum inoperability increases. This shows a tradeoff analysis between the
metrics that can be useful for resilience planning.
Given c∗ = 0,∀t and (3.45)
A∗ =
 0.25 0.40
0.10 0.05
 , q(0) =
 0.1
0.5
 , K∗ =
 k∗11 0
0 1

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Figure 3.9: Sector 1 contour lines of F1 for varying τ1 and q
m
1 for two type of responses
generated as a result of choosing different k∗11 values. Decisions can be made between
the two options based on where the sector performance lies on the plots.
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Figure 3.10: Sector 2 contour lines of F2 for varying τ2 and q
m
2 for two type of responses
generated as a result of choosing different k∗22 values. Decisions can be made between
the two options based on where the sector performance lies on the plots.
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Figure 3.11: Sector 1 relationships between maximum inoperability (qm1 ) and average
inoperability (1− F1) vs recovery time (τ) for varying k∗11 values. As k∗11 is increased
from 0 to 1 the time to recovery decreases along with the average inoperability, but
the maximum inoperability increases. This shows a tradeoff analysis between the
metrics that can be useful for resilience planning.
3.4 Adaptive resilience planning
The static and dynamic resilience estimation and planning schemes developed so far
are based on the assumption that disruptive impacts are felt one time or follow a
fixed trajectory during recovery. In the dynamic domain it is realistic to assume that
disruption occurs in phases or there are multiple disruptions that affect the system. As
such the system needs to readjust its recovery behavior and reevaluate its resilience.
This means that the K∗ matrix needs to be updated in order to accommodate such
readjustment, which leads towards an an adaptive resilience estimation model.
In effect updating the K∗ matrix shows the systems capability to “maintain func-
tion on the basis of ingenuity or extra effort” (Rose, 2009a). Such resilience has an
emergent property that allows the system to reorganize against the changing risk
(Haimes et al., 2008). The discussion here suggests a scheme of modeling dynamic
resilient responses due to the changing risks.
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3.4.1 An adaptive dynamic risk input-output model
The dynamic risk input-output model developed so far can also be used for estimating
adaptive resilience for sector recoveries. Resilience is developed against disruptions
in the supply, which are treated as instantaneous effects similar to the onset of the
initial inoperability q(0). Also, resilience is developed for changing demand pertur-
bations, which can be continuos in time. Given the dynamic risk input-output model
of Equation (3.18) it is assumed that new disruptions occur at times 0, t1, t2, ....., tn
where 0 < t1 < t2 < ..... < ts. Also, it is assumed that the disruptions in sup-
ply/inoperability are quantified through the series of vectors d(0),d(t1), ...,d(ts).
These disruptions add onto the already existing inoperability in the system, which
implies that the inoperabilities are effected as
q(0) = d(0)
q(t1) → q(t1) + d(t1)
...
q(tn) → q(tn) + d(tn) (3.46)
Disruptions can also have an effect on the demand perturbations, which means c∗(t)
can be divided into different time intervals to reflect the changes in the demand side
c∗(t) =

c∗0−t1(t) 0 ≤ t < t1
c∗t1−t2(t) t1 ≤ t < t2
...
...
c∗≥ts(t) ts ≤ t <∞
(3.47)
Using Equations (3.46) and (3.47) we can divide the time evolution of inoperabil-
ity into intervals that divide the different shocks and their effects. Equation (3.48)
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provides the formulation for the evolving inoperability
q(t) =

e−K
∗
1(I−A∗)tq(0) +
∫ t
0
e−K
∗
1(I−A∗)(t−z)K∗1c
∗(z)dz 0 ≤ t < t1
e−K
∗
2(I−A∗)(t−t1)q(t1) +
∫ t2
t1
e−K
∗
2(I−A∗)(t2−z)K∗2c
∗(z)dz t1 ≤ t < t2
...
...
e−K
∗
s+1(I−A∗)(t−ts)q(ts) +
∫ t
ts
e−K
∗
s+1(I−A∗)(t−z)K∗s+1c
∗(z)dz ts ≤ t <∞
(3.48)
As shown in the above equation, for recovery from a new impact of the disruptive
event on the system would require different K∗ estimates. Hence K∗ is adapting to the
requirements of the new system behavior. From Equation (3.48) the inoperability in a
time interval tk ≤ t < tk+1 can be transformed into a time interval 0 ≤ t′ < (tk+1− tk)
where the model evolution now becomes
q′(t′) = e−K
∗
k+1(I−A∗)t′q′(0)
+
∫ t′
0
e−K
∗
k+1(I−A∗)(t′−z)K∗k+1c
′∗(z)dz, 0 ≤ t′ < (tk+1 − tk)
(3.49)
where q′(t′) = q(t − tk), q′(0) = q(tk) and c′∗(t′) = c∗(t − tk). Hence we have a
series of dynamic risk input-output models for each time interval that can be used
for analysis of an adaptive response to disruptions.
An example problem shows how the inoperability response evolves when multiple
disruptions affect the system. We consider the two sector economy system given in
Table 3.2 whose interdependency matrix is restated here in Equation (3.50). As-
suming that there are no demand perturbations in the economy, but three supply
disruptions given in Equation (3.50) occur at times 0, 10 and 25. Different values of
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K∗ are used in the recovery planning as given in Equation (3.51).
A∗ =
 0.25 0.40
0.10 0.05
 , d(0) =
 0
0.5
 ,
d(10) =
 0.2
0
 , d(25) =
 0.1
0.1
 (3.50)
K∗0−9 =
 0.5 0
0 0.5
 , K∗10−24 =
 0.2 0
0 0.2
 , K∗≥25 =
 0.8 0
0 0.8
 (3.51)
Figure 3.12 shows the evolution of the sector operabilities due to the above values
of K∗ in response to the multiple disruptions. The resilience metrics that were devel-
oped in Section 3.3.2 can be applied to the adaptive analysis to also understand the
system performance due to different resilience decisions.
3.5 Summary and discussion
This Chapter presented resilience estimation models for static and dynamic systems.
It was argued that the static risk input-output model is in itself a resilience estima-
tion scheme and thus can can be used to improve infrastructure resilience through
risk management. The risk management problem is in essence a method to reduce
the demand perturbation effects for the interdependent systems, which results in low-
ering the direct and indirect cascading inoperability effects of the disruptions. In
general there are several decision-making options available, which are geared towards
reducing the demand perturbations. It is assumed, and there is plausibility in such
an assumption, that the decision-maker has a mathematical model that signifies the
effectiveness of the risk policies in decreasing the demand risks. Hence the primary
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Figure 3.12: Operability profiles showing sector recoveries due to different K∗ matrices
to adapt to multiple disruptions of the interdependent system.
objective of the static resilience scheme is to come up with a decision to allocate the
policies across interdependent sectors subjected to budget constraints for implement-
ing said policies. The guiding objective of the planning decision is the preference
to lower the total economic losses for the entire economy. For a particular budget
resource allocation problem the solution of the risk management problem shows the
effectiveness of budget allocation, and the limit beyond which there is no need to al-
locate more budget. Overall the scheme is a useful optimization based methodology
that can provide planners with simple metrics and a prescription for strengthening
static resilience in an interdependent economy.
Resilience is also constructed in the domain of the dynamic risk input-output
model. The lack of a proper resilience estimation scheme in the dynamic model do-
main motivates the formulation of metrics that describe resilience. Even though the
model has been capable of describing interdependent infrastructure resilience, its in-
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terpretation of resilience has been flawed. This is corrected here and improved to
provide a holistic resilience construct through the dynamic model. Three charac-
teristics in dynamic resilience behavior namely the average sector level of function-
ality/operability, the maximum inoperability/loss of functionality and the time to
recovery are described. These provide a complete picture for resilience estimation in
dynamic systems because they reflect the notion that resilience should indicate the
ability to maintain functionality and posses a speed to recovery.
The usefulness of generating a trio of resilience metrics for the dynamic system
behavior is shown through the conceptual and mathematical decision-making scheme
that is prescribed here. The resilience metrics can be related to each other by a
function, which typically expresses the average sector level of functionality in terms
of the maximum inoperability and the time to recovery. As such a decision space can
be generated to give the tradeoffs between the choice of resilience planning options,
which are reflected through the values taken by the metrics.
Generating an adaptive scheme for resilience estimation and dynamic model be-
havior is a natural extension of the dynamic risk input-output model. Such an exten-
sion has been missing from previous research. An adaptive model is a better repre-
sentative of actual recovery behavior because there are multiple shocks and changing
resilience properties that are exhibited by the system. The resilience metric schemes
can be also applied to the adaptive model behavior.
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Chapter 4
Robust Static Resilience Planning Under an Uncertainty
Framework
4.1 Introduction
The risk input-output model is a data-driven model. It contains uncertainties due
to inaccuracies in data collection, including source data and assumptions inherent in
input-output analysis. Some input-output assumptions that create uncertainty are
the linearity or proportionality assumption, the allocation of resources distributed
across sectors, and aggregation of multiple sectors into bigger sectors. In addition,
the risk-based parameters such as demand perturbations and initial inoperabilities
used in decision-making depend upon events that are often extreme in nature and
difficult to understand a priori.
This Chapter discusses the nature of uncertainties in the problem at hand and
provides planning solutions to the decision-makers for the worst-case uncertainties.
The relevant research questions here is:
What is the nature of the uncertainties present in the optimization scheme and
how do they affect the problem formulations and solutions? What decision-
making formulations can be constructed to consider the extreme realizations
of the uncertainties in decision planning? Can we guarantee that the planning
solutions are robust to every uncertainty specified within a prescribed limit?
Section 4.2 discusses the solution approach that answers the questions posed
above. Uncertainties in the available data change the problem objective due to which
the static resilience risk management questions posed in Section 3.2.1 has to be re-
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formulated. While previously the planning objective was to minimize the overall
economic losses with given budgets, due to uncertainty there is no certainty as the
how much loss reduction would occur for a given budget allocation. Since planners
would like to have estimates for their budgets the problem objective changes to es-
timating the required amounts of resource allocations when economic losses need to
be kept below certain thresholds. Section 4.2.1 elaborates this further.
Since there is interest in analyzing the extreme uncertainty effects on the planning
solutions the optimization problem is formulated as a robust optimization scheme.
Section 4.2.2 gives the general guidelines that need to be followed to make the robust
formulations. The nature of the uncertainties are fundamental to understanding so-
lutions to planning objectives. Section 4.2.3 constructs the uncertainty sets that are
vital to the solution of the robust problem. These uncertainty sets are constructed to
reflect the real world interpretations of uncertainties in the input-output scheme and
the model physics itself. The robust formulations to the nominal problems are built
from the given uncertainty sets in Section 4.2.4. Robust formulations increase the
problem dimensions considerably but here they preserve the nominal problem struc-
ture and hence are useful. The Section 4.3 example problem highlights the usefulness
of the robust schemes by showing that small data uncertainties have great affect on
the planning solutions, which are accounted for in the robust solution. Section 4.4
concludes the work.
4.2 Robust optimization in static resilience
4.2.1 Reformulating the risk management problem due to uncertainty
In Section 3.2.1 we presented the framework for building and strengthening static re-
silience through the inoperability input-output model. The framework was based on
the notion that static economic resilience can be improved through optimal allocation
91
of risk management options that contribute towards decreasing the demand pertur-
bations that drive direct and indirect disruption propagation effects (Santos, 2006).
For an n sector economic system we formulated a resource allocation based optimiza-
tion framework whose objective is to minimize the total economic loss Q subjective to
budget constraints. Also it is assumed that there are functional relationships between
demand perturbations (c∗) and the effectiveness of the risk management options (r)
that suggest decrease in demand perturbations as the risk management efficacy is
increased. For m ≤ n sectors impacted by initial demand perturbations c∗(0) the
static resilience planning problem we formulated is restated below.
min Q = xᵀ[I−A∗]−1c∗
subject to
c∗l = fl(c
∗
l (0), rl),∀l = {1, 2, ...,m}∑m
l=1 gl(rl) ≤ b
rl ≥ 0,∀l = {1, 2, ...,m}
(4.1)
where x is the n× 1 vector of sector outputs, I is an n× n identity matrix, A∗ is the
n × n interdependency matrix, fl is the functional relationship between the sector l
initial demand perturbation c∗l (0) and the risk management option rl, gl is the cost
function for implementing the risk management option rl and b is the budget limit
for implements risk management in the entire economy.
In Section 3.2.1 we discussed the solution of the optimization problem when r
denote budget allocations, which are related to the demand perturbations through
an exponentially function. Equation (4.2) is a particular case of the Equation (4.1),
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where αl > 0 is the measure of the effectiveness of the resource allocation.
min Q = xᵀ[I−A∗]−1c∗
subject to
c∗l = c
∗
l (0)e
−αlrl ,∀l = {1, 2, ...,m}∑m
l=1 rl ≤ b
rl ≥ 0,∀l = {1, 2, ...,m}
(4.2)
The above decision-making framework is a convex optimization problem, for which
the solution was obtained through the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (Boyd & Vandenberghe,
2004) optimality conditions. Even though it is a convenient framework for resilience
strengthening through risk management planning there are some important system
considerations that are omitted in the analysis. Primarily the framework is built
on the assumption that the system properties and behavior are deterministic, which
gives point estimates for the risk planning options. Such analysis is incomplete and
in fact inaccurate because risk is uncertain by nature and in its extreme realization
can have severe effects on the system behavior. If planning options do not consider
extreme risk then they are rendered ineffective leading to severe systems failures.
The general optimization problem formulated in Equation (4.1) contains: (i) mod-
eling or epistemic data uncertainties in estimation of the A∗ matrix and magnitude
of x vector and (ii) statistical or aleatory uncertainties in estimating probability dis-
tributions for c∗(0) vectors. Due to the presence of such uncertainties there arises a
need to reformulate the problem statement. Previously our risk management problem
was motivated by the question
Given a finite budget for implementation how do we allocate the strategies
such that the overall interdependent economic losses are minimized?
which showed that we were certain our planning would lead to a certain minimized
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economic loss estimate. Since, the objective Q is uncertain now the finite budget
allocation approach does not apply because we are not sure if the allocated budget
is sufficient to begin with. As a risk planner the interest still lies in minimizing the
overall risk at an acceptable cost. Hence, due to the new planing paradigms the risk
management problem is reformulated through the question
For given initial impact on sectors in the form of demand perturbations if risk
management strategies exist to reduce effects of such demand perturbations,
then what is the minimum budget required for implementation of allocation
of strategies such that the overall interdependent economic losses are below a
certain acceptable threshold?
The mathematical statement of the above translates into the following optimization
problem
min b =
∑m
l=1 gl(rl)
subject to
xᵀ[I−A∗]−1c∗ ≤ Q
c∗l = fl(c
∗
l (0), rl),∀l = {1, 2, ...,m}
rl ≥ 0,∀l = {1, 2, ...,m}
(4.3)
Applying this general framework to the specific problem of resource allocation we dis-
cussed for static resilience planning in Equation (4.2), the resource allocation problem
is reformulated as
min
∑m
l=1 rl
subject to
xᵀ[I−A∗]−1c∗ ≤ Q
c∗l = c
∗
l (0)e
−αlrl ,∀l = {1, 2, ...,m}
rl ≥ 0,∀l = {1, 2, ...,m}
(4.4)
Due to uncertainty there are certain modifications that need to be incorporated into
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the optimization frameworks of Equations (4.3) and (4.4). For this we investigate
the components of the optimization problem that contain uncertainties and the effect
said uncertainties have on the problem. Primarily we are concerned with knowing
whether the functional forms of the objective function and constraints are preserved
or changed when data and event uncertainties are incorporated into the framework.
Objective function
The general objective function of the resource allocation problem is to find the optimal
budget that needs to be allocated to the risk management options. For this the
planner would like to have a certain functional form of the objective function, which
means that the parameters in the function gl are certain. This does not mean that
the budget allocated would be a certain budget. It essentially implies that there
is certainty that the functional form of the objective function does not alter. We
say that the optimization problem has a certain objective. Hence, in the resource
allocation Equation (4.4) the objective is always
∑m
l=1 rl, in which the coefficients
associated with the rl variables will always be 1.
Constraints
As mentioned previously, the estimates of the industry outputs (x) and the inter-
dependency structures in A∗ are not known with certainty. This can result in the
different sets of constraints for bounding the total economic loss. Hence, the con-
straint xᵀ[I−A∗]−1c∗ ≤ Q is no longer a single constraint but belongs to a family of
constraints given as
xᵀ[I−A∗]−1c∗ ≤ Q,∀x ∈ Ux,A∗ ∈ UA∗ (4.5)
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where Ux is a set that contains all possible realizations for the output vectors and
UA∗ contains all possible realizations for the A∗ matrices. Detailed descriptions of
the uncertainty sets will be provided in the next section.
The functional relationship c∗l = fl(c
∗
l (0), rl) between the demand perturbations
and the risk management options also contains the initial demand perturbation esti-
mates that initiate the onset of disruptions in the system. As is the nature of disrup-
tions and risks, the estimates for c∗(0) cannot be known with certainty. As such the
equality in the relationship cannot be maintained and from a planning perspective
the best that can be done is to try to achieve a relationship that holds true within a
bounded neighborhood. This implies that the equality constraint is transformed as
|c∗l − fl(c∗l (0), rl)| ≤ l,∀c∗l (0) ∈ Uc∗(0) (4.6)
where  << 1 shows how close the risk management option translates into the de-
sired demand perturbation, Uc∗(0) is the set that contains all possible realizations for
the event that generates c∗l (0). Hence, the corresponding constraint in the resource
allocation problem of Equation (4.4) becomes
|c∗l − c∗l (0)e−αlrl | ≤ l,∀c∗l (0) ∈ Uc∗(0) (4.7)
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4.2.2 Uncertain optimization and general robust formulation
The new formulation of the risk management problem (4.4) due to uncertainty be-
comes
min
∑m
l=1 rl
subject to
xᵀ[I−A∗]−1c∗ ≤ Q,∀x ∈ Ux,A∗ ∈ UA∗
|c∗l − c∗l (0)e−αlrl | ≤ l,∀c∗l (0) ∈ Uc∗(0),∀l = {1, 2, ...,m}
rl ≥ 0, ∀l = {1, 2, ...,m}
(4.8)
Equation (4.8) is a collection of uncertain optimization problems of which Equa-
tion (4.4) is an instance. Since, now we are dealing with a collection of problems,
instead of a single optimization problem, the concepts of optimality and feasibility
lose their relevance. As decision-makers we are interested in obtaining a determinis-
tic solution to an uncertain optimization, and thus are required to define paradigms
for decision-making. Robust optimization principles for uncertain optimization prob-
lems provide such paradigms which are stated through the main proposition of robust
optimization:
When we solve the uncertain optimization problem we should obtain a de-
terministic value for the decision variable. This value should hold as long as
the data is within the uncertainty sets defined for the problem and it never
violates any of the constraints of the optimization.
The above proposition leads to the concept of a robust feasible solution set consisting
on the decision variables that satisfies all the realizations of the constraints coming
from the uncertainty set. In our risk management framework the decision variables
are the c∗ and r vectors, for which the robust feasible solution is one that belongs to
97
the set
S(Ux,UA∗ ,Uc∗(0)) =
{
(c∗, r) :
xᵀ[I−A∗]−1c∗ ≤ Q, ∀x ∈ Ux,A∗ ∈ UA∗
|c∗l − c∗l (0)e−αlrl | ≤ l, ∀c∗l (0) ∈ Uc∗(0)
}
(4.9)
It is very clear from the information so far that the ability to obtain the robust feasi-
ble set of solutions to the uncertain optimization problem hinges on the uncertainty
sets. The theory of robust optimization is mainly concerned with constructing rules
for the uncertainty sets that lead to feasible solutions. Since, new sets of rules are
being created in addition to the ones defined by the problem statement, robust opti-
mization leads to increased computational complexity of the uncertain optimization
problem. Computational tractability is thus the governing issue when robust opti-
mization formulations are made. Most of the recent theoretical research has focused
on identifying problems for which tractable robust solutions can be obtained. It can
be stated here that robust optimization is different from sensitivity analysis because
the aim of robust optimization is to seek feasible solutions that do not depend upon
the data uncertainties, but instead on the larger set which bounds them, and are
constructed a priori. Sensitivity analysis, on the other hand, looks at a trajectory of
solutions obtained from data variations and hence are data and perturbations sensi-
tive.
We now provide a further rule that is required to make a start in solving the
uncertain optimization problem of Equation (4.8).
1. The uncertainty sets are closed, convex sets. If a general non-convex set U¯
is chosen for the uncertainty then we can always take its Convex Hull (Conv(U¯))
to construct U . For the class of convex problems this means that the convexity
structure of the problem is still preserved. Since, every uncertainty set is convex
and the constraints in the problem Equation (4.8) are also convex, the robust
feasible solution will hold for all uncertainties if it satisfies the worst-case of the
98
uncertainty. Hence, robust optimization problem is reduced to finding robust
feasible c∗ and r that satisfy
S(Ux,UA∗ ,Uc∗(0)) =
{
(c∗, r) :
maxx,A∗ x
ᵀ[I−A∗]−1c∗ ≤ Q
maxc∗l (0) |c∗l − c∗l (0)e−αlrl | ≤ l
}
(4.10)
This simplifies our analysis from an uncertain constraint problem to a certain con-
straint problem. This is one of the central principles of robust optimization and
introduces the concept of the robust counterpart of an uncertain optimization prob-
lem. The robust counterpart of Equation (4.8) can now be stated as
min
∑m
l=1 rl
subject to
maxx,A∗ x
ᵀ[I−A∗]−1c∗ ≤ Q,∀x ∈ Ux,A∗ ∈ UA∗
maxc∗l (0) |c∗l − c∗l (0)e−αlrl | ≤ l,∀c∗l (0) ∈ Uc∗(0),∀l = {1, 2, ...,m}
rl ≥ 0,∀l = {1, 2, ...,m}
(4.11)
4.2.3 Constructing uncertainty sets
The notion computational tractability of the robust optimization problem hinges
on the structure of the uncertainty sets. Here we discuss the development of the
uncertainties for which we seek solutions to the robust problem.
Data uncertainties
The coefficients of the A∗ matrix, derived from the technical coefficient matrix A,
are subject to uncertainties arising from the inter-industry data collection efforts by
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (Horowitz & Planting, 2006). The BEA
collects annual input-output records for a group of 15 aggregated industries and more
detailed records for 65 industries every five years. Hence, there exists data uncertainty
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in the industry aggregations and in the temporal nature of inter-industry transactions.
Furthermore, structural changes might occur in the A∗ matrix due to occurrences of
disruptive events (Percoco, 2006), which manifest themselves as forced substitutions
in A∗ whether by strategy a priori or by necessity a posteriori. Uncertainty in the
interdependency matrix has been analyzed in a number of studies (Quandt, 1958,
1959; Bullard & Sebald, 1977; Percoco et al., 2006) and specifically for A∗ (Barker
& Haimes, 2009). The x vector is obtained from the same BEA data and hence,
has uncertainties similar to the A∗ matrix. Most of these studies concluded that the
sample mean estimates coefficients of the A matrix, x vector or the I−A∗ matrix
are bounded within a small interval of the published values (Bullard & Sebald, 1977).
Due to the assumption of having bounded intervals for the data uncertainty, we
construct the uncertainty sets along similar lines to the theories of budgeted uncer-
tainty sets (Bertsimas & Sim, 2004). We assume that each data value available to
us is known to lie within an interval instead to having a point estimate. Hence, the
actual output xi of sector i lies somewhere in the interval [x¯i − xˆi, x¯i + xˆi], where
x¯i is known as the nominal value that is free of any uncertainty, while xˆi is the un-
certain value that signifies the perturbation resulting in deviation from the nominal
value. Generally it is expected that the perturbation is small or at least less than
the nominal value. Since, xi is known to occur within the specified interval, a scaled
parameter νi is defined for quantifying the fractional deviation of xi from x¯i relative
to the maximum allowed deviation xˆi.
νi =
xi − x¯i
xˆi
∈ [−1, 1] (4.12)
This means that xi can be represented as
xi = x¯i + νixˆi, νi ∈ [−1, 1] (4.13)
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While in a robust sense each νi can either be equal to -1 or 1 when we consider the
maximum bounds of the uncertainty set. In reality every xi will lie somewhere within
the chosen interval and it would be a decision-makers preference to build a robust
solution for the extreme interval as it might be too conservative. Hence, in order to
control the amount of uncertain deviation the total uncertainty is limited by a budget
that is given as
n∑
i=1
|νi| ≤ Λ (4.14)
where Λ lies in the interval [0, n]. By controlling the value to Λ the amount of un-
certainty that is distributed to the sector outputs is regulated. It also shows the
decision-makers preference in assigning uncertainty to his/her available nominal es-
timates for the output vales. Using the Equations (4.13) and (4.14) the uncertainty
set Ux is given as follows
Ux =
{
xi : xi = x¯i + νixˆi, |νi| ≤ 1,
n∑
i=1
|νi| ≤ Λ, i = {1, 2, .., n}
}
(4.15)
A similar approach can be adopted in constructing the uncertainty sets for the el-
ements of the n × n A∗ matrix. Assuming for each element a∗ij the interval [a¯∗ij −
aˆ∗ij, a¯
∗
ij + aˆ
∗
ij] specifies the range within which the actual realization of the element
lies. A scaling parameter ηij is defined as
ηij =
a∗ij − a¯∗ij
aˆ∗ij
∈ [−1, 1] (4.16)
This means that a∗ij can be represented as
a∗ij = a¯
∗
ij + ηij aˆ
∗
ij, ηij ∈ [−1, 1] (4.17)
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While incorporating uncertainties into the A∗ matrix certain rules have to be followed
that come from the definition of the matrix itself. It was established in Section 2.3.2
that each element of the interdependency matrix is greater than 0 and the sum of
elements along a row are less than 1. This means that the uncertain A∗ will have to
belong to the set
A∗ =
{
a∗ij, a
∗
ij ≥ 0,
n∑
j=1
a∗ij ≤ 1
}
(4.18)
It is assumed here that the perturbed values aˆ∗ij are always less than the nominal
values a¯∗ij, which implies that the condition that the elements in the uncertain matrix
are greater than of equal to zero is always met. Guaranteeing the bound on the row
sums of the matrix would lead to a budget over the amount of uncertainty that can
be associated with the ηij values. This is constructed as follows
n∑
j=1
a∗ij ≤ 1
=⇒
n∑
j=1
(
a¯∗ij + ηij aˆ
∗
ij
)
≤ 1
=⇒
n∑
j=1
ηij aˆ
∗
ij ≤ 1−
n∑
j=1
a¯∗ij
=⇒
∣∣∣ n∑
j=1
ηij aˆ
∗
ij
∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣1− n∑
j=1
a¯∗ij
∣∣∣ = Γi (4.19)
Here Γi is associated with the allowed budget in the uncertainty, which has similar
meaning to the budget Λ. The constrain (4.19) can be further modified to accommo-
date for the largest possible uncertainties associated with the scaling of the ηij values
for the upper bounds established for the budgets. Hence, the inequality (4.19) should
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be true for the largest value of the left hand side term. This is established as follows
max
∣∣∣ n∑
j=1
ηij aˆ
∗
ij
∣∣∣ ≤ Γi (4.20)
=⇒
n∑
j=1
aˆ∗ij|ηij| ≤ Γi (4.21)
Using the Equation (4.15) and (4.20) the budgeted uncertainty set UA∗ for the A∗
matrix is established as
UA∗ =
{
a∗ij : a
∗
ij = a¯
∗
ij + ηij aˆ
∗
ij, |ηij| ≤ 1,
n∑
j=1
aˆ∗ij|ηij| ≤ Γi, i = {1, 2, .., n}
}
(4.22)
Event uncertainties
Uncertainties associated with c∗(0) are classified as event uncertainties because they
depend upon the occurrence of a disruptive event. Instead of an interval bound
on the possible realizations of the event uncertainties, it is preferred to associate
such uncertainties with probability distributions. In reality we would consider the
chances of a disruptive event occurring and causing an expected amount of damage,
which results in an average value for the c∗(0). Average estimates are not good
enough for decision-making because there is also the possibility of the disruptive
event resulting in a c∗(0) that deviates substantially from the expected value. Hence,
multiple realizations of c∗(0) are required for a complete decision-making analysis.
Instead of the actual probability distribution if it is assumed that the expected value
E[c∗(0)] and the variance V ar[c∗(0)] of c∗(0) are known, then we can construct an
uncertainty set. Having the first two moments are good enough for our purposes
of constructing an uncertainty set, and in general we might not have enough data
to construct an actual distribution but can extract some estimates of the fist two
moments. Any realization of c∗(0) can be said to be within the interval [c¯∗(0) −
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κcˆ∗(0), c¯∗(0) + κcˆ∗(0)] ,where κ ≥ 0 signifies the spread of the interval about its
expected value. The uncertainty set Uc∗(0) is thus constructed as
Uc∗(0) =
{
c∗(0) :
c∗(0) ∈ [c¯∗(0)± κcˆ∗(0)],
E[c∗(0)] = c¯∗(0), V ar[c∗(0)] = cˆ∗2(0), κ ≥ 0
}
(4.23)
4.2.4 Robust problem formulation
With the uncertainty sets that have been constructed, we need to see the correspond-
ing robust formulations of the constraints in the optimization problem. As mentioned
previously the robust formulation transforms the original problem into a higher di-
mension problem, which satisfies the constraints for the extreme uncertainty bounds
imposed by the budgets. We look at the two types constraints in our resource allo-
cation problem and construct robust counterparts for them.
Robust constraint due to data uncertainty
In the risk management problem we formulated in Equation (4.11) the robust formu-
lation for data uncertainties requires us to formulate a tractable formulation for the
constraint
max
x,A∗
xᵀ[I−A∗]−1c∗ ≤ Q,∀x ∈ Ux,A∗ ∈ UA∗ (4.24)
Due to the presence of the term (I−A∗)−1 the uncertainty from A∗ is not linearly
transformed into the constraint unlike the x vector. We can construct an approxi-
mation of the (I−A∗)−1 matrix that allows for a linear transformation of the un-
certainties. If an uncertain A∗ matrix is given as A¯∗ + ∆A¯∗ ∈ UA∗ then assuming
the terms of ∆A¯∗ are small we get the following transformation of the inverse matrix
104
[I− (A¯∗ + ∆A¯∗)]−1.
[I− (A¯∗ + ∆A¯∗)]−1 = I + (A¯∗ + ∆A¯∗) + (A¯∗ + ∆A¯∗)2 + ...
≈ I + A¯∗ + (A¯∗)2 + ....+ ∆A¯∗[I + 2A¯∗ + 3(A¯∗)2 + ....]
= (I− A¯∗)−1 + ∆A¯∗(I− A¯∗)−2 (4.25)
Before building the robust constraint some notation is introduced here as follows
A¯∗ = [a¯∗ij] ∈ Rn×n
∆A¯∗ = [ηij aˆ∗ij] ∈ Rn×n
D¯∗ = [d¯∗ij] = (I− A¯∗)−1 ∈ Rn×n
P¯∗ = [p¯∗ij] = (I− A¯∗)−2 ∈ Rn×n
∆D¯∗ = ∆A¯∗P¯∗ ∈ Rn×n
x¯ = [x¯i] ∈ Rn×1
∆x¯ = [νixˆi] ∈ Rn×1
Due to uncertainty the left hand side of the Equation (4.24) is transformed as
xᵀ[I−A∗]−1c∗ = (x¯ + ∆x¯)ᵀ[I− (A¯∗ + ∆A¯∗)]−1c∗
= (x¯ + ∆x¯)ᵀ[D¯∗ + ∆D¯∗]c∗
= x¯ᵀD¯∗c∗ + x¯ᵀ∆D¯∗c∗ + ∆x¯ᵀD¯∗c∗ + ∆x¯ᵀ∆D¯∗c∗
≈ x¯ᵀD¯∗c∗ + x¯ᵀ∆D¯∗c∗ + ∆x¯ᵀD¯∗c∗ (4.26)
By separating the nominal data and the uncertain data the robust constraint of
Equation (4.24) is interpreted as solving for the maximum of the uncertain parts of
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the inequality. Hence, the robust constraint is the one that satisfies
x¯ᵀD¯∗c∗ + max
UA∗
x¯ᵀ∆D¯∗c∗ + max
Ux
∆x¯ᵀD¯∗c∗ ≤ Q (4.27)
We look at the element wise expansion of each component of the above formulation
to construct the robust constraint.
max
UA∗
x¯ᵀ∆D¯∗c∗ = max
UA∗
n∑
j=1
(
n∑
i=1
x¯i
( n∑
k=1
ηikaˆ
∗
ikp¯kj
))
|c∗j |
= max
UA∗
n∑
i=1
(
n∑
k=1
x¯i
( n∑
j=1
p¯kj|c∗j |
)
aˆ∗ikηik
)
=
n∑
i=1
max
ηik∈UA∗
n∑
k=1
sikaˆ
∗
ikηik (4.28)
where sik = x¯i
(∑n
j=1 p¯kj|c∗j |
)
.
Finding the solution of the Equation (4.28) is equivalent to solving the n problems
the ith of which is given as
maxηik
∑n
k=1 sikaˆ
∗
ikηik
subject to ∑n
k=1 aˆ
∗
ikηik ≤ Γi
0 ≤ ηik ≤ 1
(4.29)
Since this is a linear optimization problem its optimal solution is the same as its dual.
The dual of the Equation (4.29) optimization problem is calculated as
min Γiwi +
∑n
k=1 zik
subject to
aˆ∗ikwi + zik ≥ aˆ∗ikx¯i
(∑n
j=1 p¯kj|c∗j |
)
wi, zik ≥ 0
(4.30)
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Here wi and zij are dual variables. There are n such problems each coming from
constructing the dual for each term of the ith sum in the final term of Equation (4.28).
We can construct a similar formulation for the term maxUx ∆x¯
ᵀD¯∗c∗ which is given
as
max
Ux
∆x¯ᵀD¯∗c∗ = max
νi∈Ux
n∑
i=1
( n∑
j=1
d¯∗ij|c∗j |
)
xˆiνi
= max
νi∈Ux
n∑
i=1
rixˆiνi (4.31)
where ri =
∑n
j=1 d¯
∗
ij|c∗j | The solution of the above problem is equivalent to solving
the problem
maxvi
∑n
i=1 rixˆiνi
subject to ∑n
i=1 νi ≤ Λ
0 ≤ νi ≤ 1
(4.32)
The optimal solution of the above is the same as its dual, which is given as
min Λy +
∑n
i=1 ti
subject to
y + ti ≥ xˆi
∑n
j=1 d¯
∗
ij|c∗j |
y, ti ≥ 0
(4.33)
From the Equations (4.27), (4.30) and (4.33) the following theorem is proposed
Theorem 1. The robust constraint
x¯ᵀD¯∗c∗ + max
UA∗
x¯ᵀ∆D¯∗c∗ + max
Ux
∆x¯ᵀD¯∗c∗ ≤ Q
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can be solved by the linear programming problem
min
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 d¯
∗
ijc
∗
j x¯i +
∑n
i=1 Γiwi +
∑n
i=1
∑n
k=1 zik + Λy +
∑n
i=1 ti ≤ Q
subject to
aˆ∗ikwi + zik ≥ aˆ∗ikx¯i
(∑n
j=1 p¯kjf
∗
j
)
,∀i, k
y + ti ≥ xˆi
∑n
j=1 d¯
∗
ij|c∗j |
−f ∗j ≤ c∗j ≤ f ∗j , ∀j
wi, zik ≥ 0,∀i, k
y, ti ≥ 0
(4.34)
Proof. See Equations (4.27), (4.30) and (4.33)
Robust constraint due to event uncertainty
As discussed previously the event uncertainty is given by a probability distribution for
which the first two moments are known to us. The constraint in the Equation (4.11)
for which we seek a robust formulation due to the event uncertainty shows the plan-
ning function that relates the effectiveness of the risk management option in reducing
the effect of the initial disruption. We further make an assumption that due to the
uncertainty in c∗(0) we are not 100% certain that the inequality will be true to begin
with. This implies that most of the times we are sure that our planning function
and the targeted demand perturbation are within the bound l, but there is a chance
that the inequality is violated sometimes. This might happen due to fact that the
planning function has been designed for a particular range of possible values for c∗(0),
but does not hold when c∗(0) lies outside this range. Thus our inequality for which
we seek a robust formulation is now a chance constraint given as
P
[|c∗l − c∗l (0)e−αlrl | > l] ≤ γl (4.35)
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where γl << 1 shows the small chance that the constraint is violated. The robust fea-
sible counterpart to the above chance constraint is the one that satisfies the constraint
for the maximum limit of the uncertainty set and is given by
max
c∗(0)∈Uc∗(0)
P
[|c∗l − c∗l (0)e−αlrl | > l] ≤ γl (4.36)
Before we derive the robust formulation we state the following result from Chebychev
(Stewart, 2009)
Proposition 7. Let X be a random variable with finite expectation E[X] and nonzero
variance V ar(X) then for some t > 0
P[|X − E[X]| ≥ t] ≤ V ar(X)
t2
(4.37)
Proof. For the random number X, we have
tP[|X| ≥ t] = tE[I|X|≥t] = E[tI|X|≥t] ≤ E[|X|] (4.38)
where I|X|>t is an indicator function which is 1 if |X| ≥ t and 0 if |X| < t, which
means tI|X|≥t ≤ |X|. From the constraint (4.38) we can see that
P[|X| ≥ t] ≤ E[|X|]
t
(4.39)
The above result is in fact known as the Markov inequality (Stewart, 2009). In (4.39)
if we replace X by X − E[X] then we can get
P[|X − E[X]| ≥ t] =⇒ P[(X − E[X])2 ≥ t2] ≤ E[(X − E[X])
2]
t2
=
V ar(X)
t2
(4.40)
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which proves the Chebychev’s Inequality.
From the above condition we can build a robust formulation for the chance con-
straint. Inequality (4.36) can have two variants given as
P
[
c∗l (0)e
−αlrl − c∗l > l
] ≤ γl (4.41)
P
[
c∗l (0)e
−αlrl − c∗l < −l
] ≤ γl (4.42)
. Rearranging the constraint (4.41) we get the following
P
[
c∗l (0)e
−αlrl − c∗l > l
]
= P
[
c∗l (0)e
−αlrl > l + c∗l
]
= P
 |c∗l (0)e−αlrl − c¯∗l (0)e−αlrl |
> |l + c∗l − c¯∗l (0)e−αlrl |
 (4.43)
Equation (4.43) is of the form of Equation (4.37), because E[c∗l (0)e−αlrl ] = c¯∗l (0)e−αlrl .
Hence we get
P
[
c∗l (0)e
−αlrl − c∗l > l
] ≤ cˆ∗2(0)e−2αlrl
(l + c∗l − c¯∗l (0)e−αlrl)2
(4.44)
From Equation (4.44) we can assume that
max
c∗(0)∈Uc∗(0)
P
[|c∗l − c∗l (0)e−αlrl | > l] ≤ γl
=⇒ cˆ∗2(0)e−2αlrl
(l+c
∗
l−c¯∗l (0)e−αlrl )2
≤ γi
=⇒ |l + c∗l − c¯∗l (0)e−αlrl | ≥ 1√γi cˆ∗(0)e−αlrl (4.45)
The above outlined method generates a loose robust bound on the chance constraint.
The factor γl can be related to the number of deviations κ of a random c
∗(0) from
its mean. Specifically from the definition of the Chebychev’s inequality in Equa-
tion (4.37) we can see that if t = κ
√
V ar(X) then we get 1/κ2 as the upper limit on
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the inequality. Thus γl = 1/κ
2 can be set as a bound on the chance constraint. This
is not a very robust constraint bound because it means that the probability that the
chance constraint is violated has a very high upper bound. For example if κ = 2,
then γl = 0.25 which is a very loose upper bound for the probabilistic constraint.
Nevertheless there is merit in such a bound because it helps us develop an estimate
for the event uncertainty measure even though they are conservative.
Final robust formulation
Collecting the results from the development of the robust constraints the final robust
counterpart of our original resource allocation problem is summarized as follows
Theorem 2. Given the budget allocation problem for static resilience estimation
min
∑n
l=1 rl
subject to
xᵀ[I−A∗]−1c∗ ≤ Q
c∗l = c
∗
l (0)e
−αlrl ,∀l = {1, 2, ..., n}
rl ≥ 0,∀l = {1, 2, ..., n}
(4.46)
If the uncertainties in the data are defined through budgeted sets Ux and UA∗ defined
in Equations (4.15) and (4.23) respectively and the event uncertainties are specified by
the set Uc∗(0) defined in Equation (4.24) and the chance constraint in Equation (4.34),
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then the robust counterpart of the problem is given as
min
∑n
l=1 rl
subject to ∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 d¯
∗
ijc
∗
j x¯i +
∑n
i=1 Γiwi +
∑n
i=1
∑n
k=1 zik + Λy +
∑n
i=1 ti ≤ Q
aˆ∗ikwi + zik ≥ aˆ∗ikx¯i
(∑n
j=1 p¯kjf
∗
j
)
,∀i, k
y + ti ≥ xˆi
∑n
j=1 d¯
∗
ijf
∗
j , ∀i, j
−f ∗j ≤ c∗j ≤ f ∗j ,∀j
wi, zik ≥ 0,∀i, k
y, ti ≥ 0,∀i
l + c
∗
l − c¯∗l (0)e−αlrl ≥ 1√γi cˆ∗(0)e−αlrl ,∀l
l + c
∗
l − c¯∗l (0)e−αlrl ≤ − 1√γi cˆ∗(0)e−αlrl ,∀l
rl ≥ 0,∀l
(4.47)
4.3 Example Problem
In order to show the effectiveness of the robust optimization scheme we illustrate
the effect of uncertainties in the framework and the look at the nominal and robust
solutions. The static resilience estimation problem of Section 3.2.2 is again examined
with uncertainties introduced into the framework. Table 4.1 shows the transaction
flow data for the economic system from which the interdependency matrix A∗, and
maximum demand perturbations c∗ are generated. As previously mentioned the
parameters αl are available to the decision-maker.
A∗ =

0.27 0.38 0.23
0.18 0.073 0.15
0.28 0.28 0.39
 , c∗(0) =

0.13
0.59
0.04
 , α =

0.05
0.04
0.08
 (4.48)
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Table 4.1: Two industry input-output transaction data in million of dollars
Industry 1 2 3
External Demand (c) Total Output (x)
($ US million) ($ US million)
1 266 378 230 126 1000
2 267 110 224 899 1500
3 340 340 468 52 1200
Value added 127 672 278
Total Output(xT ) 1000 1500 1200
4.3.1 Data uncertainty effects
As a first stage analysis it is considered that there are no unknown events in the
framework and the planner is certain about the policy functions that relate the de-
mand perturbations to the allocated budgets. The only uncertainties that arise in
the framework exist due to unreliable data estimates. Assuming a 5% uncertainty in
both the output (x) and the interdependency matrix coefficients the corresponding
robust formulation is constructed. From previous formulations that data uncertainty
sets take the following values
Ux =
{
xi : xi = x¯i + 0.05νix¯i, |νi| ≤ 1,
3∑
i=1
|νi| ≤ 3, i = {1, 2, 3}
}
(4.49)
UA∗ =
{
a∗ij :
a∗ij = a¯
∗
ij + 0.05ηij a¯
∗
ij, |ηij| ≤ 1,
∑3
j=1 aˆ
∗
ij|ηij| ≤ Γi,
Γi = {0.1260, 0.5993, 0.0433}, i = {1, 2, 3},
}
(4.50)
The values above are the maximum allowable uncertainty budgets that can be intro-
duced into the formulations. As a planning exercise we examine the effects of varying
the uncertainty budgets from 0 to their maximum values. There are significant dif-
ferences in amounts of resources that need to be allocated to keep the total economic
losses to targeted levels. Figure 4.1 shows that as the allowable uncertainties are
increased by moving the realized values for the allocated budgets to their maximum
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values there is a considerable deviation from the nominal planning scenarios. For this
problem the robust uncertainty solution shows that for just a 5% uncertainty in data
estimates the required monetary values of resource allocations are considerably higher
than their nominal counterparts. In particular the maximal robust solutions shown in
the Figures 4.1(a) and 4.1(b) dominate all the other solutions, which show that they
reflect the notion of the decision-making solution being robust to all realizations of
the uncertainties within its limits. To further highlight the effect of uncertainties and
the robust considerations the amounts of resource allocations to each sector for given
total economic loss planning are shown in the Table 4.2. The nominal value results
are denoted by rN , while the robust planning results are denoted by rR. The numbers
show that there is a considerable difference in the requirements for each sectors when
the worst-case uncertainties are incorporated into the planning. Also it is evident
that the onset of resource allocation required for each sector is realized earlier than
the nominal planning case. Such an analysis highlights the importance of the robust
scheme developed and its requirement for the resource planning.
Table 4.2: Comparisons of the required resource allocations between the nominal
planning and the robust planning. All numbers are in $US millions.
Q
Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3
rN rR rN rR rN rR
3700 0 0 0 0 0 0
3330 0 0 3.3694 33.0776 0 0
2960 0 1.4269 7.2646 37.5941 0 0
2590 0 4.7042 11.8809 41.6833 0 0
2220 0 8.5048 17.5470 46.4342 0 0
1850 0 12.4287 24.8857 51.3458 0 1.4136
1480 0 16.9622 35.3182 57.0059 0 4.2523
1110 6.5781 22.7159 44.2229 64.1979 0 7.8483
740 15.4108 30.8252 55.2636 74.3347 3.2904 12.9163
370 29.2737 44.6179 72.5923 91.5825 11.9547 21.5303
0 431.0008 543.3183 571.0274 614.0301 262.2573 273.1499
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(b) Net benefit vs Allocated budgets
Figure 4.1: Trade-offs between investments in losses for different levels of budgeted
data uncertainties. The bold line with circles is the maximal robust solution under
the available budgets
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4.3.2 Event uncertainties
In addition to introducing data uncertainties in the analysis event uncertainties are
also introduced. It is assumed that available data estimates are still known within
±5% accuracy. The uncertainty in the values of the c∗ is assumed to be of ±2%
deviation from the mean. This means the uncertainty set for the events, which is the
set for c∗ is defined as
Uc∗(0) =
{
c∗i (0) :
c∗i (0) ∈ [c¯∗i (0)± 0.02κc¯∗i (0)], i = {1, 2, 3}
E[c∗i (0)] = c¯∗i (0), V ar[c∗i (0)] = 0.0004c¯∗2i (0), κ ≥ 0
}
(4.51)
We choose κ = 3 here which means that the upper limit of the violation of the chance
probabilistic chance constraint is γ = 0.11. The values above are the maximum
allowable uncertainty budgets that can be introduced into the formulations. As done
previously we examine the effects of varying the uncertainties in data and event
budgets from 0 to the maximal limits that have been set for them. The amounts of
resources that need to be allocated to keep the total economic losses to targeted levels
are further increased when event uncertainties are added to the previously introduced
data uncertainties. Figure 4.2 shows that as the allowable uncertainties are increased
by moving the realized values for the allocated budgets to their maximum values there
is a considerable deviation from the nominal planning scenarios. There is a greater
variation in the budget allocation for just the additional 2% deviation in the event
estimates along with the 5% data uncertainties. Now the required monetary values
of resource allocations are considerably higher than their nominal counterparts. As
shown in the previous case the maximal robust solutions shown in the Figures 4.2(a)
and 4.2(b) dominate all the other solutions. The amounts of resource allocations to
each sector for given total economic loss planning are shown in the Table 4.3. The
nominal value results are denoted by rN , while the robust planning results are denoted
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by rR. The numbers show that due to event uncertainties there is further difference in
the requirements for each sectors when the worst-case uncertainties are incorporated
into the planning. The onset of resource allocation required for each sector is realized
earlier than the nominal planning case, and great amounts of budgets are required
for each level of economic loss. The only inconsistent result here is the value for
resource allocations when Q = 0. The value for the robust solution is considerably
less than the nominal value. This a due to the probabilistic limits we have placed
over the chance constraint. The robust solutions obtained a violated with probability
1− γ = 0.89, which is a weak bound and needs to be improved. For other cases the
robust results are as expected.
Table 4.3: Comparisons of the required resource allocations between the nominal
planning and the robust planning. All numbers are in $US millions.
Q
Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3
rN rR rN rR rN rR
3700 0 0 0 0 0 0
3330 0 0.4670 3.3694 36.3938 0 0
2960 0 3.3408 7.2646 39.9791 0 0
2590 0 6.5839 11.8809 44.0330 0 0
2220 0 10.3211 17.5470 48.7118 0 0.0949
1850 0 14.0377 24.8857 53.3502 0 2.4245
1480 0 18.5003 35.3182 58.9287 0 5.2135
1110 6.5781 24.2535 44.2229 66.1203 0 8.8093
740 15.4108 32.3621 55.2636 76.2559 3.2904 13.8773
370 29.2737 46.1529 72.5923 93.5013 11.9547 22.4895
0 431.0008 231.7977 571.0274 287.9179 262.2573 144.8736
4.4 Summary and discussion
This Chapter addresses the issue of uncertainties in the interdependent input-output
framework and their effect on risk management. There is a need to consider such
uncertainties because they will produce varying planning risks some of which would
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Figure 4.2: Trade-offs between investments in losses for different levels of budgeted
data uncertainties and also event uncertainties. The bold line with circles is the
maximal robust solution under the available budgets
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not be captured through the nominal planning strategies. Uncertainties manifest
themselves in several ways and can be analyzed through various approaches. Since
the planning objective is to guarantee results that consider the maximal effects of
the uncertainties the solutions we seek to the risk management problem should be
representative of the worst-case/best-case scenarios in the planning. This leads to
the robust optimization approach, which is a useful construct for extreme uncertainty
analysis.
In order to construct robust solutions to the static resilience strengthening and
estimation problem the nature of the uncertainties present in the system need to
be considered. In particular the mathematical properties of the uncertainty sets
are important to us because they influence the structure of robust formulation. We
have divided the uncertainties into data and event uncertainties to construct the
uncertainty sets. Data is assumed to be estimated within an interval of accuracy,
which means that the data uncertainty sets are bounded sets. The actual realization
of the data values is controlled within the bounded sets by imposing budget limits that
that control the amount of uncertainty within the prescribed interval. The budgets
are also controlled through the considerations of the feasibility of the problem as is
the case with the interdependency structures because there is a limit to which the
interdependency matrix remains viable. For event uncertainties the introduction of
chance constraints means that due to the uncertainty of the events the feasibility of
the planning constraints is not known with complete certainty. The limits which give
the bound the probabilities that the constraints are feasible or are violated shows the
decision-makers preference and conservatism in handling the event uncertainty. Here
we have introduced a bit conservative bound on the event chance constraint.
The robust formulation that is constructed here increases the size of the nominal
problem significantly but the structure of the robust counterpart is the same as the
nominal problem. The constraints containing the data were linear in the original
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problem and that linearity is preserved in the robust formulation. Also the chance
constraints for event uncertainties have similar structures to the nominal problem,
although that happens due to simplified nature of the planning functions. The overall
robust formulation is not too complex to solve.
The static resilience planning results show the effect of small uncertainties in
the solutions. In general the robust problem results show that small uncertainties
in the data and event estimates make huge differences in the amounts of required
resource allocations for keeping the total economic losses below accepted thresholds.
As such the usefulness of the robust schemes is validated through the severity of the
impact of small uncertainties in the problem. The robust solution guarantee that
maximal worst-case scenarios are generated and for planning this is an important
consideration.
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Chapter 5
Forward Sensitivity Based Parameter Estimation in the
Dynamic Risk Input-Output Model
5.1 Introduction
The dynamic risk input-output model presented in Chapters 2 and 3 was shown to
be a useful tool in risk evaluation and in particular resilient recovery estimation.
Resilience through the model has been explicitly expressed through a matrix, which
we call K∗, for which data or estimates do not exist. This Chapter proposes a scheme
for obtaining the K∗ by setting targets for the dynamic recovery that provide a
feedback to estimate the model parameters.
In current research K∗ has been modeled as a diagonal matrix in which each
diagonal element is obtained from a recovery decision made for the particular sector
it represents (Lian & Haimes, 2006). The general interpretation associated with the
resilience matrix is that it represents a recovery rate during direct supply disruptions
to sectors (Haimes et al., 2005b) or a substitution rate during demand disruptions
(Haimes et al., 2005a). We argued in Chapter 3 that using the diagonal matrix alone
as a resilience metric is an incomplete and inaccurate analysis through the model.
Also, having a diagonal matrix that is derived based on the individual sector planning
only does not reflect the interdependent effects of resilience planning in the economy.
Interdependent systems are coupled so any parameter in the model should account
for such coupling. It has been argued that the current dynamic risk input-output
model does not account for resilience satisfactorily (Rose, 2007).
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The three resilience metrics we proposed in Section 3.3.2 can be used provide a
more complete picture of the resilient recovery through the dynamic risk input-output
model. Since these metrics were derived from the model, we need to have all the model
parameters, which brings us back to the problem that we do not know the K∗ elements
from any data or event a prior. The resilience metrics, called the average level of
system operability (F ), time to recovery (τ) and maximum inoperability (qm), can
be treated as performance metrics for evaluating the model performance. Decision-
makers’ interest is to make sure that systems perform within specific desirables. An
example of desirables for evaluating the performance of sector i from initial impact
(q(t = 0) = 0.3) till long run recovery (T = 60 days) could be: (1) 0.95 ≤ Fi ≤ 1
- On an average the sector maintains at least 95% functionality in the long run; (2)
τi ≈ 30 - The sector is able to almost attain stable productivity after 30 days; (3)
qmi ≤ 0.4 - At the most the sector loses 40% productivity before making a recovery.
Setting targets for performance metrics provides a benchmarking for the model.
Such information can be utilized as a feedback to the model for setting values for
the K∗ elements. We desire sectors to have certain levels of resilience quantified
through the metrics we defined. The relevant resilience performance questions for the
estimation of K∗ are:
What should our estimates of K∗ elements be so that we can take the system
to a targeted level of recovery for a specified time? What should our estimates
of K∗ elements be so that we make sure that the system has a desired average
level of operability performance target during the entire time of recovery?
Resilience has been expressed as “the ability to efficiently reduce both the magnitude
and duration of the deviation from targeted system performance levels” (Vugrin et al.,
2010). This is consistent with the approach we adopt here because in the absence of
any prior knowledge of our system parameter K∗, we estimate it through targeted
knowledge of the physical and mathematical properties of the system. This approach
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is called the inverse problem and is used widely in feedback control systems research
(Franklin et al., 1994; Lewis et al., 2006; Lakshmivarahan & Lewis, 2010).
The inverse problem and the parameter estimation scheme is subsequently ex-
plained in the Chapter. Section 5.2 outlines the mathematical statement of two
inverse problems, one based on setting targets for the recovery metric τ , while the
other based on setting targets for the performance metric F . It is a more complete
metric for performance evaluation because it includes other metrics also. Section 5.3.1
explains and derives the formulation and algorithmic scheme, called the forward sensi-
tivity method (Lakshmivarahan & Lewis, 2010), for solving the inverse problem. The
algorithm is a least square fit of the model to the targeted data in which sensitivity
functions lead to corrections in control estimates. The computations of sensitivity
matrices required to solve the inverse problem are explained in Section 5.3.2. These
computations also highlight the forward sensitivity scheme’s computational tractabil-
ity in solving the inverse problem. Section 5.3.3 examines the significance of the
method and computational issues that limit the solution scheme. Section 5.4 sug-
gests a scheme based on system planning for the generation the the performance
metrics that help evaluate the model parameter. Section 5.5 explains the concepts
developed through a numerical example. A summary and discussion of the topics
presented in this Chapter is provided in Section 5.6.
5.2 Mathematical statement of the inverse problem
The n sector dynamic risk input-output model of Equation (2.33) describes a system of
first-order differential equations. We restate the model here to note certain properties
necessary for solving the inverse problem.
q˙(t) = −K∗(In −A∗)q(t) + K∗c∗(t),∀t (5.1)
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where q is the n×1 inoperability vector, c∗(k) are n×1 vectors for demand perturba-
tions, A∗ is an n×n interdependency matrix, K∗ is the n×n rate parameter matrix,
and In is an n × n identity matrix. It is assumed that the given model produces a
deterministic forecast for q(t). The formulation suggests that a solution q(t) of the
model exists and in unique for a given set of initial conditions q(0), external forcing
c∗(t) and parameters K∗,A∗. Also, we see that the first partial derivatives of the
q(t) with respect to any of the variables exists. The dynamic discrete-time version
of the model from Equation (2.34) is also restated and would henceforth be used for
developing the inverse problem.
q(k + 1) =
[
In −K∗(In −A∗)
]
q(k) + K∗c∗(k), ∀k = 0, 1, 2, ... (5.2)
As established previously the initial condition q(0) is given and is bounded between 0
and 1. Equation (5.2) can also be expressed explicitly in terms of the initial conditions
as (Barker, 2008)
q(k + 1) =
[
In −K∗(In −A∗)
]k+1
q(0)
+
k∑
r=0
[
In −K∗(In −A∗)
]r
K∗c∗(k − r) ∀k = 0, 1, 2, ... (5.3)
Equation (5.3) shows that the evolution of inoperability at any time-step k depends
upon the initial inoperability q(0), the demand perturbations c∗(r) at all previous
time-steps, the matrices A∗ and K∗. These parameters are referred to as system
controls.
As is evident from Equation (5.3), q(0) and c∗(r) are external control inputs, to
which the system responds. The elements of q(0) represent measures of initial impacts
on sectors due to disruptions. If disruptive events have a direct impact on economic
sectors then we can obtain data-based estimates of the initial inoperabilities. For
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economic sector i, the value of qi(0) can be controlled through inventory management
strategies (Barker & Haimes, 2009; Barker & Santos, 2010a). Similarly, demand
perturbations are exogenous terms that depend upon responses to external stimuli.
For a disruptive event, values of demand perturbations can be obtained from data
of the impact or could be based on expert elicitation. In this study, we assume that
q(0) and c∗(r) estimates come from data or models that need to be combined with
the Equation (5.2) model.
From Equation (5.3) we also see that K∗ and A∗ reflect internal controls that
determine the trajectory of inoperability. In Chapter 3 we established that these
controls can be associated with redundancies and resourcefulness of sector resilience
behavior. As mentioned previously, A∗ can be obtained through the data (BEA.,
2011). Hence, any form of system control would be incorporated through estimating
K∗, which is not known to us.
Two metrics derived from the dynamic risk input-output model are the time to
recovery and average level of operability, which for a particular sector i are respectively
given as
τi =
{
k : k > 0, |qi(k)− qei | ≤ 
} ⇐⇒ τ = {k : k > 0, |q(k)− qe| ≤ } (5.4)
Fi = 1− 1
T
T∑
k=0
qi(k) ⇐⇒ F = 1− 1
T
T∑
k=0
q(k) (5.5)
τi indicates the time it takes the disrupted system to recover to acceptable levels of
functionality given by qei , and Fi represents the average level of functionality that is
maintained by the sector during the time frame T when recovery is analyzed. τ can
be considered to indicate an overall recovery for the entire n sector system, while
F is the n × 1 vector quantifying average operability of all n sectors. These can be
considered to represent performance metrics that indicate a resilience properties of
the system.
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As we do not know the values in the K∗ matrix, we cannot readily estimate
the above performance metrics. On the other hand there are physical meanings
attached to these metrics, which can help us develop an estimate for them. For
example saying that the disrupted sector recovers in 30 days means we know that
τi = 30 with q
e
i having value indicative of such recovery. Similarly saying that during
recovery the sector is able to function at 90% capacity on an average means Fi = 0.9.
Assuming that such estimates can be inferred they can be used to compute the model
parameters. This is the inverse problem or a feedback problem. The estimated values
for the performance metrics can be called ‘observations’ that help us calibrate the
model.
If, for a sector, the value for one of the chosen performance metrics is decided then
it is known that this target value can be achieved through the model with suitable
values assigned to the parameters. If, for the chosen performance metric for sector i,
ztari denotes the observation value and z
mod
i denotes the true value given by the model
then it can be assumed that
ztari = z
mod
i + νi (5.6)
where νi ∼ N(0, σ2i ) is a random Gaussian unavoidable error that exists due to im-
precise information in estimating the observation. This also shows some uncertainty
that always exists in estimating the targeted value for the performance metric.
The inverse problem is an parameter estimation problem where it is desired that
the model and observation are as close to each other as possible. The least squares
criterion, which finds the best fit between modeled and observed values, is the obvious
choice for solving the inverse problem. Equation (5.7) expresses the least squares
problem, which is a mathematical statement of the inverse problem.
min
{
J =
n∑
i=1
1
σ2i
(
ztari − zmodi
)2
=
(
ztar − zmod)ᵀW(ztar − zmod)} (5.7)
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where the n × n matrix W = diag(1/σ2i ) in general represents the weights given to
each target, ztar is an n× 1 vector of target values for all sectors and zmod is an n× 1
vector of all sector performance metric values given by the model.
Since zmodi is obtained from the model it is a function of the state variable qi(k),
which can be represented as zmodi = hi(qi(k)) or z
mod = h(q(k)). Using zi = z
tar
i
and z = ztar for further notation the Equation (5.6) observation-model relationship
is expressed as
zi = hi(qi(k)) + νi (5.8)
As established qi(k) is a function of K
∗ among other parameters. Since the goal is
to find the parameter K∗ that provides the best model fit for the given observation
Equation (5.7) is written as
min
K∗
{
J(K∗) =
n∑
i=1
1
σ2i
[
zi − hi(qi(k))
]2
=
[
z− h(q(k))]ᵀW[z− h(q(k))]} (5.9)
Here it is noted that the cost function J is an implicit function of K∗ since the choice
of K∗ determines how well a fit is achieved.
The general formulation developed applies to any of the resilience metrics shown
in Equations (5.4) and (5.5). If the time to recovery metric, τ is used as a performance
metric then we are planning for the time when the economic sectors have inoperabil-
ities which indicate stability. A planning decision can be made about deciding the
time at which such stability should exist. Setting a target value for τ means a deci-
sion is made to attain stability from τ onwards. Stability means the system is able
to reach an equilibrium from initial impact. The value that denotes stability depends
upon the type of external stimulus to the system. Hence if it is assumed that we
know the targeted equilibrium inoperability zτ at τ then, hτ (q(t)) = q(τ), and the
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inverse problem is given by the following set of equations
Model space: q(k + 1) =
[
In −K∗(In −A∗)
]
q(k) + K∗c∗(k)
Observation space: zτ = q(τ ) + ντ
Inverse problem: minK∗
{
J(K∗) =
[
zτ − q(τ )
]ᵀ
W
[
zτ − q(τ )
]} (5.10)
Similarly the overall average level of operability metric, F can also be used for
performance evaluation. F is a more complete metric for performance that can be
used to find K∗ because it captures the most likely system behavior, which is averaged
over every time-step. The Equation (3.37) representation for F is restated here in
discrete form to show that quantifying F leads to estimating time to recovery and
equilibrium inoperability, which gives a more complete picture of system performance.
F = 1− (1− τ
T
)
qe − 1
T
k=τ∑
k=0
q(k)dt (5.11)
Instead of F we use F¯ given by Equation (5.12) for setting a observational space
model for which the target value is set at zF¯ . F¯ in fact represents an average loss of
operability measure.
F¯ = 1− (1− τ
T
)
qe − F (5.12)
The observational space model, which comes from Equation (5.11), is obtained as
hF¯ (q(k)) =
1
T
τ∑
k=0
q(k) (5.13)
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Hence, the inverse problem in this case is represented as
Model space: q(k + 1) =
[
In −K∗(In −A∗)
]
q(k) + K∗c∗(k)
Observation space: zF¯ =
1
T
∑τ
k=0 q(k) + ν F¯
Inverse problem: minK∗
{
J(K∗) =
[
zF¯ − h(q(k))
]ᵀ
W
[
zF¯ − h(q(k))
]} (5.14)
Having set up the inverse problem our goal is to find the optimal K∗ that solves
systems in Equations (5.10) or (5.14). In the next sections we outline the general
solution scheme that estimates such an optimal K∗.
5.3 Solution scheme for the inverse problem
5.3.1 First-order forward sensitivity method
In order to solve the minimization problem in Equation (5.9) the computation of the
gradient of J with respect to K∗ is calculated and equated to zero. This gradient,
denoted by ∇K∗J is a non-linear function of K∗, which makes it difficult to get a value
for K∗ by simply calculating the gradient and equating it to zero. A method based on
calculating the first-order directional derivative with respect to K∗ is employed here
to approach the optimal K∗ through the δK∗ incremental improvements following an
initial estimate. In the subsequent development of a solution for the problem we will
transform the n×n matrix K∗ into an n2×1 vector k∗, which is obtained by stacking
the columns of [K∗]ᵀ into a column vector.
Equation (5.2) is a state space equation in which q(k) denotes the state of the
system at time-step k. An initial guess can be made about the elements of k∗ to
obtain a value of q(k) that would satisfy Equation (5.8). But this value of sector
inoperability calculated through the model is different from the true value. As such
there will be an error in prediction of the observations. This error is called the forecast
error (Lewis et al., 2006; Lakshmivarahan & Lewis, 2010), because it measures the
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amount by which the model is unable to match the observations. The forecast error
e at time-step k can be defined as
e ≡ z− h(q(k)) = f(k∗) + ν (5.15)
where f(k∗) is a deterministic error induced by the incorrect control variables. We are
interested in finding corrections δk∗ such that the model forecast errors e updated to
eN = e + δe are purely random, that is E[eN ] = 0.
Using the first-order variational analysis approach (Lakshmivarahan & Lewis,
2010), the problem of improving the model forecast is tackled by improving the param-
eter via small increments and looking at the first variation effects of such increments
on the model and observation functions. Figure 5.2 shows the schematic of the solu-
tion approach being adopted here. A δk∗ change in the controls will induce a change
q(0),A∗, c∗(k) q(1) q(2)k∗
δk∗
k∗ + δk∗ q(1) + δq(1) q(2) + δq(2)
δq(2)δq(1)
e
e+ δe
Figure 5.1: First-order variational analysis showing the increment of the parameter
from a base case to a perturbed case, which results in the increment of the model
values and therefore the error estimates
δq(k) in the model, which gives
eN = e + δe = z− h(q(k) + δq(k)) (5.16)
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From the first-order Taylor’s expansion we can obtain
eN = e−Dq(k)(h)δq(k)) (5.17)
where Dq(k)(h) = [∂hi/∂qj(k)] denotes the n× n Jacobian of h with respect to q(k).
Further the change δq(k) is due to the perturbation of k∗ by δk∗. Using the Taylor’s
series expansion the first variation of this induced change can be expressed as
δq(k) = Dk∗(q(k))δk
∗ (5.18)
where Dk∗(q(k)) = [∂qi(k)/∂k
∗′
ij ] is the n × n2 matrix for the Jacobian of q(k) with
respect to k∗ and represents the first-order sensitivity of the state with respect to the
k∗ vector. Combining Equation (5.17) and (5.18) we get
eN = e−Dq(k)(h)Dk∗(q(k))δk∗
= e−Hδk∗ (5.19)
where H = Dq(k)(h)Dk∗(q(k)). The perturbation that removes the systematic error
from the forecast error satisfies
E[eN ] = 0 =⇒ e = Hδk∗ (5.20)
The above system is a linear least-squares problem, in which e is an n× 1 vector, H
is an n × n2 matrix and δk∗ is an n2 × 1 vector. It is an under-determined system
where the number of unknowns are more than the number of equations. Hence,
the solution to this problem is obtained by minimizing the Tikhonov regularization
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function (Tikhonov et al., 1977; Groetsch, 1984)
min
δk∗
{
J¯(δk∗) =
1
2
(e−Hδk∗)ᵀW(e−Hδk∗) + µ
2
(δk∗)ᵀ(δk∗)
}
(5.21)
where µ is a regularization constant. The solution of this linear least-squares problem
can be found by directly equating the Jacobian ∇δk∗ J¯ = 0, which is now linear in
δk∗.
∇δk∗ J¯ = −HᵀWe + (HᵀWH + µIn2)δk∗ = 0
=⇒ δk∗ = (HᵀWH + µIn2)−1HᵀWe (5.22)
where In2 is an n
2 × n2 identity matrix. With the above calculated value for δk∗
the updated error estimate of Equation (5.19) can be obtained to see how much
improvement has been made in estimating the discrepancy between the model and
the observation. If this improvement is satisfactory then the new value k∗ + δk∗
indicates the value for the K∗ that satisfies the targeted system behavior. Otherwise
we can further improve the estimate by again calculating the next perturbation δk∗
that is solved through the process outlined from Equation (5.15) to (5.22) above.
Table 5.1 shows the iterative algorithm through which the optimal increment leading
to the optimal K∗ is obtained.
The analysis approach, called the forward sensitivity method (FSM) (Lakshmi-
varahan & Lewis, 2010), is useful for obtaining better estimates to the system and we
know the sensitivity evolution of the state space in terms of the control parameters.
5.3.2 Computing the sensitivity functions
The solution of the forward sensitivity methods relies on finding the matrix H from
Equation (5.19). For the two inverse problems defined in Equations (5.10) and (5.14)
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Table 5.1: First-order sensitivity algorithm for solving the inverse problem
Given: z,h,W,A∗,q(0), c∗(k),∀k, µ
Set: tol << 1
Step 1: Initial guess for K∗
Step 2: Find e = z− h(q(k))
Step 3: If e ≤ tol; STOP
else
Step 4: Find H = Dq(k)(h)Dk∗(q(k))
Step 5 Solve δk∗ = (HᵀWH + µIn2)−1HᵀWe
Step 6: Update:
k∗ → k∗ + δk∗
eN = e−Hδk∗
Step 7: If eN ≤ tol; STOP
else
Step 8: e = eN ; GOTO Step 4
the specific expressions for H provides more insight into the forms of the sensitivity
functions that generate the forward sensitivity calculations. Hence, we are interested
in finding the two matrices Hτ and HF¯ given as
Hτ = Dq(τ)(q(τ))Dk∗(q(τ)) (5.23)
HF¯ = Dq(k)(hF¯ )Dk∗(q(k)) (5.24)
In this section we provide the expressions from calculating the required Jacobian
matrices, which reflect the forward sensitivities with respect to model parameters.
Before proceeding we express the sector-wise temporal inoperability, which is needed
for sensitivity calculations. From Equation (5.2), the sector i inoperability at time-
step k + 1 becomes
qi(k + 1) = qi(k)−
n∑
j=1
k∗
′
ijqj(k) +
n∑
j=1
( n∑
r=1
k∗
′
ira
∗
rj
)
qj(k) +
n∑
j=1
k∗
′
ijc
∗
j(k)
= Gi(K
∗,A∗,q(k), c∗(k)) (5.25)
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Calculations for Dq(k)(h) depends upon the functional form of h. When the
observation space is defined by the Equation (5.10) then
Dq(k)(h) = Dq(τ)(q(τ)) = In (5.26)
For the observational space given by Equation (5.13) the expression for Dq(k)(h)
is
Dq(k)(h) = Dq(k)
(
1− 1
T
T∑
k=0
q(k)
)
= − 1
T
T∑
k=0
Dq(k)(q(k))
= − 1
T
T∑
k=0
In (5.27)
Dk∗(q(k)) are obtained from a recursive computation of the forward sensitivities
of q(k+ 1) in dynamic risk input-output model Equation (5.2). At any time step we
are interested in the following forward sensitivity matrices
Dk∗(q(k + 1)) = U(k + 1) =
[
uij(k + 1)
]
=

∂q1(k+1)
∂k∗11
· · · ∂q1(k+1)
∂k∗nn
...
. . .
...
∂qn(k+1)
∂k∗11
· · · ∂qn(k+1)
∂k∗nn
(5.28)
For calculating the forward sensitivities, we will need the Jacobian of Gi from Equa-
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tion (5.25) with respect to ql(k)(l ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}) and k∗′pj(p, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n})
∂Gi(k)
∂ql(k)
=
∂
[
qi(k)−
∑n
j=1 k
∗′
ijqj(k) +
∑n
j=1
(∑n
r=1 k
∗′
ira
∗
rj
)
qj(k) +
∑n
j=1 k
∗′
ijc
∗
j(k)
]
∂ql(k)
=
[
δil − k′∗il +
n∑
r=1
k
′∗
ira
∗
rl
]
(5.29)
∂Gi(k)
∂k∗′pj
=
∂
[
qi(k)−
∑n
s=1 k
∗′
isqs(k) +
∑n
s=1
(∑n
r=1 k
∗′
ira
∗
rs
)
qs(k) +
∑n
s=1 k
∗′
isc
∗
s(k)
]
∂k∗′pj
= 1p((p−1)×n+j)
[
− qj(k) +
n∑
s=1
a∗jsqs(k) + c
∗
j(k)
]
(5.30)
where 1pg is an indicator function that is equal to 1 at the (p, g) element of the matrix
and 0 otherwise. Using Equation (5.28) and Equation (5.30) the calculations of the
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forward sensitivities are as follows:
∂qi(k + 1)
∂k∗′pj
=
n∑
l=1
∂qi(k + 1)
∂ql(k)
∂ql(k)
∂k∗′pj
+
∂Gi(k)
∂k∗′pj
=
n∑
l=1
∂Gi(k)
∂ql(k)
∂ql(k)
∂k∗′pj
+
∂Gi(k)
∂k∗′pj
=
n∑
l=1
[
δil − k′∗il +
n∑
r=1
k
′∗
ira
∗
rl
]
∂ql(k)
∂k∗′pj
+ 1p((p−1)×n+j)
[
− qj(k) +
n∑
s=1
a∗jsqs(k) + c
∗
j(k)
]
=⇒

...
· · · uij(k + 1) · · ·
...
 =
[
∂Gi(k)
∂q1(k)
· · · ∂Gi(k)
∂ql(k)
· · · ∂Gi(k)
∂qn(k)
]

u1j(k)
...
ulj(k)
...
unj(k)

+ 1p((p−1)×n+j)
[
− qj(k) +
n∑
s=1
a∗jsqs(k) + c
∗
j(k)
]
=⇒ U(k + 1) = [In −K∗(In −A∗)]U(k)
+ T(k), U(0) = 0 (5.31)
where T(k) is the n× n2 matrix of the ∂Gi(k)/∂k∗′pj terms defined in the equations
above. From the above expressions spanning Equations (5.23) to (5.31) the expres-
sions for the required H matrices are given as
Hτ = InU(τ) (5.32)
HF¯ = −
1
T
T∑
k=0
InU(k) (5.33)
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5.3.3 Importance of and issues with forward sensitivities
In general using the the inverse problem for parameter estimation is a useful scheme
because it shows the fidelity of the model to actual data/observations. The approach
is an online method in which the parameter estimate can be improved and updated as
more data is available to us. Hence, the method leads to reliable estimates of model
parameters.
Equations (5.32) and (5.33) suggest that the calculations of the matrices Hτ and
HF¯ are based on obtaining Dk∗(q(k)), which is the state variable sensitivity with
respect to the control parameter. This further shows that the gradient of the function
J¯ in Equation (5.22) can be directly interpreted in terms of the sensitivities. Also
the updated forecast error eN is shown to be dependent on the forward sensitivities
in Equation (5.19), which means that the structure of the forecast errors can be
interpreted in terms of sensitivity calculations. Hence, the direction of the gradient
and the error updates can be understood in terms of the sensitivity calculations using
the method we presented here. Such analysis insights make the FSM a useful method
in solving the inverse problem.
Substituting M =
[
In −K∗(In −A∗)
]
, the expression for the forward sensitiv-
ity of Equation (5.31) can be expanded as a series of M and T(k), ∀k as shown in
Equation (5.34)
U(k + 1) = MU(k) + T(k)
= M
[
MU(k − 1) + T(k − 1)]+ T(k)
= M2
[
MU(k − 2) + T(k − 2)]+ MT(k − 1) + T(k)
...
= MkT(0) + Mk−1T(1) + · · ·+ MT(k − 1) + T(k) (5.34)
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M is the state matrix of the dynamic risk input-output model and it was es-
tablished in Section 2.5.3 that for the model to have a stable solution the spectral
radius of M is less than 1. Therefore the powers of M progressively contain smaller
terms and after some k,Mk → 0. Also, the elements of T(k) come from the vector
c∗(k)− (In−A∗)q(k), which also approaches 0 as the system moves towards stability.
Therefore, it can be seen that beyond some value of k,U(k+1)→ 0. Hence there is a
region in the iterative scheme where the forward sensitivities are said to be saturated
and do not change. This results in the matrix H being ill-conditioned. As such if the
observations lie in this region then the FSM is not able to estimate the parameter.
Such considerations a required while using the performance metrics to set targets for
the system to generate the inverse problem. Lakshmivarahan & Lewis (2010) suggest
that if the condition number of the matrix HᵀH should be less than 104 for favorable
estimates. Section 5.5 expands on the above discussion through a numerical example.
5.4 Setting values for observation space
A key issue in the development and solution of the inverse problem is the availability
of the observation space or target values that will be used for parameter estimation.
Knowledge of the system through past recovery data can provide us with estimates
for the recovery time or average inoperability values, which can be used for solving
the inverse problem. For example estimates are available for disaster impact and
recovery from Hurricane Katrina (Hallegatte, 2008), and these can be used for future
recovery planning. One caveat of using already available data is that it will not
replicate itself in reality, which means planning decisions made from one disruptive
event are unique to that problem. Also, in general there is little or no data for recovery
planning of most macro level systems. The problem we are dealing with could be
referred to as an ‘online’ parameter estimation problem, where the estimates depend
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upon the type of disruptive event characterized through the initial inoperability and
demand perturbations. The observational space generated should represent a desired
behavior we want to ascribe to the system that is reflective of the response to the
given disruptive event given through the model space. Such an approach has been
employed in economic planning and design, where the planner wants his/her system
behavior to ‘emerge’ from the model itself. This planning philosophy for feedback
control design for economic systems is elucidated by Archibald (2005) in his work
‘Information, incentives and the economics of control’
There is, however, a crucial distinction between the familiar use of feed-back
systems for physical control and their potential use for economic control: in
the former use, the target must be set, i.e. pre-selected; in the latter use, the
target must somehow “emerge” as the process goes on. If this were not the
case, we should at the most have a system for the implementation of a plan,
not a substitute for the planning process itself.
Given the situation that there is no available data in our problem we use particular
scenarios of the dynamic risk input-output model itself to generate the observation
space. Based on the previous discussion on the dynamic risk input-output model in
Chapter 2 setting K∗ = In gives some insights into the system recovery behavior.
In Section 2.5.3 we established that since K∗ is modeled to be diagonal or close to
diagonal with its elements k∗ij ∈ [0, 1], having K∗ = In means that the interdepen-
dent recovery is fastest compared to other responses most of the times. Moreover.
K∗ = In signifies that the system interdependence given through A∗ is preserved and
controls the response. Hence, we use the model given by Equation (5.35) to generate
a benchmark for the observation data.
q1(t) = e−(In−A
∗)tq(0) +
∫ t
0
e−(In−A
∗)(t−z)c∗(z)dz (5.35)
Using the above model we can calculate for all the sector time to recovery τ 1, equi-
librium inoperabilities q1e and F¯1 = 1
T
∫ T
t=0
q1(t) among other parameters. The zτ
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observational data can be conveniently generated as
zτ = q
1e + ντ , ντ ∼ (0, diag(σ2τ )) (5.36)
In the inverse problem of Equation (5.13) setting τ ≥ τ 1 would imply that the
equilibrium has been shifted to a later time and hence the K∗ estimation problem is
posed as
For times τ ≥ τ 1 we ask ourselves the question: What is K∗ such that
zτ = q(τ ) + ντ?
We are mainly shifting the equilibrium towards a later time and finding the
K∗ for the sectors for this new situation.
Similarly the zF¯ observational data can be generated and used to estimate system
performance
zF¯ = F¯
1 + ν F¯ , ν F¯ ∼ (0, diag(σ2F )) (5.37)
where the Gaussian error terms ν F¯ arise because the assumptions that the targets
cannot be set with complete certainty.
In the inverse problem of Equation (5.14) setting τ ≥ τ 1 would imply that the
equilibrium has been shifted to a later time and hence the K∗ estimation problem is
posed as
For times τ ≥ τ 1 we ask ourselves the question: What is K∗ such that
zF¯ =
1
T
τ∑
k=0
q(k) + ντ?
We are mainly shifting the equilibrium towards a later time, while maintaining
the same overall level of functionality, and finding the K∗ for the sectors for
this new situation.
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Using K∗ = In for benchmarking and setting τ ≥ τ 1 for performance evaluation of
the system is justified due to the opposing tradeoff between the maximum inoperabil-
ity and the time of recovery arising from coupled system behaviors. Figure 5.2 shows
that faster recovery might come at the cost of greater maximum inoperability for the
same level of overall performance. Same areas under curves means same overall level
of operabilities and lower maximum impact at the cost of later recovery might be a
preferred option. Table 5.2 summarizes the observational data generation approach.
Table 5.2: Algorithmic procedure to generate the observation data for the inverse
problems
Given: A∗,q(0), c∗(k), ∀k, µ
Set: K∗ = I
Calculate: q1e, τ 1, F¯1
Set: zτ = q
1e + ντ , ντ ∼ (0, diag(σ2τ ))
Set: zF¯ = F¯
1 + ν F¯ , ν F¯ ∼ (0, diag(σ2F ))
5.5 Example problem
The practical application of the above methods is highlighted through a 15 sector
economy that shows the interdependence between economic sectors in the state of
Oklahoma. This data is obtained from the BEA (BEA., 2011). Table 5.3 lists the
economic sectors with annual output levels specified. Assuming that there is a disrup-
tive event that results in initial inoperabilities for the mining and the manufacturing
sectors only, the values in the initial inoperability vector are also given in Table 5.3.
If there are no demand perturbations for this system at all times (c∗(k) = 0,∀k),
then the problem of finding the K∗ matrix is a recovery rate estimation exercise. We
investigate the problem in context of the inverse problem given in Equation (5.10)
where the τ metric generates the performance criteria and also reflects the recov-
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Figure 5.2: Two sector recoveries with same areas under the curves showing same
levels of functionality. It can be seen that there is a tradeoff between the recovery
time and the maximum inoperability which needs to be considered in setting recovery
targets.
ery behaviors. From the Table 5.2 approach for estimating the observational data
the recovery times τ 1 for all sectors are about the same (τ 1i = 6,∀i ∈ [1, 15]). The
observational vectors q1e and F¯1 are also given in Table 5.3.
Setting different recovery times for the attainment of stable states is analogous
to setting different planning horizons for recovery and monitors the consequences
of such decisions. Figure 5.3 shows the trajectories of four major sectors as their
recovery times vary. In the plots it is visible that the delayed recoveries result in
later attainment of stabilities but there are lower maximum losses for the sectors.
Figure 5.4 highlights such tradeoffs due to different recovery planning efforts. Shown
in the figures 5.4(a) to 5.4(d) on the left side are the maximum economic/output losses
incurred by the sectors for different recovery planning horizons and on the right side
are the average economic/output losses the sectors incur due to such planning. Using
these metrics instead of the previously defined qm and F metrics gives a practical
interpretation to the metrics the signify resilience. For a planner measures of economic
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losses help in understanding the implications of the planning decisions. As seen in
the Figure 5.4 for each sector delayed recovery results in a higher average loss of
functionality but there is a maximum impact effect due to the interdependence with
other affected sectors, which results in initial cascading of the disruption. Such results
highlight the justifications in using the proposed triplet of resilience metrics instead of
a singular measure like total economic loss, which is generally done for such studies.
From the computational aspects of the forward sensitivity scheme interest lies in
examining the evolution of the forward sensitivity operators because these are indica-
tive of the capability of the model to provide a solution to the inverse problem. As
discussed before the sensitivity functions ∂qi(k+1)
∂k∗jk
approach towards zeros after some
time which means that they not sensitive to the placement of the data/observation
beyond a certain time. Figure 5.5 shows the sensitivity functions for the two affected
sectors (mining and manufacturing) because these drive the responses for most of the
interdependent economy. In this problem the size of the matrix Dk∗(q(k)) is 15×225,
which means there are 225 sensitivity operators for each sector. As seen in the fig-
ures beyond time t = 25 most of the sensitivity operators approach towards zero,
and having data/observations beyond this point would not yield any solutions from
the computational scheme. Also, another advantage of these sensitivity operators is
that they can tell how much each qi(k) is sensitive to which k
∗
ij elements and in what
direction does that sensitivity progress. From a planning perspective we can interpret
this as a indicator of the effectiveness of the sector investments in substitutions for
certain products that would help in better recovery. Figure 5.6 shows the values for
the k∗ij, j = [1, 15] in the form of a bubble plot for the mining sector as the recovery
planning horizon is shifted for 6 days to 20 days. Here the sizes of the bubbles reflect
the values of the k∗ij elements. Greater the size of the bubble greater is the value of
the parameter. Such a plot is indicative of two things: (i) The interdependent struc-
ture of the resilience parameters that shows the amount of substitution/inventory the
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mining sector needs to maintain to attain a targeted planning recovery, (ii) The af-
fect of the substitutions on the overall performance metrics. As expected the mining
sector needs to increase its self reliance to achieve faster recovery and also increasing
most of its interdependent resilience leads towards the faster recovery. Since, we have
been highlighting the fact that faster recovery comes at a cost of increased maximum
impacts there is an interest to regulate the amount of interdependence due to substi-
tution/inventory. In particular there is an indicator here that the mining sector can
increase its k∗ij value with respect to other sectors by more substitution and decrease
its own k∗ii by maintaing lesser redundancy to decrease the maximum economic loss
impacts and achieve comparable recovery times.
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Figure 5.3: Recovery trajectories for four sectors as time to recovery is extended.
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Figure 5.4: Trade-offs between maximum output losses and average output losses as
recovery is delayed.
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Figure 5.5: Evolution of the forward sensitivities for the inoperabilities of the two
affected sectors.
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Figure 5.6: Values of the k∗ij, j = [1, 15] elements for the mining sector for different
recovery times.
5.6 Summary and discussion
This Chapter presents the computational scheme for solving the parameter estima-
tion problem of the dynamic risk input-output model. The approach adopted here
comes from theories in control system designs and dynamic data assimilation method-
ologies. Primarily the parameter estimation problem is an inverse problem that is
solved through the availability of data that the model is supposed to predict. A func-
tional relationship exists between the model and the observation and the unknown
parameter is estimated to satisfy this functional relationship with as much precision
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as possible. Though such methods are available in other research domains their us-
age in the parameter estimation for the dynamic risk input-output model is a novel
approach.
Unlike other domains of application where the data is readily available to calibrate
the model here the big issue is the lack of data which shows the recovery behavior
that can be explained through the model. As such the problem is really a planning
issue where the model is being used to agree to a specified decision preference. As
the requirements of the model are that it should be a suitable construct for resilience
estimation, the data is realized as performance targets set to meet specific resilience
goals. Such assumptions are not too implausible, because in risk planning for future
behaviors and for unknown scenarios there is a need to create manufactured scenarios.
The solution scheme adopted here is called the forward sensitivity scheme and
its is based on calculating the sensitivity of the model state to the parameter being
estimated. This approach has computational and practical relevance. Computation-
ally sensitivity shows the effect of perturbation of the parameter on the model state,
which translates to the magnitude of the effect on model state due to the parameter.
More sensitivity indicates the parameter is significant in predicting the model states.
Time evolving sensitivity, which is being used here, also shows the domain of analysis
where the model does not respond to fluctuations in the parameter values. For the
inverse problem this domain is important because it shows that the model parameter
would not be able to predict the model state properly within the domain, hence the
effect of observations on the model are negligent. These issues are discussed here in
relation to the dynamic risk input-output model.
Having developed the solution scheme, the example problem brings together the
resilience concepts and the forward sensitivity approach develop over the previous
chapters and this one. Primarily the goal of developing the forward sensitivity ap-
proach here is the seek solutions to the possible values the K∗ matrix takes during
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recovery and how these translate towards resilience indicators. Through the example
problem the resilience conceptualization and model frameworks have been presented
here. In the end we have a convenient tool for predicting dynamic resilience in inter-
dependent systems.
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Chapter 6
Inland Waterway Disruption Analysis
6.1 Introduction
This Chapter presents a study on multi-modal transportation risk assessment, with
particular focus on inland ports. The purpose of this Chapter is to develop a method-
ology for applying the input-output risk models, so that the concepts that were de-
veloped in the previous chapters can be used for real world applications. Inland
waterway systems are CIKR of homeland security importance and hence need to be
studied for risk assessment and planning. The Chapter is organized in the following.
Section 6.2 motivates the importance of studying inland waterway ports from a eco-
nomic and security point of view. Section 6.3 presents a multi-regional framework
for applying the input-output models that were discussed previously. The economic
multi-regional model is based on the input-output principles and its risk-based exten-
sion is also constructed by following previously defined steps for model development.
The models presented here are static, but they can be conveniently extended to the
dynamic domains. In Section 6.4 the link between the commodity flows across inland
waterway port hubs and input-output models is shown. This leads to the development
of the risk metrics that express the losses in commodity flows as inoperabilities and
demand perturbations. Hence, the unified framework that combines transportation
hub commerce with input-output risk models is established. In order to estimate
losses in the transportation hub we need to develop a model that as-planned and
disrupted states of the system being analyzed. Hence, in Section 6.5 a port queuing
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model is presented for representing the flow of goods across the. The queuing model
divides the commodity flows into four main components: arrivals, yard storage, crane
operations and departures, which is useful in monitoring the flows across the differ-
ent stages of the transport. Therefore, disruptions to each of these components can
be separately modeled and their effect on the rest of the queue can be conveniently
quantified. Such schemes are suggested for building different disruption scenarios that
affect port commerce, and generate risk metrics. Section 6.6 presents a case study for
the Port of Catoosa in Tulsa Oklahoma, where the methods developed are applied
and their risk assessment application is shown. The work presented here shows the
scope of the models, which can be applied to any general transportation hub and
network. The importance of the work and its applicability to the risk management
and resilience method is highlighted in Section 6.7.
6.2 Motivation
The prevention of, and recovery from, disruptions to large-scale economies often in-
volves decision making by parties interested in the normal operation of more than one
industry. Government policy makers and industry decision makers both have a need
for distributing resources where they will be most useful in ensuring normal produc-
tion levels, whether for the economy as a whole or for individual supply chains. This
resource allocation depends on accurate information regarding the potential effects
of preparedness and mitigation strategies that take into account the interconnected
nature of the economy.
Such planning is particularly important risk-based policy and decision making
for transportation infrastructure, listed among the US critical infrastructure and key
resources (DHS., 2009). Roads and highways have been the primary mode for freight
transport, moving an estimated 69% freight by weight and 65% by value in 2007
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(Schmitt et al., 2010). With US domestic freight projected to grow annually by
1.6% from 2010 till 2040 (Schmitt et al., 2010) along with greater increase in general
pedestrian traffic, there is concern about the future of the aging US transportation
system (Hasley, 2010). Estimates suggest that in 2009, congestion in 423 metropolitan
areas caused urban Americans to travel 4.8 billion hours more, and to purchase an
extra 3.9 billion gallons of fuel for a congestion cost of $115 billion (Schrank et al.,
2010). Congestion also exists on rail transport and is projected to increase along
Class I railway lines and terminals along coasts (Association of American Railroads,
2007). A viable freight alternative is needed for sharing the burden with road and
rail for future sustenance of the US multi-modal transportation infrastructure.
The US Maritime Administration, a division of the US Department of Transporta-
tion, has identified such a freight alternative, calling for an investment in inland wa-
terways for general freight movement (Marine Administration, 2011). The increased
use of the 25,000 miles of commercially navigable waterways for freight transport will
likely lead to reduced congestions on US highways, as well as reduced risk of acci-
dents relative to highway and rail transport and reduced air pollution emissions (US
Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, 2010). Transportation
by barge is often cheaper than the alternatives of rail and truck, and there are many
products that are too large for other methods of transport. Around 38 states depend
on inland waterways to move as much as 630 million tons annually in the last decade
(US Army Corps of Engineers, 2009), currently a distant third behind roadway and
rail.
6.3 Multi-Regional Economic Impact Framework
Isard et al. (1998) proposed a multi-regional input-output (MRIO) framework for
multi-regional trade supply and demand balance. If we assume that the n economic
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sectors trade across p regions then using the MRIO we can express the equilibrium
between sector outputs supplies and intermediary and final product demands across
all regions. Equation (6.1) expresses this trade balance as
xri =
p∑
s=1
n∑
j=1
trsi a
s
ijx
s
j +
p∑
s=1
trsi c
s
i (6.1)
where xri is the output of industry i in region r, t
rs
i is the proportion of industry
i output that flows from region r to region s, asij is the proportion of industry i
output used by industry j after it comes from all sources in region s, and csi is
the final exogenous demand for industry output i in region s. Expressed in matrix
form Equation (6.1) leads to Equation (6.2) with np× 1 vectors and np× np matrix
structures. Each n × n sub-matrix Trs = [diag(trsi )]∀i = {1, 2, ..., n} is called the
trade coefficient matrix for trade flow interdependence between region r and s. Also
each sub-matrix As =
[
asij
]∀i, j = {1, 2, ..., n} is an n × n regional industry-to-
industry interdependency matrix for region s. Each n× 1 vector of regional industry
outputs, xr(=
[
xri
]∀i = 1, 2, ..., n) and n × 1 vector of regional exogenous demand,
cr(=
[
cri
]∀i = 1, 2, ..., n) make up the multi-regional supply and demand vectors of
the MRIO.
x1
...
xp
 =

T11 · · · T1p
...
. . .
...
Tp1 · · · Tpp


A1 · · · 0
...
. . .
...
0 · · · Ap


x1
...
xp
+

T11 · · · T1p
...
. . .
...
Tp1 · · · Tpp


c1
...
cp

(6.2)
The MRIO is also supported and validated through publicly available data sources.
The Bureau of Transportation Statistics, maintains commodity flow data for entire
US domestic and international trade (BTS., 2011), which is used in constructing the
trade coefficient matrices. Also, the A matrix data available at the national level
is converted to a regional Ar matrix through different regional multipliers methods
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(Miller & Blair, 2009). The location quotient multipliers used here takes into account
the regional contribution of an industry compared to its contribution to national
outputs. As outlined by the BEA (BEA., 1997) the location quotient lri for industry
i in region r is the proportion between its regional output contribution to the entire
regional economic output xrto and its national output contribution to entire national
output xto.
lri =
xri/x
r
to
xi/xto
(6.3)
The regional input-output industry-by-industry interdependence matrix obtained by
combining the two BEA data sources is expressed in Equation (6.4). As lri approaches
1 industry i’s contribution to regional demands approaches its national trade capac-
ity, which means the national interdependency has a one-to-one correspondence to
regional interdependency.
arij =
 l
r
i aij l
r
i < 1
aij l
r
i ≥ 1
(6.4)
The MRIO extension to the inoperability framework leads to a multi-regional inop-
erability input-output model (MRIIM) (Crowther & Haimes, 2010). In the MRIIM
Equation (6.5), derived from (6.2), qr and c∗r are respectively the n × 1 vectors
for inoperabilities and demand perturbations at the region r level. A∗s is now the
n×n regional industry-to-industry inoperability propagation matrix for region s, and
T∗rs =
[
diag(xr)
]−1
Trs
[
diag(xr)
]
represents the n × n matrix for the inter-regional
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inoperability flow between regions r and s.

q1
...
qp
 =

T∗11 · · · T∗1p
...
. . .
...
T∗p1 · · · T∗pp


A∗1 · · · 0
...
. . .
...
0 · · · A∗p


q1
...
qp

+

T∗11 · · · T∗1p
...
. . .
...
T∗p1 · · · T∗pp


c∗1
...
c∗p
 (6.5)
6.4 Applications to Transportation facility disruptions
Transportation facilities, such as ports, are outlets for commodity flows across regions.
Since the multi-regional input-output model quantifies the equilibrium of the imports
and exports between regions, port facilities are suitable geographic locations where
this equilibrium can be studied. For a port located in region r(r ∈ {1, 2, ..., p})
exporting to region s(s ∈ {1, 2, ..., p}, s 6= r), the amount of commodity i that arrives
at the port is the amount of final demand for that commodity for region r. Hence,
Equation (6.6) shows how the total final demand, cri , for commodity i in region r is
divided, where (cri )re is the amount of commodity i that is consumed internally or
exported out of other locations except the port, and (cri )pe is the amount of export
out of the port into region s.
cri = (c
r
i )re +
p∑
s=1,s 6=r
(cri )pe (6.6)
The amount of commodity i that is shipped to region s is then used by industries in
s for their production and for final consumption. Hence, in region s the amount of
import, Dsi =
∑p
r=1,r 6=sD
rs
i , contributes towards the total output, x
s
i , of the industry
i and the final demand, csi , for the commodity i. Value (x
rs
i )pi is the amount of
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industry i output that comes through the port from region r, (xsi )re is the amount of
industry i output in region s coming for sources other than the port import, (crsi )pi
is the amount of final demand for commodity i coming from the port into region s,
(csi )re is the amount of final demand for commodity i through sources other that the
port import.
∑
r 6=s
Drsi =
∑
r 6=s
(xrsi )pi +
∑
r 6=s
(crsi )pi (6.7)
xsi = (x
s
i )re +
∑
r 6=s
(xrsi )pi (6.8)
csi = (c
s
i )re +
∑
r 6=s
(crsi )pi (6.9)
When disruptions result in change in the amount of arrivals and departures of com-
modities at the port, they affect the exports and imports of the regions having com-
merce through the port. It is assumed that the disruptions cause losses in commodity
flows only through the port while the rest of the flows are not affected. Hence, Equa-
tion (6.10) shows that for the entire economy of region r, port disruptions result in a
demand perturbation for commodity i, c∗ri , given by the loss of exports,
∑
s 6=r(∆c
rs
i )pe,
as a proportion of the total output of commodity i in region, xri .
c∗ri =
∑
s 6=r(∆c
rs
i )pe
xri
(6.10)
For the importing region s, the amount of import loss,
∑
r 6=s ∆D
rs
i , in Equation (6.11)
results in the loss of output,
∑
r 6=s ∆(x
rs
i )pi, and final demand,
∑
r 6=s ∆(c
rs
i )pi, for
commodity i in region s.
∑
r 6=s
Drsi =
∑
r 6=s
∆(xrsi )pi +
∑
r 6=s
∆(crsi )pi (6.11)
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Thus, for the entire economy of region s, the loss of imports causes an inoperability,
qˆsi , and demand perturbation, c
∗s
i . The demand perturbation in industry i can be
calculated.
c∗si =
∑
r 6=s ∆(c
rs
i )pi
xsi
(6.12)
While export contributions toward input-output model metrics are straightforward
to understand and model, import substitutions are more complicated. Typically in
input-output tables imports are value-added contributions towards sector outputs and
thus the inoperability due to them is expressed as
qˆsi =
∑
r 6=s ∆(x
rs
i )pi
xsi
(6.13)
Since the MRIIM also provides sector inoperability (denoted by q˜si here), we need
to compare Equation (6.5) and (6.13) inoperabilities, and the maximum of the two
values provides actual sector inoperability.
qsi = max
{
q˜si , qˆ
s
i
}
(6.14)
The MRIIM interdependency equation uses the information from Equations (6.13)
and (6.14) as inputs for calculating the inoperabilities and demand perturbations for
interconnected industries across regions. If m ∈ 1, 2, ..., n different commodities are
transported through the port from region r to s, then in the event of a disruption
there is a demand perturbation, given by Equation (6.13), only for those commodities,
while the rest of the commodities experience no demand perturbation. Hence, the
demand perturbation vector for region r is found with Equation (6.15).
c∗rj =

∑
s 6=r ∆(c
rs
j )pe
xsj
, j ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}
0, otherwise
(6.15)
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Similarly, for the importing region s, there is a demand perturbation for only those
commodities imported through the port, while the rest of the commodities experience
no perturbation in demand. The demand perturbation vector for the importing region
s is calculated in Equation (6.17)
c∗sj =

∑
r 6=s ∆(D
rs
i )pe
xsj
− qsj , j ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}
0, otherwise
(6.16)
Equations (6.15) and (6.17) combined with the MRIIM form a complete solvable sys-
tem that quantifies the inoperability and demand perturbations for the entire regional
economies for interconnected industries. The equations for demand perturbations de-
veloped above assume only exports from region r through the port, whereas in actual
situations commodities are also imported into r through the port. Therefore, the
total demand perturbation for region r is given in Equation (6.18).
c∗rj =

∑
s 6=r ∆(c
rs
j )pe
xrj
+
∑
s 6=r ∆(D
sr
i )pe
xrj
− qrj , j ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}
0, otherwise
(6.17)
While there are several kinds of disruptions, any of which can be incorporated into
transportation flow analyses, we are primarily interested in modeling impacts due to
export-import losses. Such an approach is practical from the perspective of estimat-
ing economic losses because we are interested in quantifying lost commerce due to
disruptions.
6.5 Port simulation model
A simulation model that provides estimates of the commodity arrivals and departures
through the port is a useful tool for estimating the parameters for the MRIIM. Fig-
ures 6.1 and 6.2 depict a supply chain model for inland port operations, which can
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be extended to the entire waterway network. For the inter-regional commodity flow
analysis we consider a queueing system for freight transfer through the supply chain.
Supply chain modeling approaches have been applied in the transportation studies
for different types of transfer facilities (Sima˜o & Powell, 1992; Lee et al., 2003) and
have been used in analyzing transportation disruptions (Wilson, 2007). In this study,
the components of the different port operations are defined and explained as follows.
1. Delivery/Receipt - These operations include the arrival of commodities for ex-
ports out of the region and the departure of commodities for imports into the
region.
2. Yard operations - These are storage operations for the temporary storage of
commodities at the port where they are kept for further transport.
3. Crane operations - Cranes are used at the port to transfer commodities to and
from the port docks.
4. Shipment - Freight shipment operations include the departure of commodities
for exports and the arrival for imports.
Figure 6.1: Port export-import model
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Figure 6.2: Overall inland waterway transportation model
A discrete time model, based on concepts developed by Sima˜o & Powell (1992), can
be built for simulating the above port operations. Due to different order of the oper-
ations, the simulation models for exports and imports will be separate. It is assumed
that commodities arrive independent of each other at the port, and each commodity
is transported through the port operations separately. Hence, for m commodities
arriving at the port there are m parallel queueing systems in operation. Considering
a time increment of ∆t, the discrete time model can capture the evolution of queue
model at all times t = 0,∆t, 2∆t, .... Before developing the iterative equations for the
queueing system, some random variables are defined for quantifying different elements
of normal port operations:
1. Yi(t) = The number of units of commodity i arriving at the terminal in the time
interval (t−∆t, t];
2. Ni(t) = Number of units of commodity i in yard storage at time t after com-
modities have arrived in the interval (t−∆t, t];
3. Vi(t) = The maximum units of commodity i that can be transferred by the
cranes to the docks in the time interval (t, t+ ∆t];
4. Wi(t) = The maximum number of imported units of commodity i that can be
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loaded from the yard to trucks or trains in the time interval (t, t+ ∆t];
5. Ui(t) = The number of units of commodity i that are transferred to the dock
for shipment in the time interval (t, t+ ∆t];
6. Di(t) = The number of units of commodity i departing in the interval (t, t+∆t].
In simulating the commodity arrival process, service capabilities of the transfer cranes
and import loading process are known from data describing port annual exports and
imports and daily crane operations, respectively. Hence, assuming that Yi(t), Vi(t)
and Wi(t) are known, the other variables are calculated by adding and subtracting
random variables, as described in the following sections. The same variables are used
for formulating the export and import operations as they have the same meaning for
both operations.
6.5.1 Port export operations
When commodities arrive at the port, they are stocked at the yard. At time t+ ∆t,
the number of units of commodity i at the yard is the sum of the units remaining to
be carried by the transfer cranes and the units that arrive.
Ni(t+ ∆t) = max[0, Ni(t)− Vi(t)] + Yi(t+ ∆t) (6.18)
The number of units of commodity i transferred by cranes is the minimum of the
number of units at the yard and the crane capacities.
Ui(t) = min[Ni(t), Vi(t)] (6.19)
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For normal port operations, the number of units of commodity i exported from the
port is equal to the number of units transferred to the docks.
Di(t) = Ui(t) (6.20)
6.5.2 Port import operations
For imports the commodities are now arriving at the docks and transferred from the
cranes to the yards. The number of units of commodity i transferred by the cranes
becomes
Ui(t) = Yi(t+ ∆t) (6.21)
Equation (6.22) calculates the number of units of commodity i at the yard as the sum
of the units remaining and the units transferred by the cranes.
Ni(t+ ∆t) = max[0, Ni(t)−Wi(t)] + Ui(t) (6.22)
Under normal port operations, the number of units of commodity i departing the
port are equal to the units transferred by the crane, as shown
Di(t) = min[Ni(t),Wi(t)] (6.23)
From the simulation equations it can be seen that the crane operations and depar-
ture processes lag the arrival and yard storage operations by ∆t time. The above
formulations for exports and imports involve the simple additions, subtractions and
splitting of random variables. As mentioned before, if the distributions for Yi(t),
Vi(t) and Wi(t) are known, then the rest of the distributions of the random variables
can be obtained by convolutions of the probability mass or density functions. This
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allows for estimates of the random variables in the queueing model. Arrivals of the
commodities can be modeled as independent non-stationary Poisson processes (with
rate λi(t) for commodity i). Similarly, the rate of service for the crane operations at
the terminal could be modeled as a Poisson process with time-dependent rates (µi(t)
for commodity i).
6.5.3 Modeling disruptive events
A disruptive event such as a man-made attack, an accident, or a natural disaster can
cause damage to components of the transportation network. Different scenarios of
incorporating disruptive events in the supply chain model can be explored to quantify
the amount of loss incurred due to damages. In this study we investigate how dis-
ruptions can affect the parameters in the queueing system simulation model. Some
situations considered are as follows.
1. Terminal Closure - A disruptive event, such as a storm, tornado or attack, may
cause the closure of the terminal for some time ∆T . In this case there are no
arrivals over the period of the storm, but normal service is resumed once the
event subsides. In the simulation algorithm this is modeled as.
Yi(i) = 0,∀t ∈ [t, t+ ∆T ] (6.24)
Such an event is a special case of the scenario where there is a partial disruption
in the arrival of commodities due to a disruptive event. Using the assumption of
time-dependent Poisson arrival rate of commodities, Equation (6.25) quantifies
how the rates of arrival for commodity i change in the simulations, where λ∗i (t)
are the the disrupted arrival rates and λi(t) are the arrival rates under normal
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port operations.
λ˜i(t) =
 λ
∗
i (t), ∀t ∈ [t, t+ ∆T ]
λi(t) otherwise
(6.25)
2. Crane Outage - Disruptive events and normal wear and tear that damage some
of the cranes may limit the number of commodities that are transferred to and
away from the docks. Hence, if the disruption lasts for a time ∆T , in the
simulation model the condition imposed is governed by Equation (6.26), where
U˜i is the capacity limit on the amount of units of commodity i that can be
transported by the cranes.
Ui(t) = U˜ , ∀t ∈ (t, t+ ∆T ] (6.26)
A generalized simulation modeling scenario for such events could be the change
in the time-dependent service rates of crane operations, as shown in Equa-
tion (6.27), where µ∗i (t) are the the disrupted crane service rates and µi(t) are
the service rates under normal port operations.
µ˜i(t) =
 µ
∗
i (t), ∀t ∈ [t, t+ ∆T ]
µi(t) otherwise
(6.27)
3. Departure Stoppage - Similar to arrival disruptions, hazards such as floods in
the river or barge accidents can cause disruptions in the departure of com-
modities for exports and imports. For commodity i, such disruptions over
time ∆T change the number of units departed with Equation (6.28), where
θ(t) ∈ [0, 1),∀t ∈ (t, t+ ∆T ] is the factor representing the reduction in depart-
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ing commodity.
D˜i(t) =
 θ(t)Di(t), ∀t ∈ [t, t+ ∆T ]Di(t) otherwise (6.28)
The above three modeling formulations for disruptive events provide different scenar-
ios for calculating the losses over the period of analysis. Some or all of these scenarios
can occur in an actual port disaster. Each scenario can be incorporated easily into
the queueing model while preserving the simple arithmetic of addition, subtraction,
and splitting on the random variables.
6.6 Case Study: Inland Waterway Port Dock and Channel
Disruptions
We demonstrate, through a case study of commerce disruption at the Port of Catoosa
and along the Mississippi River System, the application of the network model with
the MRIIM.
6.6.1 Port of Catoosa Overview
Connecting to the Mississippi River System, considered the most important commer-
cial navigation corridor in the US, is the McClellan-Kerr Arkansas River Navigation
System (MKARNS). Along the MKARNS is the Port of Catoosa located near Tulsa,
Oklahoma, the subject of the case study that illustrates the dock-specific discrete-
event queueing models for commodity flows and disruptions.
The port is an important transportation hub for the Midwest, as it is the farthest
north inland port that remains unfrozen all year long. Commodities of all types,
including grains, fertilizers, metal products, and chemicals, are shipped both in and
out of the port. The port provides services for at least ten states, including Al-
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abama, Arkansas, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Ohio, Oklahoma,
and Texas.
The Port of Catoosa has four main docks, each of which deals with a specific
commodity type. The Dry Cargo dock handles large items, primarily steel, iron, and
machinery. The Dry Bulk dock handles a variety of loose commodities that are moved
by conveyer, such as sand, gravel, and fertilizers. The Grains dock moves agricultural
products such as corn, wheat, and soybeans. Finally, the Liquid Bulk dock moves
liquid products including chemicals, liquid fertilizers, and even molasses. If any of
these docks were to become inoperable, it would stop the flow of the specific type of
commodity handled by that dock.
Figure 6.3 lists the the combined estimates for the annual exports and imports (in
US$ million) for major industries among the states that do the most commerce using
the port. These estimates are obtained from the integration of different databases
(BTS., 2011; Catoosa., 2011; USAC., 2011). These industries/commodities are the
inputs for the port and network simulation model, with each commodity having its
separate queue from arrival until departure.
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Figure 6.3: Estimates for the 2007 annual export-import commerce through Catoosa,
in US $ million
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6.6.2 Port Disruptions
We consider a port closure for a duration of two weeks and model the local and
multi-regional effects of such a disruption. There are a number of natural and man-
made events that could cause disruptions in the movement of commodities through
the Port of Catoosa. In May of 2002, an Interstate 40 bridge spanning the Arkansas
River collapsed, shutting down barge traffic for over two weeks. Heavy rains in the
summer of 2008 led to flooding of the waterway, which greatly reduced the number of
barges that could be moved through. A fire at a fertilizer company in early 2009 led to
chemical run-off into the port, which required clean up before it spread. Events such
as the bridge collapse and flooding affect the entire port’s ability to move product,
whereas a fire and the subsequent cleanup affect one or more docks.
We choose a day of the year when a disruptive event occurs and stop overall
port and the local waterway commerce for a two week duration. In the port model,
the disruptions manifest with the stopping of the arrival and departure queues in
the port supply chain, which results in commodities not entering the network flow.
Hence, export-import loss metrics are generated for the duration of disruption by
estimating the amount of lost flow relative to a “no disruption” scenario. We also
observe that, for the magnitude of the event we discuss: (1) disruptions at the port
or waterway do not directly disrupt industry supply chains/ infrastructures, and (2)
the values of demand perturbations or supply inoperabilities due to such a localized
disruption are small fractions compared to entire state-wide industry outputs.
Figure 6.4 shows the cumulative loss of export-imports from the onset of disruption
around day 25 of the year extended till the rest of the year. The individual effects of
such a disruption felt across each of the docks in shown in Figure 6.5. The Dry Cargo
and Liquid Bulk docks experience highest export-import losses due to volume and
value of commerce through these docks. Overall, more losses are incurred as import
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losses than export with total losses amounting to an estimated $45.0 million for such
a disruptive event.
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Figure 6.4: Sector-wise accumulation of export-import losses of the year due to 2-week
port closure
The overall impacts of the disruption are propagated due to interdependencies
cascading to regional economies of the states doing commerce with Oklahoma through
the port. Out of many possible scenarios, we present here the effects on Oklahoma
industries due to total and partial port closure. Figure 6.6 ranks the top 10 industries
by the total amount of losses as a result of the port closure, while Figure 6.7 shows
such ranking due to closure of only the Dry Cargo dock. Such analysis highlights
the importance of using the dynamic MRIIM for studying macroeconomic risks. As
shown in the figures, there are several industries which are indirectly affected by
the port closure and incur substantial losses due to their interdependence with port
industries.
Another aspect of port disruptions worth highlighting is the economic impact it
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Figure 6.5: Dock specific export-import losses due to port closure
has across multi-regional economies. Figure 6.8 shows the direct, indirect, and total
losses for regional economics of the 10 states using the port for commerce. In input-
output modeling terms, direct losses come from the demand driven disruptions and
are calculated as the sum of the T∗c∗ vector in the multi-regional models. These
contribute towards backward linkage effects of disruption propagation that result in
indirect losses. As can be seen from the Figure 6.8 total multi-regional direct losses of
$111.8 million due to two week port closure are accompanied by total indirect losses
of $72.9 million across all states. Hence, we have shown through data the severity of
an localized transportation disruption on multi-regional commerce.
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Figure 6.6: Output losses for Oklahoma industries due to total port shutdown
6.7 Summary and discussion
Multi-modal transportation systems are vital to the shipment of commodities among
interdependent industries and across multiple regions, and freight disruptions at a
number of nodes along the transportation system can have adverse impacts on the
flow of commodities. One such node is an inland waterway port, whose risk stud-
ies in the literature have been sparse. This study provides a novel approach for
modeling the adverse impact across interdependent industries and across multiple re-
gions, resulting from a disruption in the operations of an inland port. The risk-based
approach integrates the Multi-Regional Inoperability Input-Output Model (MRIIM)
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Figure 6.7: Output losses for Oklahoma industries due to Dry cargo dock shutdown
with a simulation model of inland port operations to quantify the impact of real dis-
ruptions in inter-regional commodity flow connected by a single terminal of usage in
a multi-modal transportation system. The study considers three different disruption
scenarios (terminal closure, crane outage, and departure stoppage) and quantifies in-
terdependent impact in terms of inoperability (extent to which output is not being
shipped and produced), and economic losses (dollar value of port inoperability).
The modeling approach depends upon existing and estimated data sources. The
MRIIM is parameterized from commodity flow databases from the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis and the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, and the simulation model
is parameterized by commodity flow data describing the operations of the inland port.
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Figure 6.8: Estimates for industry direct and indirect losses across 10 states using
Catoosa for commerce
The two-week disruption scenario for the inland Port of Catoosa in Oklahoma
that we explore in this study shows that $45 million export-import losses in port
industries result in $111.8 direct and $72.9 indirect losses for industry sector across
10 states. The ranking of sectors with most losses further highlights the fact that
interdependence results in substantial losses of sectors that do not directly operate at
the port. The dock specific losses we present here give an indication of the impacts on
the port and industries if disruptions were more localized, identifying key industries or
key docks facilitates investments to protect against and prepare for disruptive events.
The contributions of this paper are several. First, we broaden the scope of the
MRIIM scheme (Crowther & Haimes, 2010) with the novel integration of the approach
with multi-modal transportation systems for analyzing the interdependent adverse
impacts of an inland port disruption. Second, our queuing model provides a much
simpler analysis approach of tracking freight movement through the port compared
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to other discrete models (Sima˜o & Powell, 1992). We also show how the components
of our queuing model are altered due to disruptions, often ignored in much of the
literature. Finally, the ultimate usefulness of our risk-based approach lies in its ability
to measure the efficacy of risk management options. That is, investments in port
protection (e.g., security, system hardening) may result in reduced initial effects of a
disruption, and investments in preparedness (e.g., contingency routing options) may
result in reduced downtime of a port. The approach described here is also useful
to measure the interdependent and inter-regional benefit of implementing these risk
management investments. Although this case study has been descriptive in nature,
prescriptive uses of the model may be more useful and powerful.
Several opportunities for further research will be explored, including relaxing the
equilibrium assumption of the MRIIM to include a dynamic analysis of inoperability
and economic losses, and exploring more complex scenarios of port disruptions that
highlight the realistic nature of man-made attacks, accidents, and natural disasters.
173
Chapter 7
Concluding Remarks
7.1 Summary and Conclusion
The overriding theme of this dissertation was to develop a static and dynamic re-
silience estimation scheme for interdependent sectors of national importance (DHS.,
2009). To this end a methodology was constructed using the interdependent risk
input-output models (Haimes & Jiang, 2001; Santos, 2006), which have been derived
from economic input-output data and models (Leontief, 1966; Miller & Blair, 2009).
The summary and outtakes from the research presented here are as follows:
1. An analysis of the interdependency models used in the study, with emphasis
on the mathematical feasibility of these models, was presented in Chapter 2.
Using eigenvalue analysis and convergence criteria rules, the stability criteria
was developed for a convergent feasible solution of the dynamic models. The
real world importance of the terms in the interdependency models were related
to mathematical constructs, which helps establish certain guidelines for esti-
mating or choosing the possible values of model parameters for practical and
mathematical convenience. Such properties are for providing a prescription for
choosing possible values for data or parameters, where data is sparse or there
is no prior knowledge about the possible parameter values, and hence a design
or expert-based judgement is required.
2. Chapter 3 presented resilience estimation models for static and dynamic sys-
tems. It was proposed that static resilience strengthening can be planned
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through a risk management problem to reduce the demand perturbation ef-
fects for the interdependent systems, thereby lowering the inoperability effects
of the disruptions. A general risk policy planning framework geared towards
reducing the demand perturbations was presented. The guiding objective of
the planning decision was the preference to lower the total economic losses for
the entire economy. The solution of the risk management problem showed the
effectiveness of budget allocation and the limit beyond which there is no need
to allocate more budget. Hence a useful optimization based methodology was
suggested for providing planners with simple metrics, and a prescription for
strengthening static resilience in an interdependent economy.
3. Also in Chapter 3 dynamic resilience concepts were discussed. The lack of inter-
dependent dynamic resilience estimation methods in the dynamic model domain
motivated the formulation of metrics that describe resilience and provide a holis-
tic resilience construct through the dynamic model. Resilience was constructed
on the basis of the metrics (i) average sector level of functionality/operability,
(ii) maximum inoperability/loss of functionality, and (iii) time to recovery from
disruptions. Therefore, a complete picture for resilience estimation for dynamic
systems was generated based on the notion that resilience should indicate the
ability to maintain functionality and a speed to recovery.
4. The usefulness of generating a trio of resilience metrics for the dynamic system
behavior helped in developing a decision-space that had both descriptive and
prescriptive uses in resilience decision-making. The tradeoffs between the choice
of resilience planning options which are reflected through the values taken by
the metrics provides valuable insights into interdependent resilience planning.
5. An adaptive scheme for resilience estimation and dynamic model behavior was
also provided in Chapter 3. This is a natural extension of the dynamic risk
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input-output model, which has been missing from previous research. An adap-
tive model is a better representative of actual recovery behavior because there
are multiple shocks and changing resilience properties that are exhibited by the
system. The resilience metric schemes can be also applied to the adaptive model
behavior.
6. Chapter 4 expanded on the static resilience planning framework of Chapter 3
with emphasis on developing optimization methods that account for uncertain-
ties in the interdependent input-output framework. Such uncertainties produce
varying planning risks some of which would not be captured through the nom-
inal planning strategies. Given that the motivation of the planning strategies
was to guarantee results that consider the maximal effects of the uncertainties,
the solutions should be representative of the worst-case/best-case scenarios in
the planning.
7. The robust formulation highlighted the nature of the uncertainties in data and
event present in the problem. Each data was assumed to be realized within an
interval, which gave rectangle bounded sets. For event uncertainties the intro-
duction of chance constraints meant that due to the uncertainty of the events the
feasibility of the planning constraints was not known with complete certainty.
The limits, which give the bound the probabilities that the constraints are fea-
sible or are violated, show the decision-makers preference and conservatism in
handling the event uncertainty. The robust solutions guaranteed that maximal
worst-case scenarios were generated and for planning this is an important con-
sideration. Overall the robust method is a useful tool for the interdependency
model analysis as the uncertainty sets constructed here can be applied to an
uncertainty analysis of these models.
8. In Chapter 5 the rate parameter of the dynamic risk input-output model was es-
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timated using concepts from dynamic data assimilation methodologies. Though
such methods are available in other research domains their usage in the param-
eter estimation for the dynamic risk input-output model is a novel approach.
Data generation for model calibration was achieved by interpreting the model as
a resilience planning tool. The data was realized by setting performance targets
to meet specific resilience goals. This is a new conceptual approach discussed
here.
9. The parameter estimation problem was solved using a forward sensitivity scheme,
which was based on calculating the sensitivity of the model state to the param-
eter being estimated. This approach has computational and practical relevance.
Computationally sensitivity shows the effect of perturbation of the parameter
on the model state, which translates to the magnitude of the effect on model
state due to the parameter. More sensitivity indicates the parameter is signifi-
cant in predicting the model states. Time evolving sensitivity shows the domain
of analysis where the model does not respond to fluctuations in the parameter
values. For the inverse problem this domain is important because it shows that
the model parameter would not be able to predict the model state properly
within the domain, hence the effect of observations on the model are negligent.
Such consideration can be applied in the planning scheme because it is an indi-
cator of the domain in which the performance targets need to be specified. In
the end a convenient tool for predicting dynamic resilience in interdependent
systems was developed.
10. The port study in Chapter 6 described the interdependent adverse effects of
disruptive events on inter-regional commodity flows resulting from disruptions
at an inland port terminal. This was done by integrating a risk-based Multi-
Regional Inoperability Input-Output Model with models that simulate port
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operations such as commodity arrival, unloading, sorting, and distributing.
The study made several contributions to the homeland security literature in
risk-based decision making for the little-explored, though vital, components of
multi-modal commodity flows. There has been very limited research on inter-
dependency risk analysis, particularly applied to inland waterway disruptions.
Integrating these two research domains helped produce a framework that pro-
vides suitable metrics for risk-based decision making.
7.2 Future directions
There are several avenues of using and expanding the methods developed in this
dissertation. Some of them are discussed below.
1. To begin with the static and dynamic resilience estimations framework needs
to be integrated with the port and waterway network models to provide a real
world application of the concepts presented here. Developing the resilience
models for the port studies would help in testing and refining these models.
2. The robust static resilience optimization formulation can be improved by devel-
oping a more robust formulation for the chance constraint. This can be improved
by developing a better uncertainty guarantee in the chance constraint.
3. The dynamic resilience parameter estimation problem considered here does not
account for uncertainties in the model. There are several developments to the
method if model uncertainties are incorporated. Robust concepts can be devel-
oped in similar fashion to the methodology presented for the static problem.
4. The port study can be further extended to include other network- and facility-
specific details into the model. Uncertainties in analysis have not been dis-
cussed here and need a detailed investigation for a robust risk assessment and
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planning. Overall, this work serves as an initial blueprint for further complex
multi-regional interdependent risk analysis along inland waterways.
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